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The Journal of the Maryland Historical Society
Mayor William Donald Schaefer (1921–2011) jumped into the seal pool of the unfinished National Aquarium on August 8, 1981, capturing nationwide attention. Born, raised, and educated in Baltimore, Schaefer first won election to public office in 1955, a seat on the City Council that served as the stepping stone to council president, mayor, governor, and then state comptroller. The public learned of his death on Monday, August 15, 2011, and national news anchors, many of them veteran reporters who had followed Schaefer’s successful and sometimes controversial career, quickly picked up the story. All commended the former mayor’s vision for his city and the tenacity with which he drove the plan to an inspiring reality—Harborplace, the centerpiece that transformed the core of a once prosperous industrial hub from a dank and decaying wasteland on the rim of the harbor into a glittering get-away for tourists and locals seeking nearby diversions. Although critics noted that the urban renaissance did not solve many of the city’s ongoing problems such as chronic drug use and the decline of a school system that had once been a national model, none could deny Schaefer’s unwavering commitment to the city he loved and the state he served. In all, William Donald Schaefer forged a career that left a lasting footprint on Maryland’s political landscape. (Maryland State Archives.)
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of the Maryland Historical Society

The Maryland Historical Society (MdHS) is committed to publishing the finest new work on Maryland history. In late 2005, the Publications Committee, with the advice and support of the development staff, launched the Friends of the Press, an effort dedicated to raising money used solely for bringing new titles into print. Response has been enthusiastic and generous and we thank you.

Our next major project (working title: A Photographic History of Maryland in the Civil War) is planned for spring 2012. Ross Kelbaugh, veteran collector and interpreter, has assembled the largest private collection of Maryland Civil War photographs and related material in the state, many of which will be published here for the first time. Betsy Bonaparte, fourth of the Friends of the Press titles, is selling well, continuing the Maryland Historical Society’s long tradition of bringing forth the best new Maryland history.

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In Slavery and in Freedom: Oliver C. Gilbert and Edwin Warfield Sr.

JODY R. FERNALD

Oliver Gilbert went shopping for a new suit at Rogers, Peet & Co. on Broadway in New York City in 1884. A music teacher and father of five, he had not been in the habit of shopping for expensive clothing. For this special occasion, he needed gentleman’s attire, including a hat and a silk umbrella. Rogers, Peet advertised wise counsel for occasions such as courtship or marriage. Full dress suits, hats, shoes, and vests could all be purchased to create a complete outfit.1 Gilbert sought the complete look. Every detail had to be perfect, for he was preparing to visit his Maryland past. Thirty-six years had gone by since he had escaped at age sixteen from forced service to the Watkins family near Clarksville.

In 1884, Gilbert was living on North Twentieth Street in Philadelphia with his wife and children.2 His life had been far different from those of the white tradesmen who were his neighbors. Born Oliver Cromwell Kelly about 1832 to Cynthia Snowden, a slave, he and his siblings had become the servants of a Revolutionary War hero, Col. Gassaway Watkins, on his plantation—Walnut Grove—near Clarksville. Gilbert’s father was Joseph Kelly, a free black from the nearby town of Owingsville, Maryland. At Watkins’s death in 1840, Gilbert and his immediate family had been dispersed among Watkins’s heirs. Gilbert became a servant to Watkins’s daughter Margaret, who had married Albert Warfield. Because Margaret Watkins Warfield had a surplus of servants, she gave Oliver Gilbert to her brother, Dr. William W. Watkins, who lived at Richland, nearby.

After several unsuccessful attempts, Gilbert fled Richland in 1848 with a small group of slaves. In a state where nearby urban employment, easy access to shipping, close proximity to Pennsylvania abolitionists, and a large free black population, such a move was possible.3 The slaves slipped away from a St. James Parish camp meeting, then Gilbert made his way from Maryland into Pennsylvania, eluding capture several times along the way. In Pennsylvania he and one of his brothers adopted the surname Gilbert after Amos Gilbert, an antislavery activist in Lancaster. In 1849 he found work as a waiter on the steamboat Penobscot, running from Philadelphia to New

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York, but in the spring of 1850 he moved to the resort city of Cape May, New Jersey, to become a waiter at the Columbia House. Later he moved to New York, where he worked as a waiter in the Hotel Earle until he saw his former master's brother enter the hotel. Fearing he might be captured and returned to slavery, Gilbert moved on to Boston and joined that city's population of fugitive slaves.  

Oliver Gilbert might have remained longer in Boston had the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 not been passed. As slave catchers came to Boston with the law on their side, African Americans in the city began to look for safer shelter. After the arrest of fugitive slave Shadrach Minkins in February 1851, Gilbert, with the help of the Boston Vigilance Committee, left for Halifax, Nova Scotia, intent upon sailing to England, but changed his mind after a terrible storm at sea. He then returned to Boston, and was there only briefly when, on April 12, 1851, Thomas Sims was captured and returned to slavery. At that point, again with the help of the vigilance committee, he traveled to Lee, New Hampshire, with a letter of introduction from William Lloyd Garrison to the Cartland family.

After two years in New Hampshire, Gilbert briefly returned to Massachusetts before moving west to Rochester, New York, the home of Frederick Douglass, who had escaped from slavery on Maryland's Eastern Shore in 1838. In 1854 Gilbert gave a speech at Rochester's Zion Church about the slave hunt in Boston. The following year, he was accused of soliciting money for fugitive slaves on the streets of Rochester and pocketing it himself, an accusation that recurred six months later. Gilbert made no mention of this activity in his memoir or his letters, but he might have viewed it as a necessary means of survival. The following year Gilbert moved to Troy, New York, where again he was accused of begging. An acquaintance, black abolitionist William J. Watkins Jr., excoriated him in Frederick Douglass' Paper as damaging the antislavery movement with his behavior, and expressed his fear that Gilbert would end up in the state prison. Born in Baltimore to free parents, Watkins had never been enslaved, so he had a less-than-full understanding of what the institution might do to an individual.

Gilbert left Troy for another resort city, Saratoga Springs, where he found legitimate work in a hotel. While there he married and began a family. He also corresponded with William Lloyd Garrison and actively promoted the advancement of his peers by serving as temporary secretary of the New York State Colored Labor Convention in 1870, and as a member of the executive committee of the state labor union. He took his wife and children to the Philadelphia Centennial celebration in 1876 and by 1880 had moved the family to Philadelphia, where he died in 1912. Throughout his life Gilbert gave lectures about his own experiences as a slave and the future of his race, and performed with his family, the Gilbert Family Jubilee Singers, at churches and opera houses throughout the Northeast.
Back to the Past

In 1876, Gilbert had sent a copy of the *Progressive American* to Dr. William W. Watkins, his former master, whom he had not seen since 1848. Gilbert sent the newspaper because it contained his letter about organizing the “colored” voters of New York, one of several projects to which he devoted his efforts in middle life. The reply came in the form of a letter written by Watkins’s son, because the elderly Watkins was in ill health. “Father told me to say that he was much gratified to learn that you still remember him and how well you must have educated yourself to have been able to have written such a fine letter,” J. S. Watkins wrote, “which only shows what industry and perseverance will accomplish. He also says should you sometime visit Maryland, you surely must come to the place and see him.”

Eight years later, Gilbert accepted Watkins’s invitation to visit, although his former master had since died. Having already made an impression with his literacy, Gilbert had plans to expand that impression on his former owner’s family. Gilbert later wrote in his memoir:

> Going back to Dixie after an absence of thirty years to the place where I was born. . . . When I left there I was very coarsely dressed in rags. Now that I am a freeman, I want those who are still at the old home, let them see what freedom has done for me. I went to Rogers and Petes great clothing house, Broadway and Houston Sts and bought myself a fine suit of clothes. I went to Dunlap, the hatter, near Union Square and bought a bell crown hat and a 26 inch silk umbrella. When I arrived at Broad Street station Philadelphia, I found that I still lacked something in the way of a complete outfit. It was a Cabber or handbag. I was bound to go looking all night to let the Maryland-
ers see what freedom had done for me. So, while waiting for a 6 o’clock train to Baltimore, I went to Wannamaker’s and bought the desired articles. My family departed me at the depot and went uptown to our home 1954 N. 20th Street and away I went for Baltimore, where I arrived about 9 o’clock p.m. I spent the Sabbath in Baltimore with some of my relatives.\textsuperscript{12}

In middle age with a family of his own, Oliver Gilbert knew exactly what he hoped to accomplish in this visit. He approached it with a spirit of redemption, a sense of curiosity, a remembrance of childhood attachments, and complicated feelings for the families who had enslaved his own for several generations. He was determined to establish himself as a free man of value and status in the eyes of his enslavers, even if that status was partial fiction. His memoir continued:

On Monday, March 17, St. Patrick’s Day, I left on the Baltimore and Ohio RR for Ellicot City. When I arrived there it was raining and I was some ten miles or more from the Old Plantation. How to get there was the question. If I undertook to walk it would look bad. It would show no improvement on my side, and besides, it might spoil my fine suit of clothes and my patent leather shoes walking in the mud. So, I was puzzled for a time what to do. Finally, I put on a bold front and inquired for a first class livery. I was told that a man by the name of Kaiser kept the best. I went to his stable and introduced myself as Prof. O. C. Gilbert of Philadelphia, and that I wished to obtain a turn out or a carriage to go out to Walnut Grove, the old Col. Watkins Plantation. He said he could accommodate me. I saw from his manner of talk that he was a pleasant German. I told him I wanted the finest team he had in livery, and that I wanted a span of horses and a coachman and that I would like, if possible, a white man. I had my reasons for such a request. I wanted to see how it would look down in Maryland, a white man acting as a coachman for a black man. A fine looking young German was selected and the turnout was superb. The silver mounted horses and carriage shone so bright you could see your face in it. When I entered the carriage, I could hardly believe my own eyes. When I sat down on those soft cushions they were so soft I kept sinking down and sinking down. I said to myself, this is you, Gilbert, back in old Maryland seated in this fine vehicle, and with supreme reflection and satisfaction I sat back and gave directions to the coachman, how to reach the Old Home. As we passed along Montgomery Turnpike, the colored people as well as the whites looked with great astonishment. You could hear some of them say I wonder who he is. He must be Fred Douglass or a Bishop. I enjoyed it hugely. We went by the way of Clarksville. The Watkins Post Office address was 3 miles away. I arrived at Walnut Grove. There stood the immense Walnut Tree on the fine lawn and where the gate once hung, still stands the
old Locust Tree, but none is there now. No white wash pail fence greeted my eyes. Old things seem to have passed away, all things had become new. I called to the coachman to stop. I got out of the carriage and walked up to the front door. Not as a poor, old slave expecting 9 & 30 lashes, but as a man. I rapped on the door soon an aged white man came to the door.”

The white man who came to the door was John S. Watkins, son of Col. Gassaway Watkins. The younger Watkins, who had inherited Walnut Grove, was described as “genial, hospitable, and popular” in family records. His sister spoke with Gilbert, remembering his mother and all of the children, and Watkins, who had been a state senator from Howard County at the beginning of the Civil War, invited him to stay for dinner. Gilbert had staged his display to impress and had not considered the possibility of an extended visit and a dinner invitation. “Something I was not dreaming of. I did not know where they wanted to put me to eat. I was afraid they might send me to the kitchen and if they did, it would take down all of my style. So I politely declined by saying my coachman was waiting for me now.” In fact, Gilbert had never had much money, he had invested much in this visit, and he was not about to sacrifice the effect he had so expensively created.

Still uncertain about his current relationship with his former enslavers, Gilbert made his excuses and moved on to locate other Watkins family members nearby. As household servants, the members of Oliver Gilbert’s immediate family had known and interacted more closely with the white family than they would have had they been agricultural slaves. Their psychological entanglements were more complex. Gilbert knew where he stood with former slaves, but he had relationships to alter with white slaveholders. He had returned to Maryland not to converse with former slaves and servants but to meet former slaveholders on equal ground. At the courthouse, he found Dr. Lewis Watkins, clerk of the court and another son of his former master; he met Lewis Watkins’s son, and then visited Lewis’s sister, Mrs. Dorsey, whose maid wanted him to enter by the back door. Gilbert insisted on the front entrance.

Gilbert’s visit to Maryland resulted in a decade-long exchange of letters with Governor Edwin Warfield Sr., grandson of Col. Gassaway Watkins and nephew of Dr. William Watkins. To date no evidence has been found that Gilbert used his return to Maryland as the subject of any speaking engagements, although he did claim to praise the Warfields and Watkinses in his “public engagements.” He would return again, and these visits to Maryland formed part of Gilbert’s series of reunions with people from his past at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1898, he took one of his sons to visit the Cartland family of Lee, New Hampshire, who had taken him in forty-five years earlier. He also spoke with M. M. Fisher, a Massachusetts abolitionist who contributed to Prof. Wilbur Siebert’s extensive research about the Underground Railroad. After performing at a concert in Orchestra Hall in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1880, he told the story of his escape from slavery and mentioned that Thaddeus
Stevens had been one of the men who had helped him in Lancaster. Evidently, Gilbert was trying to ensure his place in the historical record of the Underground Railroad. His return visit to Maryland figured prominently in his memoir, which he probably wrote early in the twentieth century from motives that appear to have been both personal and financial, in that they were intended for future publication.

The exchange of letters between Gilbert and Edwin Warfield reveals much about the skills Oliver Gilbert acquired in slavery and honed in freedom, and about an old southern slaveholding family’s sense of identity. His worries about status aside, Oliver Gilbert held his own in conversation with the man who would become governor of Maryland. Warfield had been a child when Gilbert escaped from slavery. Definitions of liberty, family, childhood attachments, attitudes about race and identity, and mutual recognition of a sense of obligation on the part of the slaveholder—all are revealed in this correspondence.

Oliver Gilbert spent his post-slavery life lecturing, writing, organizing, and singing against slavery. He remained driven by the “past, present, and future of his race.” He looked toward a new future, a vision he shared with fellow escaped slave Frederick Douglass, of a redefined nation. But he was intelligent and experienced enough to know that he would have to work for it. On the other hand, Edwin Warfield Sr. spent his adulthood focused on the veneration of his family’s past: benevolent slaveholding, Revolutionary War ancestry, political prowess, and Confederate service. Warfield saw a future for himself based only on the past, and it turned out that he, too, would have to work to maintain that vision. The contradictions he embraced in advocating liberty for some at the expense of others, and his limited perspective on the lives of those whom his family had enslaved, set him apart from Oliver Gilbert in a number of ways. Each man’s identity was determined and challenged by his relationship with the other.

It is not known if Gilbert had any contact with his former master’s family in the twelve years between his visit to Walnut Grove in 1884, and his first letter to Edwin Warfield, which was dated October 10, 1896, and which Warfield answered five days later. Gilbert’s letter has been lost, but, with the assistance of Aunt Caroline Watkins, Warfield replied with information about Gilbert’s early life. The stories included the death of Gilbert’s grandmother, Rachel Snowden, by lightning as she sat in the chimney corner at Richland.

The differences between this free black man and this former slaveholder revealed themselves almost immediately. Gilbert had sent Warfield a program from a performance of his Gilbert Family Jubilee Singers, and Warfield promised to attend a concert should one take place in Baltimore. To Warfield, the Gilbert Family Singers were a “glee club.” Newspaper accounts reported that they sang “plantation
songs.” To the Gilberts, their music was a form of social activism. Warfield ended by praising Gilbert’s family in Maryland as of “honest upright stock” and “connected to quite a number of leading colored people in our county.” He meant they were formerly enslaved people who were a credit to their masters, slaves who reinforced their masters’ self-images. However, Warfield could not ignore the fact that Gilbert took his own freedom and challenged Warfield’s identity in the process.

Liberty

Edwin Warfield Sr., described in newspaper accounts and in family histories as social, sentimental, domestic, and always pleasantly interested in the past, held his Revolutionary War associations dear. A devoted Democrat, he hosted political soirees and made speeches on request. His political affiliations led to his holding the offices of register of wills, state senator, surveyor of the Port of Baltimore, delegate to the National Democratic Committee, and, in 1903, the governorship. He was a founder of an insurance company and a bank. Warfield was president of the National Congress of the Sons of the American Revolution and served six terms as president of the Maryland Historical Society. He was a man of means, whose personal and family power had originated before Emancipation. The Warfield family heritage included the institution of slavery, but they preferred to see themselves as kind and gracious masters caught up in a system beyond their control.

Aware that slavery was “inconsistent with the character of our republican institutions,” the Warfields of the early twentieth century recast their past to be as benign as possible. Warfield’s maternal grandfather, Gassaway Watkins, held twenty-four slaves in 1840, the year he died. Warfield’s uncle, Dr. William Watkins, owned six slaves of various ages and genders in 1850, when he was seventy. Edwin Warfield knew life only in the context of slaveholding. Liberty for some and slavery for others coexisted in Warfield’s Maryland. More than just a financial investment, slaveholding remained part of Edwin Warfield’s culture, and his family employed household help of color long after slavery ended (two white servants and four black servants in 1900).

Warfield’s understanding of “liberty” assumed a hierarchical social structure, with slaves or servants forming the lower tier, and he continued throughout his life to master the lives of others. As a politician, Warfield placed himself at the center of Maryland’s political responses to the Civil War. The “Negro problem” recurred throughout his career in Maryland politics, particularly in his 1903 run for governor.

During the Civil War, Maryland assumed the ambiguous stance of the border states: aligned with the Union, but expecting life to continue after hostilities ceased as it had been before the war. Maryland slaveholders clung to the belief that the war was about disunion, not slavery. After President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 freed the slaves in Confederate states but not in the Union state of Maryland, the temporarily Unionist-controlled (later Republican) legislature in 1864
passed a new constitution that outlawed slavery in the state. Many of Maryland’s slaves had already escaped and sought protection with the Union army. “Had it not been for ballots cast by soldiers in the field—in a procedure that many considered irregular—the inevitable would have failed to muster a majority in Maryland.”27 On November 1, 1864, Maryland’s new constitution took effect, replacing its constitution of 1850, which had forbidden passage of “any law abolishing the relation of master or slave, as it now exists in this State.”28 But Maryland’s Union party were in control only briefly, and after the war Republicans continued to look to black voter support as a means of regaining some of that power, something they accomplished—again only briefly—in 1895.29

National support for Reconstruction waned quickly. Less than three years after the state constitution of 1864 went into effect, Maryland adopted its fourth constitution, which is still in effect today, although it has been amended over the years. The “Negro” of Maryland would not vote until the congressional election of 1870, after the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—unanimously rejected by the Maryland legislature—outlawed discrimination in voting based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.30

By the late nineteenth century, bitter factional fighting within and between political parties in Maryland continued, with disfranchisement of the “Negro” taking center stage in the debate. Blacks in Maryland did not remain silent.31 The possibilities inherent in a black electorate loomed as a threat to many of the state’s white politicians, and several unsuccessful attempts were made to disfranchise black voters in Maryland over the first decade of the twentieth century. At a Baltimore rally of Democrats in 1899, during his unsuccessful first run for governor, Warfield was quoted as fearing the 39,120 black voters could march to the polls and “slaughter” the white vote. He said in an election speech of 1903, “I do not want to be Governor of this State unless I am elected to that high office by a majority of the white voters of Maryland. This election is a contest for the supremacy of the white race in Maryland. . . . The elevation of the negro is a well-nigh hopeless task, so long as they exercise like dumb driven cattle, solidly and without intelligence or reason, their right of suffrage as a weapon of offense against the Democratic party, directed and guided by Republican politicians.”32 Warfield called for a Democratic vote in order for whites to retain control.33

A complete and immediate end to slavery in Maryland affected more than the enslaved, particularly in the southern counties and on the Western Shore, where slaves had lived in greater numbers. In his 1903 run for governor, according to the Baltimore Sun, Warfield “brought an appeal from the women of Southern Maryland, that the state go Democratic and give them a feeling of safety from the negro population.”34 Fears of sexual and other forms of violence by former slaves toward whites continued to drive a political movement to disfranchise black voters, and still drove white southerners’ understanding of liberty as endangered by the prospective
political power of those they had once dominated. Emancipation ruptured a social and economic structure that supported the superiority of wealthy slaveholders over other whites as well as over blacks enslaved and free. Changing the old ways promised to be politically, physically, and socially threatening for former slaveholders, while holding the only hope for blacks in Maryland. Politics, racism, and an intense desire on the part of former slaveholders to regain their prewar power had forged a powerful movement. Edwin Warfield participated fully in that movement as he corresponded politely and warmly with Oliver C. Gilbert, organizer of “colored” laborers and “colored” voters.

Warfield explained to Gilbert that the Warfields and the Watkinses were not responsible for slavery, an opinion common among other slaveholding families. Edwin Warfield’s hierarchical concept of liberty obligated him to see his slaves as humans but with a separate place in “God’s scheme.” The white man’s liberty remained his top priority. In Warfield’s recollection, Oliver Gilbert ran away because “the longing for freedom became so intense in him that he could not resist the temptation, and that he did not run away because of bad treatment, but was, on the contrary, kindly treated.” Warfield seemed oblivious to the inherent contradictions in his position, although his continued correspondence with his family’s former slaves—Oliver Gilbert was not the only former slave with whom Warfield remained in contact—betrays the complexity of his feelings. Gilbert’s escape challenged everything Warfield believed about himself and his family’s past, but in order to preserve his sense of his own identity he had to welcome Oliver Gilbert back as only a benevolent slaveholder would.

Oliver Gilbert quite naturally held a different view of liberty. Warfield’s maternal grandfather, Gassaway Watkins, had reveled in his Revolutionary War service to preserve the liberties of American colonists from British interference. Gilbert had listened to those stories as a child servant and now told Warfield, “I . . . heard the Colonel, time and time again, give his thrilling reminiscences of the daring and bloody conflicts he had in the Revolutionary struggle,” adding, “Perhaps he thought me too ignorant to understand his talk.” Gilbert agreed that he had been relatively well treated, but he always knew that his situation was precarious: He could have been sold by the Watkins family at any time, and the threat of physical punishment was a fact of life. Interestingly, he did not repeat to Warfield the allegations made in his memoir of his physical and psychological punishment at the hands of the Watkins family. In fact, throughout this correspondence, Gilbert repeatedly complimented Warfield and mentioned little that was negative about his early life in slavery. Gilbert knew he had to act respectfully with Warfield in order to continue this conversation, from which he stood to benefit. So he let Warfield repeat his version of the family’s humane treatment of its slaves without much contradiction. He did, however, describe the overwhelming fear of being sold South. On that point Gilbert did not compromise.
The chances that members of Gilbert’s family would be sold South increased as time passed. On its Western Shore, Maryland’s fertile farm lands had once produced bumper crops of tobacco, so much so that the land eventually grew depleted. Less labor-intensive crops supplanted tobacco, and large numbers of slaves eventually proved a financial burden to slaveholders. Some slaves were hired out to urban employers to earn money for their masters. Others were sold to slave traders who in turn sold them to larger plantations farther south, where the rise of cotton and sugar plantations paralleled the fall of tobacco production in the eastern states. Being sold South (Gilbert called it being sold to Georgia) was known as a horrible fate because of separation from one’s family and the fear of inhumane treatment. The possibility of being sold to slave traders loomed before Gilbert early on and inspired his escape.40

In a letter to Warfield, Gilbert recalled that a slave trader (probably one Isaac Anderson) once visited the Watkins plantation leading two slaves tied together. William Watkins toyed with the young Gilbert, asking if he wished to go with them. Gilbert replied that he thought his mistress, Dr. Watkins’s wife, could not spare him. In Gilbert’s mind, he had not begged but simply stated his importance to the family. Watkins then told the slave trader that he would not sell Gilbert, his wife’s waiter, but he did sell Gilbert’s cousin William Dorsey, whom they never heard from again. Gilbert was haunted by the image of Dorsey’s free wife Lousie begging them to let her husband go. Warfield said of this incident, “I never heard of Uncle Doctor selling William, and I presume the only reason he did so was because of some insubordination; however, those were the painful things connected with the institution of slavery.”41 The details of this incident as described in Gilbert’s letter vary slightly
from his memoir, but clearly the Watkins family used the threat of selling their slaves South and, on occasion, followed through on the threat. This incident would prove an important crossroads for Oliver Gilbert. It taught him the lifesaving importance of the ability to communicate effectively and the insecurity of his position.

To Oliver Gilbert, liberty would include the ability to profit from his labors, to keep his immediate family together, to live free of prejudice against his race, and to express his own opinions in politics and as a human being. Although he could indeed be slyly manipulative, the evidence indicates he cared deeply what others thought of him, and he struggled with his own feelings of worthiness. Not only did Gilbert want to impress his former masters on his return visit, but he wanted the black people of his former home to mistake him for Frederick Douglass or a bishop. Being Oliver Gilbert was not enough for him. He remained determined to stand as a man among men despite his background in slavery and continually felt compelled to prove his equality in a world dominated by white men. As a former slave, he bore the scars of that institution long past the term of his enslavement.

Family

Edwin Warfield exemplified the evolution of the perception of eighteenth-century slave ownership into a sentimental, “paternal” view of slaveholding in the nineteenth century. As the nineteenth century progressed, sentimentality with regard to slavery tinged much of American culture, not just the South. Wrapped in images of benevolence, generosity, religion, and patriotism, former slaveholding families came to view their past proudly as a service to mankind. The Warfield family forgot not only the details of manumission but also the slave-trading that characterized much of Maryland’s nineteenth-century slavery. Edwin Warfield could not remember his family selling slaves despite Oliver Gilbert’s remembrance of William Dorsey’s fate. Warfield did finally admit that they may have sold the disobedient slaves, but his remembrance would not allow for the harsh realities of a slavery-based economy; only when pressed did he admit that the preservation of order took precedence.

Warfield wrote, “As long as I live I shall always feel a warm affection for all of the colored people who belonged in our family, and my heart goes out to them with the same affection almost that I feel for my own blood and kin.” Warfield’s definition of family expanded enough to include the dependent slaves of his immediate family. The rise of slavery early in the nineteenth century altered the concept of family for many slaveholders of the western Chesapeake. The number of slaves in some slaveholding households increased until they far outnumbered the white family and created a wider hierarchical community, a “landscape” of interrelationships. The workings of an estate depended on large numbers of people all under the guidance and authority of the master. Almost as if gathering his extended family to reminisce, Warfield intended to bring former field and house servants whom his grandfather and father had “endeavored to rear and care for humanely and faithfully” together
with their former masters and mistresses in a formal reunion. Any incidents of ill-
treatment had vanished from the slaveholder’s memory. He had no reason to believe
that his family’s former slaves would not want to reunite with the Warfields.

On Saturday, August 16, 1902, Warfield hosted “Old Home Coming Day” at
Oakdale, the family estate built by his father in 1838. He sent written invitations to
the “colored people” who had been born at Cherry Grove —the home of his paternal
great-grandfather Joshua Warfield—and Oakdale prior to 1862, the year in which they
were “liberated or rather emancipated by President Lincoln.” [Warfield’s memory was
indeed foggy—Lincoln never emancipated Maryland slaves.] A local newspaper’s
account together with Warfield’s own description of the gathering mentioned an
extensive luncheon menu and fond memories of the past. Among the ten survivors,
of the seventy once enslaved who returned for the occasion, Warfield noted discus-
sion of “happy incidents” and “pleasant times.” Warfield’s father Albert has been
described as “one of the largest slave-owners in this section of the state.” The fact
that ten people returned to the old plantation hints at the complex of relationships
between master and slave. The location of their childhood, Oakdale, must have also
rekindled mixed feelings about the Warfields for those ten. Three of them were still
employed at Oakdale at the time of the reunion, and seeing old friends and relatives
may have been the primary motivation for the other seven to return. They may have
felt undeniable attachments to the location and associations of their childhoods and
been influenced by the widespread feeling of sentimentality for the past stirred by the
nation’s centennial celebrations and the revival of rural colonial traditions. The news-
paper account claimed the plantation was “home” to every one of them, including
those who had not been back since emancipation. With no record of their thoughts
and feelings, their voices must remain silent. Oliver Gilbert was not present at the
reunion, whether because he turned down an invitation, was not invited, or could
not attend is not known. He was not born at Oakdale, as were some members of his
extended family, so perhaps he was not invited. Certainly such a setting would have
proved unsettling for a man like Gilbert, who preferred to put his own subordination
in the past in his correspondence with Edwin Warfield. Gilbert’s sister Betty’s sons,
Remus and Warner Cooke, did attend; they were born on the Oakdale plantation
after Betty’s marriage to Stephen Cooke in 1855. One newspaper described “old Aunt
Betty,” at age seventy-seven, one of the oldest attendees, as standing “spellbound”
before a portrait of Albert Warfield. Twice Oliver Gilbert asked Warfield for a copy
of the photograph of the reunion, which had been posed before the servants’ quarters
at Oakdale. Gilbert neglected to specify whether he wanted the photograph for the
image of his family members, or of Warfield, or perhaps for both reasons.

Gilbert rarely mentioned his relatives who remained in Maryland, although he
wrote frequently about his immediate family in Philadelphia. It could be that he
tailored his comments in his memoir and in his letters to the white audience of his
imagination. Perhaps discussion of his extended family in Maryland would have
reminded him of a life he preferred to rise above. While the institution of slavery may have expanded Warfield’s ideas about family, its repercussions apparently restricted Oliver Gilbert from close relationships with some of his own relatives.

Slavery separated families, but escape from slavery often did the same. Though some of Gilbert’s siblings remained enslaved in Maryland, many had escaped. As late as 1870, Gilbert’s mother “Sinthey” lived in Howard County with her second husband John Brook. Gilbert’s sister Betty and her husband lived next to them. His brothers Remus and Reuben, and his sister Sarah, had all escaped before he did. Reuben had settled in New Brunswick, Canada. Gilbert heard at one point that Sarah was in Massachusetts at the same time he was in New Hampshire. We do not know if they ever reunited. Gilbert’s sister Isabella reportedly escaped with the assistance of William Lloyd Garrison’s connections in Maryland, although she eventually returned to Maryland in freedom.52 Gilbert’s half-sister Harriet remained in Maryland with family as did many other extended family members. 53 Gilbert lived in New York State from the mid-1850s through the 1870s. He had married and was building a family of his own. Maria, Gilbert’s wife, is rarely mentioned specifically in his writings, although he frequently promoted the Gilbert Family Jubilee Singers. Maria, intelligent and supportive, transcribed his memoir and wrote one of their family’s last letters to Edwin Warfield.54

If Oliver Gilbert felt a sense of kinship with any of the Watkins/Warfield family, he remembered the women with the most pleasant associations. Although he may have been connected by blood to the Watkins men, Gilbert remembered Margaret Watkins Warfield more fondly. He stated “without flattery” that he might have remained in slavery until “Lincoln’s emancipation” had he been allowed to stay with her. Women slaveholders, particularly those subjugated by a patriarch, often made some connection with their enslaved as people, although they too were caught up in the system. Gilbert was only eight years old when he was moved into Margaret Warfield’s household while his mother remained behind. His memoir details the sympathy and kindness of the Watkins women toward their slaves, including William Watkins’s young sister’s reassurance to Gilbert’s mother that her son Remus had not been captured in his escape attempt. Dr. Watkins had told them Remus had been caught and “sold to Georgia,” even though it was apparently not true. This young woman counteracted the psychological torment inflicted by her brother, but feared for her own safety in doing so. Owning slaves freed white women from many of the tasks of running a household to devote themselves to the human interactions expected in an ideal family environment, but women remained as complicit in the business of slavery as their husbands and fathers. Oliver Gilbert may have been fond of Margaret Warfield, but she received him as property and gave him as property to her brother, a man who treated his slaves less than kindly.55

Aside from the threat of being sold, Gilbert recognized in his correspondence the fair treatment extended him by his owners, although doing so may have been
partly a means of manipulating Warfield. Gilbert did feel some connection to Walnut Grove, simply because, for better or for worse, those slaveholding families belonged to his childhood. Perhaps because he had been treated better, Gilbert did not exhibit the overt bitterness of Frederick Douglass toward his old master, or perhaps Gilbert used his bitterness in more subtle ways to inform his actions. Ever conscious of his own status as a free man, Gilbert maintained a gentlemanly yet firm communication with the masters and mistresses of his past. What was at work beneath that gentlemanly veneer is open to speculation.

Race

Oliver Gilbert and Edwin Warfield Sr. did eventually meet, as described in Warfield’s dictated account of a visit from Gilbert on February 4, 1908. Warfield praised Gilbert for his musical talent and his children, who had become the Gilbert Jubilee Singers. Indeed, Warfield delighted in the visit. He wrote:

Your call gave me great pleasure, and I shall always cherish the memory of it. I am very proud of the fact that you and your children have been making such an honorable record in life, because it bears out what I have always asserted, that the relation existing between the master and his servants in the old days was one of affection and loyalty. Your bearing was just as I wanted it to be, that of a man who was not ashamed of his parentage and early environment and one who realized that he had an honored self respecting ancestry.

In 1908, after a hiatus of several years, the exchange of letters between the two men resumed shortly after news of their meeting had spread through two Maryland newspapers. It was the two newspaper accounts, one original to the Sun and reprinted in the Philadelphia Record, and another article in the American, that brought Gilbert and Warfield to the uncomfortable subject of race. The most blatantly racist article, published in the Sun, was entitled “Back to Massa Edwin.” Particularly hurtful to Gilbert because of its caricature of him as a shuffling old man with a pronounced dialect deferring to his master, this article was also printed in Philadelphia where Gilbert lived. Whether the reprint was intended to hurt Gilbert in his hometown the record may never show, but Gilbert confronted Warfield with it almost immediately. In a letter dated February 13, 1908, he told Warfield that he had received a copy of the Baltimore American article, which he assumed Warfield had sent to him. He noted that he also had seen the article from the Sun reprinted in Philadelphia, its offensive headline set in capital letters. Gilbert said that although the reporter may have been trying to be witty and funny, “the day for the educated Negro, though once a slave, to use such language has passed and we don’t do very much reckoning up this way.” Gilbert did not blame Warfield for the article in the Sun; he had “too much respect” for the Warfield family to think that
they could possibly ridicule someone who had served their family, and he knew “the good feelings that you entertain toward the Negroes of Maryland especially those that were once in your family.” Did Gilbert know of Warfield’s white supremacist views, and were his comments sarcastic? Or did he really mean what he said? Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. Warfield did feel “kindly” toward those who had been enslaved and were “part of” his own family, but a larger conviction of racial equality never entered his thinking.

Warfield took no responsibility for the article. “I am glad that you received the newspaper clipping from the American which I sent you,” he wrote.

I was pained at the manner in which the facts were misrepresented in the other article to which you refer. The young man who wrote the story was unfamiliar with the conditions, and his negro dialect was anything but perfect. He made a mistake in writing in the vein that he did, and I think he realized the fact. I furnished him a copy of the data I dictated to my secretary in your presence, and he drew very largely upon his imagination.60

Warfield considered as minor an incident that Gilbert took as a major assault on his dignity as a man and on the people of his race. In writing his memoir, Gilbert had reverted to dialect only when recreating his enslavement and escape; he used no dialect in discussing his life as a free man. A newspaper reporter characterizing him by dialect and submission in effect denied everything Gilbert had accomplished as a free man, an antislavery lecturer, and a political activist for men of color. In refuting the newspaper account, Gilbert wrote to Warfield of the visit with his own sort of condescension:

Returning from Washington where I had been and called on the President, I concluded not to slight you. I did not slip by the door minder to enter your office. I handed him my card and he asked me in, and showed me a seat, as he would any other man. I did not call for the purpose of rekindling the old feelings of ante bellum days. Old things have passed away, and all things have become new. I called because I knew you to be friendly to the colored race and in my public speeches, I have had occasion to say a good word for you and your father’s family.61

Therein was the chasm between Gilbert and Warfield: Gilbert in word and action continually affirmed his status in his new life as a free man, while Edwin Warfield never moved on from his experiences based on the institution of slavery.

Obligation

Relationships within the system of slavery were never simple, and that which
existed between Oliver Gilbert and Edwin Warfield Sr. retained that complexity after
the institution had died. Although Gilbert sought to move beyond his previous life,
hel evidently believed that former slaveholders remained obligated to their former
servants, and he used his considerable talents to make that point. In a letter to Warf-
field dated November 29, 1910, Gilbert began one of his most polished performances,
addressing Warfield as “Dear Sir and Friend.” Gilbert said his family had been ill
but had recently recovered. “If I live to see the 13th of Dec. I will have been married
50 years a Golden Wedding. Think of it Governor. I would love dearly if you would
not consider it presumptuous on my part to ask you to send a present of some kind
in remembrance of the Warfields and Watkins family to a former servant to both.
I hear of your good deeds as a philanthropist . . . through a source of my relatives
near the old home in Howard Co. who like myself hold you and your family in high
esteem.” He had, he claimed, never failed to talk about the good deeds of the “South-
ern White People” and “what you have done for our unfortunate race.” Claiming to
be of “strictly temperate habits,” Gilbert assured Warfield that, if he cared to make
a donation, it would be greatly appreciated and not wasted by “your Mother’s and
Grandfather’s old servant.”62 This is the Oliver Gilbert who prided himself in his
own accomplishments and independence, but who compromised that independence
several times when he solicited the assistance of others. As it happened, Gilbert was
once more desperate, just as he had been in New York when accused of begging.
He was elderly and ailing with a wife and son whom he could not support. There
were medical bills to be paid. When he had no resources, Gilbert used his creativity
and intelligence to do whatever he deemed necessary to survive. His escape from
slavery would not have been possible without that instinct for survival. Cleverly,
Gilbert appealed directly to Warfield’s pride in his benevolence and sense of fam-
ily honor. In a later letter, he stressed to Warfield that he had “little of this world’s
goods, having devoted the best part of my life working for the progress of my race.”63
Warfield sent a check for ten dollars, but Gilbert had played his last act. In a final
letter, Gilbert’s widow Maria thanked Warfield as she notified him of her husband’s
death. On July 14, 1912, Gilbert’s son Leon also thanked Warfield but requested that
he send a replacement check made out to his mother since she could not cash one
written to her deceased husband. The money, he added, would help with Gilbert’s
medical and funeral expenses.64

The Legacy of Walnut Grove

Toward the end of Oliver Gilbert’s life, Edwin Warfield wrote to him, “I expect I shall
have to bring you back to Walnut Grove, and let you end your days in peace and
quietude where you were born.”65 Gilbert never lived to read those words, but ending
his days at Walnut Grove would not have been as peaceful for him as it would have
been for Edwin Warfield. Clearly Warfield had no concept of the man Oliver Gilbert
had become or the vision Gilbert held so dear. Warfield’s Walnut Grove was not the
Walnut Grove of its enslaved people. Although their lives intersected, their stories differed. In 2011, the house still stands in Ellicott City, but its complex history has been simplified as it is reinterpreted centuries later. Visitors to the 2009 Decorator Show House in Ellicott City could pay to explore the house to benefit the preservation of historic sites in the area. The preservationist organization Historic Ellicott City, Inc., the sponsor of the event, described the house as built around 1780, . . . once the home of Colonel Gassaway Watkins, of the Army of the Revolution. The site overlooks some of the most beautiful farmland in Maryland. Located in Ellicott City, near Clarksville, the impressive stone building offers the designers such features as rich moldings, large fireplaces and beautiful hardwood floors.  

Walnut Grove knows stories beyond those of architectural refinement. Within its walls, Maryland’s history of liberty and slavery played itself out in microcosm. Historic Ellicott City was not the first to preserve the story of this house built by a Revolutionary War patriot. When Col. Gassaway Watkins’s son John died in 1894, Edwin Warfield Sr. bought the house and combined it with an adjoining estate to restore Walnut Grove to six hundred acres of “the finest hay lands in Maryland.” With his own reverence for the past, Warfield made improvements to the house that his grandfather had built as “a commodious cottage of stone,” with a walnut tree at the door. In fact some of those impressive architectural features of the house may have been Warfield’s nineteenth-century improvements. Watkins’s Walnut Grove and Warfield’s Walnut Grove will be preserved by Ellicott City. Oliver Gilbert’s Walnut Grove lives in his surviving words.

NOTES

Several years ago, I expected to write an essay focused on Gilbert’s stay with the Cartlands, a Quaker family in Lee, New Hampshire. I had been researching Oliver Gilbert’s life for a decade and thought I had exhausted all possible sources. With his letters to the Cartland family as evidence, I successfully applied to add the Cartland house, where he had stayed, to the National Park Service Network to Freedom. I spoke at local gatherings about him in the context of the Underground Railroad in New Hampshire. Then the unexpected happened, and I was contacted by an antiques dealer from Philadelphia who had read on the Internet of my work on Gilbert. She had just purchased the papers of Oliver Gilbert, including his memoir, and was curious about my research. She generously shared the New Hampshire-related pages of Gilbert’s memoir with me, but we came to no agreement over the disposition of the papers. Months after our correspondence had ceased, a descendant of Oliver Gilbert from the Philadelphia area contacted me. She also found me via the Internet, and I gave her the contact information for the antiques dealer who possessed her family’s papers. The sequence of events almost seemed orchestrated by Oliver Gilbert himself. Much of this essay has been made possible through the generosity of the Gilbert family and that antiques dealer. The details of Oliver Gilbert’s return to Maryland in 1884 come directly from his memoir. The memoir opens with his reconnection with the Watkins family of Howard County.
I would also like to thank Prof. J. William Harris of the University of New Hampshire for his insightful comments and criticisms, and Prof. Emeritus T. Stephen Whitman of Mt. St. Mary's University for sharing his expertise in Maryland history.

4. “Grandfather Gilbert” by Julia Gilbert. This is an unpaginated, shortened version of Gilbert’s memoir copied by a descendant. Gilbert Family Papers, private collection.
6. *Frederick Douglass’s Paper*, June 30, 1854, July 27, 1855, and December 7, 1855. In the July 27, 1855, issue, junior editor William J. Watkins Jr. warned the public against men like Gilbert who used begging as a means of “getting along” and claimed men who preferred begging to work caused “serious damage to the Anti-slavery cause.” Watkins targeted Gilbert again the following December in response to a reader’s complaint about him. Watkins said he had known Gilbert for six years and had reasoned with him but feared Gilbert might end up in the state prison unless he stopped his “thieving career.”
9. *The Progressive American* was an African American newspaper published from 1871 to the 1880s. Based in New York City, it was edited by John J. Freeman, who chaired the Republican Central Committee in New York.
12. Ibid., 1–2. Gilbert was born and spent most of his childhood at Walnut Grove, Col. Gassaway Watkins’s last home. He escaped from Dr. William Watkins, the son of Gassaway Watkins, at his home, Richland, nearby.
13. Ibid., 2–4. Gilbert’s mention of thirty-nine lashes may have referred to the capture and return to slavery of Thomas Sims in Boston in 1851 while Gilbert was there. Sims was said
to have been punished by his master with thirty-nine lashes, a number commonly meted out as punishment.


17. Gilbert to E. Warfield, February 13, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, Warfield Family Papers, Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park. [Hereinafter WFP.]


22. Warfield to Gilbert, February 15, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP; *New Haven Evening Register*, June 16, 1883.

23. Warfield to Gilbert, October 15, 1896, Gilbert Family Papers.


26. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Federal Census of the Population, 1870, Maryland, Howard County, Ellicott City; *Slave Inhabitants in Howard District in the County of Anne Arundel, State of Maryland, . . . 21st day of October, 1850*. U.S. Census, Howard County, Maryland, Election District 4, 1900.


30. Ibid., 20–23.


36. Harris, The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah, 45.


38. Gilbert to Warfield, May 1, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

39. Special thanks to Stephanie Gilbert for pushing me to closely examine Gilbert’s treatment of Warfield. There is sufficient evidence of Gilbert’s ability to cleverly manipulate others, a skill he undoubtably acquired in slavery.

40. See Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the Old South (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) for data on movement of slaves throughout the South.

41. Edwin Warfield Sr. to Gilbert, May 5, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

42. Gilbert to Warfield, May 1, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP. Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground, 24–25.

43. Certainly immigrants, women, and the poor experienced intense discrimination at that time, but slavery robbed its victims in an especially brutal way.


46. Warfield to Gilbert, May 5, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.


48. “At Oakdale Again,” Baltimore Sun, August 17, 1902. See also “Saturday August 16, 1902, Old Home Coming Day,” a handwritten description signed by Warfield, in series 1, box 4, folder 5, WFP. Volume 2 of the Oakdale Log Book, Historical Manuscripts, Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park, Md.

49. Warfield, Founders of Anne Arundel and Howard Counties, 455.

50. A photograph of this reunion at Oakdale has been published in Joetta M. Cramm, A Pictorial History of Howard County (Norfolk, Va.: The Donning Co., 1987). The image is from the NAACP collection in Howard County.
51. Evidence exists in the page numbering and setup of Oliver Gilbert’s memoir that it was intended for publication.

52. Garrison to J. Miller McKim, March 19, 1853, in *The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison: From Disunionism to the Brink of War: 1850–1860*, ed. Louis Ruchames, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), 4:54. Garrison noted that he had been approached by “a very worthy colored young man, (a fugitive slave from Maryland) who has a sister at Baltimore, also a slave.” Gilbert, described as very intelligent by numerous sources, fit Garrison’s description, and his sister Isabella fit the description Garrison gave to McKim of a woman who could pass for white (descendants describe her as having blue eyes). Garrison assured McKim there would be no risk of detection if he would follow instructions to get the girl out of Baltimore and on to Boston.


55. Gilbert to Warfield. May 1, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP. See Catherine Clinton, *The Plantation Mistress* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 185. Mistresses were well aware that their slaves were commodities, since many received them as gifts, as did Margaret Watkins Warfield.

56. Series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP. Warfield made a practice of dictating accounts of incidents in his life to his secretary.

57. Warfield to Gilbert, February 15, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

58. *Baltimore Sun*, February 6, 1908; *Philadelphia Record*, March 1, 1908; *Baltimore American*, February 6, 1908. How much Warfield had to do with the accounts is uncertain, although he and members of his family owned interests in the *Ellicott City Times* and the *Daily Review*, and he was a high-profile political figure in Maryland.

59. Gilbert to Warfield, February 13, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

60. Warfield to Gilbert, February 15, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

61. Gilbert to Warfield, February 13, 1908, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.


63. Gilbert to Warfield, May 1, 1911, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.

64. Leon Gilbert to Edwin Warfield, July 14, 1912, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP; Maria Gilbert to Hon. Edwin Warfield, July 12, 1912 also folder 11,WFP.

65. Warfield to Gilbert, July 14, 1912, series 1, box 2, folder 11, WFP.


68. Ibid.

69. See Casper, *Sarah Johnson’s Mount Vernon* for more about the preservation of historic sites associated with slavery.
Cover of the Radical Guide to the University of Maryland, published by the Democratic Radical Union of Maryland, a campus protest group. Journalism student Paul Levin captured this view of those protesting President Richard Nixon's decision to send U.S. Troops into Cambodia in May 1970. (Photo ©1970 Paul Levin.)
“Today U.S. One, Tomorrow the World”: The May 1970 Protests at the University of Maryland, College Park

DAMON TALBOT

U. S. Route One in Maryland, an eighty-four-mile stretch of highway running from Washington, D.C., to Baltimore, before continuing on through Pennsylvania and up the East Coast, is a typical American thoroughfare. Originally chartered by the state of Maryland in 1812 as the Baltimore and Washington Turnpike, it served as the first designated route from the capital to Baltimore, eventually being integrated into the U.S. highway system in 1926. With the creation of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway in 1952 and Interstate 95 in 1971, Route One was eclipsed as the principal thoroughfare from Washington to Baltimore, but remains an important route to many small cities and towns, including College Park, home of the flagship campus of the University System of Maryland. Today the section of Route One that runs through College Park is an often congested stretch of road packed with motels, convenience stores, fast food restaurants, gas stations, and other businesses serving the local populace, including the some 35,000 students who attend the University of Maryland, College Park (UMD) each year. Forty years ago it appeared much the same, albeit less populated and less congested, and with different names on the storefronts.¹

But in May 1970, with the Vietnam War raging, this anonymous stretch of road played host to some of the largest protests in Maryland history. On Friday, May 1, in response to President Richard M. Nixon’s announcement a day earlier that U.S. troops had been ordered into Cambodia, over a thousand UMD students, faculty, and other demonstrators occupied Route One at the intersection of Campus Drive, the main entrance to the university, blocking traffic and halting everyday activity. What began earlier that day as a peaceful anti-war rally on the university mall turned violent. Route One and the surrounding area became a virtual battleground as local and state police confronted demonstrators, made mass arrests, and used clubs and tear gas in an attempt to quell the protests. In addition to the occupation of Route One, a group of protesters marched into the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) armory on campus, destroying offices and making a bonfire of ROTC uniforms. For

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some thirteen hours the campus remained in turmoil. Law enforcement officers and protesters clashed throughout the afternoon and into the evening, gaining national media coverage in the process. By the time calm was restored early the next morning, two dozen demonstrators had been arrested, and more than thirty people injured, including ten state troopers. Damage estimates to university buildings topped $25,000—and this was only the beginning.2

Preamble

That first day of May 1970 saw the start of a three-week period of protests and demonstrations on university campuses across the nation, culminating on May 4 with the death of four demonstrators at the hands of National Guardsmen at Kent State University. The eruption of student protest throughout the country was unprecedented. With over half of the more than 2,500 universities and colleges experiencing some form of anti-war protest, and an estimated 1.5 million students taking part, it represented the largest series of mass demonstrations in U.S history.3

Despite the deaths of demonstrators at Kent State and at Jackson State University in Mississippi ten days later, the protests that touched college campuses in May 1970 were overwhelmingly peaceful. According to one study, of the some 1,350 colleges and universities that saw anti-war demonstrations during that month, only seventy-three witnessed violence of any form. Twenty-six of those, including College Park, experienced prolonged protests that resulted in “brutal clashes between students and police, with tear gas, broken windows, fires, clubbings, injuries, and multiple arrests.” At UMD, Route One became the central stage for the protests; demonstrators occupied it five times over the three-week period, clashing violently with police, state troopers, and National Guardsmen on four of those occasions. The direction the protests took at UMD was in stark contrast to the anti-war activism of prior years.

In December 1969, Prof. Lewis Lawson, referring to the state of anti-war activities and unrest on his campus, declared that “there has been a cultural lag here of about five years,” but recent events gave some indication that the university was due for a “quantum jump.”4

That UMD had not been host to any large-scale incidents of anti-war activism up to that point had been evident from the early stages of the anti-war movement. As the Vietnam War became a major issue for college students in late 1966 and early 1967, UMD showed little unrest. In December 1966, the Baltimore Sun reported that, in contrast to other large universities, anti-war sentiment had failed to make significant inroads onto the UMD campus. Lawrence Dean, in 1970 a junior at the university and one-time coordinator of the campus Vietnam Moratorium Committee, agreed, saying that “Maryland . . . wasn’t like Berkeley in California . . . we were really kind of like one or two years behind the California schools. . . . It was a very sort of staid, quiet little southern school really. I’m sure they were taken by surprise.”5

Though it is safe to say that most universities did not have the radical pedigree
of a Berkeley, for such a large state university the scarcity of student anti-war activism at UMD from 1965 to 1970 was nevertheless unusual. In the spring of 1966, Pennsylvania State University saw a rally that attracted some two thousand students. Chapters of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), at the State University of New York–Buffalo, and Michigan State University drew more than 1,500 students to teach-ins during the early months of 1965, when the Johnson administration was beginning to escalate the war. In contrast, fewer than one hundred people attended an SDS-sponsored teach-in at UMD in April 1965. Not until the October 15, 1969, national Vietnam moratorium, when over two thousand students attended the day’s events, did any organized anti-war demonstration or protest attract more than a few hundred supporters at UMD.6

The failure of a significant number of College Park students to become involved in campus activism until late in the decade was not limited to the issue of the Vietnam War. While at many other schools the Vietnam War, civil rights, and student rights became intertwined to varying degrees, at UMD they remained, for the most part, separate. The SDS chapter was the sole beacon of anti-war activity until 1969. A chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE, later the Black Student Union), while able to garner more support and sympathy from the student body over civil rights for African Americans at UMD, chose to fight the battle on its own. And although the issue of student rights took hold of a larger portion of the student body earlier, it is revealing of the student culture that the largest demonstration before May 1970 took place in November 1967, when between 2,000 and 5,000 students attended a peaceful “student rights” rally, where one of the two main demands was to end the university ban on alcohol for those over twenty-one years of age.7

The student movement of the 1960s defies strict generalization. Protest touched virtually every U.S. campus during that turbulent period, but each experienced it a unique way. Case studies provide a better understanding of the movement by examining the distinctive ways in which it evolved, peaked, and ultimately receded. As historians Robbie Lieberman and David Cochran put it, “the evidence suggests that there is no dominant narrative that fits every case; what local stories tell us is that the supposed anomalies are the stories.”8

Though historical scholarship on the anti-war movement of the 1960s is dominated by studies of northern schools, a growing body of literature is devoted to activism in other regions, particularly the South. The South saw the lowest incidence of anti-war protest of any region in the country, and historians have attempted to identify the underlying reasons. Many attribute it to entrenched southern traditions of conservatism, militarism, and racism. Specific emphasis is placed on a southern code of honor expressed through military service and the Lost Cause ideal, where “serving one’s country in war became the highest obligation of honor that one could hope to realize.” General apathy and an apolitical student culture are also highlighted. Other studies focus on how the anti-war groups that did emerge used this cultural
heritage to create a distinctly southern identity. The Southern Student Organizing Committee (SSOC), for example, what one historian calls the “most important organization of activist white students in the South during the decade,” employed Confederate symbolism and spoke of the need for southerners to “secede” from the Vietnam War. The organization established a presence on campuses south of the Mason-Dixon Line, from Florida to Kentucky.9

Significantly, its reach did not extend into Maryland, which, like Kentucky, is a former border and slave state with a long history of segregation. But unlike the Bluegrass State, Maryland throughout its history has straddled the line between North and South, culturally, politically, and socially. Its voters enabled segregationist George Wallace to carry seventeen of twenty-three counties in the 1964 Democratic presidential primary, but it overwhelmingly supported Lyndon Johnson in the general election. That same year, Marylanders elected two staunch supporters of the civil rights movement to Congress. The state has remained firmly Democratic when many of its southern neighbors switched allegiance to the Republican Party during the 1960s. Maryland possesses what historian Robert Brugger eloquently refers to as “a middle temperament,” neither entirely northern nor southern, but embodying characteristics of both. This dichotomy came to be reflected in the trajectory of the 1960s student movement at the University of Maryland, College Park.10

“A Staid, Quiet Little Southern School”

The largest university in Maryland began as a tiny residential college with a graduating class of less than fifty in its first year. Established in 1856 as the Maryland Agricultural College by a group of wealthy Maryland farmers led by Charles Benedict Calvert, its original intent was to educate and elevate Maryland’s poorer farmer class. In 1864 the college became a beneficiary of the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862, which provided federal land to agricultural and mechanical colleges with the requirement that the colleges would integrate a course on “military tactics” into the curriculum. The Maryland Agricultural College went further than most, essentially turning the school into a military college that was also steeped in Confederate culture. Most of its founders were slaveholders and had been firmly secessionist, or at the very least held strong secessionist sympathies. From 1865 to 1888, eight consecutive Confederate army veterans served as president. Students during this period and for decades after wore Confederate gray uniforms and submitted to a daily regimen of military discipline and drill along with their rigorous class schedule.11

The military culture would persist until the first decade of the twentieth century, when it began to be replaced by a new culture dominated by athletics and fraternities. By 1916 students no longer wore uniforms, and military instruction had been reduced to a miniscule part of the curriculum. That same year the college also admitted its first female students and saw its name changed to the Maryland State College. Except for a brief interlude during World War I, when the uniforms
returned amid war fever, the military aspect of the previous half-century was gone for good. The final break with the past came in 1920, when the college merged with the Baltimore-based professional schools of the University of Maryland. The tiny, former Maryland Agricultural College was chosen to be the flagship institution of the University of Maryland. By 1929 more than 80 percent of students were members of fraternities or sororities and the *Diamondback* was boasting that the college was “one of the most sports-minded institutions in the country.”

Like most southern universities through the first half of the twentieth century, Maryland was committed to a policy of racial segregation that maintained separate but far from equal facilities for African Americans. Under the second Morrill Land-Grant Act passed in 1890, Princess Anne Academy (today the University of Maryland, Eastern Shore) was designated for Maryland citizens of African American descent.

The color line was finally broken outside of the Princess Anne campus in 1936, when Donald Murray gained admittance to the University of Maryland Law School in Baltimore. Another fourteen years would pass before an African American was accepted at College Park, when future Maryland congressman Parren Mitchell entered the graduate school of sociology in 1950. Not until June 1954, one month after the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, did the board of regents vote to accept qualified in-state students to all campuses and departments without regard to race. A trickle of African Americans had been admitted to the university’s Baltimore campuses since Donald Murray gained access, but officials did everything possible to keep the flagship campus lily-white. In explaining his recent attempts to garner support for much-needed improvements to the Princess Anne Academy, President Harry Byrd declared in 1937 that “If we don’t do something about Princess Anne we’re going to have to accept Negroes at College Park, where our girls are.” The arrival of a new university president in 1954 signaled a break from the legacy of segregation, although change would be slow in coming. African Americans at UMD did not begin to see a significant improvement in numbers and status until the late 1960s.

Wilson Homer Elkins took over the helm at Maryland midway through the school year of 1954. A former Rhodes Scholar from Texas, Elkins saw improving the prestige and intellectual standing of the university as his primary task. He established a policy of “Quality and Quantity,” tightening admission requirements for incoming freshman and transfer students. That, along with a baby boom generation attaining college age, precipitated an increase in the number of applicants seeking to attend a university with a growing academic reputation. By 1965 the University of Maryland had emerged as one of the five largest universities in the country while enjoying an increase in the quality of its academics.

But the arrival of a more progressive president did not initially do much to alter the school’s racial landscape. Elkins was not the segregationist that most of his predecessors had been, but his official policy toward African Americans at College
Park remained conservative and by his own description, “rigorously neutral.” Even when not directly opposing progress for African Americans, many of his policies nonetheless maintained the historic wall of segregation. Elkins’s strategy of raising admission standards, while not aimed explicitly at black applicants, adversely affected their chances of gaining entrance to the flagship campus; many had received sub-par educations under the “separate but equal” public school system, and thus would not meet Elkins’s more rigorous standards. By 1966, twelve years after his arrival, Elkins had done little to alter the school’s demographics; with fewer than three hundred African American students out of a student population of nearly 28,000 the campus could hardly be considered integrated.16

With UMD’s historical legacy, it is not surprising that the civil rights movement, like the later anti-war movement, arrived late to College Park. Although there was some early student involvement, civil rights activity on campus did not really begin to gain steam until the fall of 1967. This was similar to other southern universities, when black student unions and other groups began to appear on campuses during the 1966–67 school year. At UMD, a tiny African American student population, general apathy on the part of the majority white student body, and an administration that had consistently opposed gains for blacks, combined to create a climate that was not conducive to mass student involvement on the issue of civil rights.17

In the fall of 1960, half a year after the first civil rights sit-in in Greensboro, North Carolina, a group of UMD students, white and African American, boycotted a segregated bowling alley near the campus, marking the school’s entrance into the civil rights movement. Small protests and demonstrations directed at restaurants and other businesses along Route One followed. The local branch of the NAACP organized sit-ins at segregated restaurants and other businesses and enlisted the help of students. All of these early incidents took place off campus. Much of the civil rights activity at the University of Maryland was confined to the Princess Anne campus, where sit-ins and demonstrations, often violent, were frequent in the first half of the 1960s. More than sixty students were hospitalized after one particularly violent demonstration in 1964.18

The lack of activism at College Park was due in no small part to administration resistance. The university had historically opposed student political activity in any form. When the Civil War began, school officials prohibited student political clubs as well as any type of political expression on the campus. The issue of human bondage was especially taboo; agricultural journals published by the college could not mention anything relating to the dispute over slavery. During the Great Depression, when student political organizations emerged for the first time, officials made concerted efforts to undermine them. In 1934, then-president Raymond Pearson went so far as to expel the YMCA for perceived leftist tendencies. In 1948, amidst the growing Red Scare, the administration unofficially banned student political groups from the campus.19
In 1961, President Elkins relaxed this policy but only to a point. Though Democratic and Republican student organizations were allowed to emerge, civil rights groups such as the interracial CORE continued to be spurned. In 1962, with administration backing, a faculty committee rejected the establishment of a chapter of the organization on the campus. According to UMD historian George Callcott, CORE was “aggressive, tough-talking, and they were expelled from the campus for being too militant.” But the administration chose to keep far less radical civil right voices from the campus as well. In the fall of 1963 it refused to allow Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to speak on campus. While King and other civil rights figures found themselves unwelcome on the campus, outright proponents of segregation did not. During the 1964 Democratic presidential primary, George Wallace visited to garner support for his presidential bid. More than eight thousand students turned out to hear him speak, though most openly jeered the segregationist governor. This represented a fundamental change from the past. More students also took part in the civil rights rallies and sit-ins that occurred sporadically in the first half of the decade. But lingering reminders of the segregationist past remained. As late as 1967, a fraternity house continued to fly a Confederate flag on its front porch.

Elkins would serve as president until 1978, and under his leadership the university saw significant advances in academic standards, student population, athletic performance, and eventually, civil rights. Student unrest in the 1960s confronted him with some of the most difficult obstacles during his tenure as president, and he often found himself in confrontations more than he would have preferred. But it would not be African American students who would draw most of his ire. Instead, it was a small group of radical white students that would start UMD down a path toward the largest and most violent protests in its history.

“The Infamously Ineffectual Students for a Democratic Society”

The movement to end the war in Vietnam at UMD began quietly on February 15, 1965, when the ten-member chapter of Students for a Democratic Society held a “fast for peace” in the Student Union. After setting up a booth to foster discussion about the war, and living on salt tablets and water for two days, the students met with general indifference from the rest of the student body—only two joined their cause from a population of more than 26,000. This inauspicious start to anti-war activism heralded a pattern that held for most of the decade. As was the case at many other universities, the tiny chapter of SDS, which never numbered more than fifty, even at the height of the protests in May 1970, was essentially the sole source of anti-war activity. Until late in 1969, the story of the campus anti-war movement was the story of SDS. When student opposition to the war finally expanded beyond SDS, the organization saw its position at the forefront of student protest at UMD evaporate. That derived as much from its own doing as from outside forces.

The chapter’s origins began a few years after the formation of the national chapter
in January 1960. By early 1965, SDS had become, if not a serious campus force, at least a presence across the American university landscape. Forty-one campus chapters with 1,365 members had been established in thirty-seven states, including one at the Johns Hopkins University and one at UMD.23

At Maryland, SDS was for its first few years largely anonymous. Established in 1963, its energies were directed principally toward effecting change in local communities rather than at the university itself, particularly with regard to civil rights. According to Richard Ochs, a founding member, the very first endeavor undertaken was in nearby Cedar Heights. SDS members joined locals to organize demonstrations aimed at improving infrastructure and public utilities. Members also took part in sit-ins and demonstrations that took place in and around College Park.24

From 1965, when the SDS began anti-war activities on campus, to the fall of 1968, the chapter remained primarily focused on raising student awareness of the war. In the words of one member, it was “geared towards education rather than demonstration.” During the 1965–66 school year, the chapter set up discussion tables in the Student Union building, took part in debates with faculty and other student groups, and sponsored teach-ins—without effect. In the first half of the decade, most students, at UMD and elsewhere, displayed indifference to U.S. involvement in Vietnam or firmly supported the government. SDS-sponsored teach-ins in April and October of 1965 drew fewer than a hundred people, dismal numbers when compared to other state universities of comparative size outside the south. SDS was also outnumbered six to one by student groups on campus that officially supported the government. More politically conservative organizations like the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), and the Young Republicans were joined by the Young Democrats, Students Loyal to American Policy (SLAP), and the Democrats, Republicans, and Veterans for Victory in Vietnam (DRVVVV). A
Student Government Association resolution in October 1965 expressed support for the American policy in Vietnam.25

By the 1966–67 school year, campus anti-war activity at the national level had shifted from teach-ins and debates to protesting university research contracts with the government and defense contractors as well as the presence of military recruiters and the ROTC on campus.26 At UMD protest was directed against military recruiting on campus. Karen Pomerantz, who arrived as a freshman in 1968, felt that because SDS members “were students on a campus we should apply as much pressure as we could to the University of Maryland, and identify its role in supporting the war, and try to change that.” In December 1966, in their first attempt to draw significant student and media attention, SDS set up a display table opposite a Marine recruiting station inside the lobby of the Student Union. Most of the three hundred students who gathered showed their hostility. Shouting, arguing, and some shoving ensued, SDS literature was burned and ripped, and a student tore down a sign placed near the Marine booth that read, “Sign Up for War Crimes Here.” The following month SDS targeted a Navy recruiting booth. Again the crowd heckled the group and denounced them as “stooges for communism.” A protest against CIA recruitment followed in October 1967, in which state police were called in to disperse the demonstrators. That same month the group protested the participation of Dow Chemical in the Career Convocation held in Cole Field House. Again student response was general indifference or hostility.27

Although Vietnam was their principal concern, the group also tried to raise awareness of student rights. The more moderate Students for a Free University (SFU) was actually in the forefront of that issue, but SDS often joined with and supported its actions. SFU prodded the administration to extend library hours and published a course evaluation catalogue that for the next decade assessed academic departments, faculty, and classes. In 1966 it established a “free university,” which offered noncredit courses as an alternative to the official curriculum. In one of the largest student demonstrations of the decade, between 2,000 and 5,000 students gathered in November 1967 to demand that the drinking ban be lifted for students over twenty-one and that student representatives be placed on a few key university committees. Probably the most lasting and significant result of the student rights movement was the ending of the in loco parentis system. Rules about drinking, co-ed fraternization, proper student attire, and curfews created by university administrations across the nation had been in place for decades. At UMD, student pressure was instrumental in ending the system by 1970.28

The administration response to the tiny SDS chapter could be characterized as oppositional but tolerant. Despite the chapter’s inability to sway the student body, officials still viewed it as a threat. In the spring of 1966, SDS was put on probation for using a loudspeaker on university property without a permit, and the following year it received a letter of reprimand for violating a rule that forbade carrying signs
in the Student Union Building. At the annual President’s Convocation held in Cole Field House in April 1967, Elkins denounced the group, referring to them as the “radical fringe” that was “at work on a disruptive and pernicious plan” to gain student control of the university. But in the same speech he also declared that “rebellious outbursts and radical proposals should not be suppressed, for they may serve a useful purpose, and the right to dissent is essential to freedom, however bitter the pill may be at times. But they should be examined carefully to safeguard the welfare of the whole community.” Little more than a year later, Elkins reversed himself, telling the board of regents at a meeting on June 21, 1968, that radical groups, including SDS “should be thrown off every campus.” What brought this change in attitude was the emergence of a more radical, confrontational element within SDS that shifted its emphasis from education to resistance, and unwittingly led to SDS’s ultimate demise as leader of the anti-war movement at UMD.29

In the summer of 1968, the national office of SDS was beset by ideological differences that in less than a year would fracture it into pieces and effectively end its position of student leadership on the national level. SDS had always consisted of myriad smaller factions whose political, cultural, and ideological differences—some vast, most minor—fostered intense internecine squabbling. One faction emerged to challenge for leadership, a small, dogmatic group that was quickly gaining adherents called the Progressive Labor Party (PL). Established in 1962 after being kicked out of the Communist Party USA for taking the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet split, Progressive Labor actually predated SDS’s involvement in the anti-war movement, holding the first student anti-war demonstration in May 1964. In 1965 the group was absorbed into the larger and more widely known SDS, but it remained committed to an ideology that was communist, pro-Chinese, and anti-nationalist, and which viewed itself as “a vanguard party whose function it was to develop revolutionary consciousness among the working class.” The split between PL and the majority “old guard” SDS members, who were becoming more radicalized but still held on to many of the precepts of the early SDS ideology, became public at the organization’s annual convention in June 1968, when PL proposed that SDS adopt a new program based on close cooperation between students and the working class. This “worker-student alliance” proposal, although rejected for inclusion in the SDS platform, was popular with many and symbolized the increasingly tenuous position of those in the national office.30

These ideological differences created debate and contention within individual chapters. In most, Progressive Labor remained only a small contingent, but at UMD it soon became dominant. By the fall of 1968 it had enough influence to produce an abrupt shift of emphasis toward the issue of workers’ rights. In October 1968, SDS sponsored a rally attended by around 250 students to protest what they viewed as unfair wage practices by UMD. In a letter addressed to President Elkins, the board of regents, and Maryland governor Spiro Agnew, the group called for a “$199 a week minimum
wage for all university employees and a cost of living escalator in all contracts.” The letter also demanded that the university “admit thousands of black and white working class students, with subsidies if necessary.” Elkins rejected the demands without comment. The idea of a worker-student alliance would remain a core principle of the chapter even as anti-war activity increased on campus. In the next few years it formed an alliance with the campus workers’ union, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Local 1072, to protest low pay and discriminatory hiring practices, and in February 1970 they demonstrated against Continental Oil Co. for failing to provide adequate safety standards for workers in Appalachia.31

Another issue during this period pertained to the role of women. From the early days of the student movement, gender roles had been strictly delineated and hardly open to debate. Women were “helpmates, girlfriends, and assistants. They took notes, made coffee, and got out mailings, while men dominated leadership bodies, led debates, and wrote articles.” SDS, which considered itself in the forefront of progressive thought, remained strikingly backward, clinging to the gender roles of the previous decade. Movement women became increasingly frustrated with their subordinate status, as well as with their male counterparts’ generally dismissive reactions to their perspective, and began to organize on their own. Workshops and women’s liberation groups, designed to foster discussion and create solidarity among women in the New Left, began to spring up in 1967 at many universities, including UMD. A women’s liberation group formed within the SDS chapter and called for, among other things, equal pay for female faculty and campus workers. The group was also instrumental in establishing a gynecological service on the campus. Perhaps more significantly, women held various leadership positions within the chapter, with Karen Pomerantz foremost among them.32

The chapter also became more confrontational. An October 1968 letter presented to Elkins was indicative of this new tack. It was the first time the chapter confronted Elkins, and it is probably no coincidence that, a month after a second encounter the following May, Elkins called for the group to be expelled from campus.

During Elkins’s annual Convocation speech in Cole Field House on April 24, 1968, SDS members publicly embarrassed him by interrupting his speech in front of more than three thousand students and faculty. As Elkins was introduced to the crowd, about twenty-five members of SDS stood up and blared out “Maryland, My Maryland,” on kazoos.33 The incident occurred a day after violent student unrest began at Columbia University, culminating in the occupation of several university buildings, including the president’s office. Liberals condemned the students’ behavior, but the more radical came to agree with SDS founder Tom Hayden’s sentiment that “revolutionary” action, i.e. violence, “could not be ignored as an option.” Increasingly, violence would become the norm rather than the exception on northern university campuses, but at UMD, though the SDS often used revolutionary rhetoric, the chapter was rarely at the center of any violence.34
By the fall of 1968 then, officials were seeing a different version of SDS than in previous years, and the administration began taking steps to curtail the group’s increasingly disruptive presence. SDS was put on probation for the kazoo incident, and then on May 8, 1969, the Central Student Court suspended it from campus until the following February, essentially barring it from using university facilities. SDS was found guilty of failing to obtain permits for a demonstration as well as the illegal use of a bullhorn for a protest at the computer center. That SDS was being targeted for its political stance rather than its disruptive behavior soon became starkly evident. At the trial, SDS member Alan Nader pointed out that permits had not been an issue for other recent events on campus, including a concert held on the mall and the use of sound equipment by a dormitory group. The suspension proved largely symbolic. Even though it was upheld on appeal, it was not easily enforced, and SDS remained active through the rest of the decade. But the chapter had a larger problem: it was coming unglued internally.35

In December 1969, in an attempt to counteract the growing support for Progressive Labor, the SDS’s national leadership issued the manifesto, *Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement*, to undermine PL’s identification with the working class. Written by Mike Klonsky, SDS’s national secretary, it argued: “We must realize our potential to reach out to new constituencies both on and off campus and build SDS into a youth movement that is revolutionary.”36

As opposed to PL, which viewed the working class as the primary engine of revolutionary transformation, the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) contingent—those who backed the Klonsky manifesto—remained committed to the original principle of the SDS’s bedrock Port Huron Statement, which maintained the primacy of students over the working class. When SDS disintegrated over these differences at its annual convention in Chicago in June 1969, three groups emerged to claim the title of “SDS”: PL, RYM, and RYM2. RYM, consisting of most of the national leadership, renamed themselves “Weathermen,” after a position paper issued at the convention entitled, “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows,” a line lifted from a Bob Dylan song. RYM2 was an offshoot of RYM, whose members disagreed with the Weathermen’s call for violent opposition to the government. The next year, the Weathermen went underground, and RYM2 split into various factions. PL carried on until 1974, when it, too, disbanded.37

Following the disintegration of the national SDS in 1969, some of its chapters simply folded, or forsook the SDS name entirely, while others soldiered on with various degrees of infighting amongst members. The split actually had little effect on the UMD chapter. By this point PL was dominant. According to Karen Pomerantz,

Our SDS chapter, for the most part, were pro-worker-student alliance, and pro Progressive Labor Party. There were others . . . who were around SDS and some of the other organizers who were more sympathetic to the RYM, Revolutionary
Youth Movement side of things. . . . we still met together, we still organized together, but within our anti-war meetings there was still a lot of dissension, a lot of disagreement about how to organize and what to do.\textsuperscript{38}

Even before the collapse of SDS as a national organization, the UMD chapter had begun to see its role in campus activism begin to diminish. The chapter’s turn toward workers’ rights and Marxism had alienated their fellow students even more. Administration crackdowns also took their toll. And despite the fact that supporters of the Progressive Labor Party were the chapter majority, internal divisions remained. These became starkly evident during the October moratorium of 1969, when UMD anti-war sentiment reached its pre-1970 peak and signaled the shift in student opinion on Vietnam from apathy to active opposition.

The national moratorium, with millions participating in the largest anti-war demonstration in a western democracy, was also the largest anti-war event until that time at UMD. The administration joined other university administrations in claiming neutrality and refusing to suspend classes for the day, because “the name of the university must not be used to promote a preferred course of action on a given political issue.” (UMD continued to fulfill its research contracts with DOW chemical and the CIA.) Despite the fact that classes were held, more than two thousand people attended the noontime rally held on the university mall. The \textit{Diamondback} declared that, “for the first time in recent history, the majority opinion may be on the dissident radical’s side,” and the \textit{Washington Post} reported that few students could be found who expressed support for the war. In an indication of just how widespread opposition to the war had become, the president of the Student Government Association, Mike Gold, addressed the rally, the Residence Hall Association raised funds for students to travel to a march in the capital, the economics department formally endorsed the moratorium, and one fraternity bought ads in the \textit{Diamondback} expressing support. It appeared that the years of SDS anti-war activity had finally paid off, but the tiny chapter turned its back on its moment of triumph. Denouncing the moratorium as a “sham,” deriding what they viewed as its ineffectiveness, and criticizing the involvement of “liberal politicians and businessmen,” SDS along with their counterparts on the right, the Young Americans for Freedom, boycotted the day’s events. That some of its members did participate indicated the tensions within the group. Karen Pomerantz even served as campus coordinator. SDS’s rejection of the moratorium signaled its abdication of the leadership of the anti-war movement at UMD.\textsuperscript{39}

At the same time the UMD SDS chapter’s leadership began to wane, the civil rights movement saw a resurgence. In 1966 the administration had dropped its ban on civil rights organizations, and the chapter of CORE returned. The group struggled, though, to energize the small African American population on campus into action and to deal with white students’ general indifference to their plight. That began to change in the fall of 1967, when the number of black students increased somewhat,
and many of the new arrivals brought with them elements of black power ideology. The group continued to meet resistance from President Elkins, who sloughed off many of their demands by claiming that he lacked the authority to pursue them. He also dismissed their grievance over the lack of African American faculty members, declaring that he could not find “qualified colored professors.” Faced with these obstacles, CORE decided that more confrontational tactics were necessary to draw attention to their cause, and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4, 1968, provided the necessary impetus. With riots breaking out in more than a hundred cities, black student organizations forced the suspension of classes, staged protests, took over buildings, and called loudly for change. At UMD the day after the assassination, a demonstration by black and white students pushed the administration to cancel classes for the day. Three weeks later, members of the CORE chapter disrupted a speech by President Elkins in Cole Field House—the same speech interrupted by the kazoo incident—when they approached the stage and read a list of demands calling for greater status for African Americans within the university. In contrast to the kazoo-playing SDS members, who were allowed to remain in the auditorium, police quickly and forcibly ushered members of CORE out of the auditorium.40

This incident gained CORE much in the way of notoriety and respect, and membership rose dramatically. In May, CORE changed its name to the Black Student Union and voted to exclude whites from membership. Thereafter, the BSU pursued the advancement of African American interests to the exclusion of all else. To the extent that the BSU did work with largely white groups on campus, it was only when doing so improved the conditions of African Americans. The Campus Coalition Against Racism (CCAR), a predominately white organization, was formed in late 1968 with the support of the BSU to “provide an outlet for white interest in black concerns.”41

The emergence of black power and afro-centrism signaled the almost complete divergence of the civil rights movement from other forms of activism at UMD. According to historian Hayward Farrar, president of the UMD BSU in 1969, the few African American students on campus at the time were a mix of “black nationalists, racial assimilationists, supporters of the Black Panther Party, Black Muslims, Pan-Africanists, violent revolutionaries, nonviolent reformers, ‘hippies,’ conservatives, and feminists.” What united them was a “shared disgust at their second class status at the University.” Under the presidency of Terence Cooper, “a staunch black nationalist,” the BSU officially opposed the anti-war protests as a distraction from their principal objective of combating racism at the university. “While whites engage in infantile disorders,” a position paper stated at the height of the protests, “black student and community needs go untended.” Hayward Farrar saw another reason for blacks’ distance from the protests.
Most black students avoided these confrontations because the vast majority of black students at College Park—many of them the first of their families to attend college, others representatives of the black elite of Maryland or Washington, D.C.—were not as radical as their white counterparts came to be in 1970, and they did not want to jeopardize their hard-won status at the school by participating in what they believed were white folks’ squabbles. They thought that black issues were all that counted, and protests against the Vietnam War were irrelevant to their interests.42

By May 1970, the separation between the BSU and white activists was complete. The BSU, and with it the African American population on campus, would remain on the sidelines for the duration of the anti-war protests.

In March 1970, the university saw one of the more significant acts of student protest up to that time, noteworthy for the more provocative stance adopted by heretofore politically moderate protesters who by then were upstaging SDS. On March 23, more than four hundred students occupied the Skinner Building, which housed the philosophy department, for fifteen hours until state police removed them. This nonviolent, non-destructive sit-in came in response to the dismissal of two popular assistant professors, Richard Roeloff and Peter Goldstone. The pair, who had been at the university for five years and were highly regarded by students, had been denied tenure for failing to publish enough scholarly material. Student resentment had been simmering since their dismissal had been announced two weeks earlier. Eighty-seven students and faculty were arrested, most charged with trespassing.43

The sit-in at the Skinner Building was the last major episode of student activism at UMD prior to May 1970. It was emblematic of the last half-decade of student activism—peaceful and having little to do with the largest issue of the day, the Vietnam War. In contrast, by this time student protests at northern universities often veered into violence. At Michigan State demonstrators were arrested after engaging police in street battles, and students at the State University of New York at Buffalo firebombed the ROTC building. Violence had become the modus operandi for many in the student movement, but at UMD it had not yet reared its head. That would soon change.44

The May 1970 Protests

The announcement by President Nixon on the evening of April 30, 1970, that he had authorized a joint U.S.–South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia provoked an instant public backlash and revitalized an anti-war movement that had been steadily losing support among the wider population as a result of students’ increasingly violent and destructive tactics. Within minutes of the speech demonstrators spilled onto the streets of New York City and Philadelphia, and the next day, May 1, saw the first protests at colleges and universities. At Princeton, two-thirds of the
undergraduates boycotted classes, and students and faculty gathered on hundreds of other campuses to protest the invasion. At College Park, Friday, May 1, began peacefully. On a bright, warm, spring morning, students could be seen gathering at various spots around campus discussing Nixon’s announcement. A noon rally on the university mall drew a crowd approaching a thousand, while nearby a group of “guerrilla theater” actors from New York gave an impromptu performance. Although the banter between the speakers and the crowd at times grew heated, there were no signs of violence. Sometime around 1:00 p.m., an unidentified man shouted, “ROTC has got to go” and bade the crowd to follow him to the nearby Reckord Armory, which housed the ROTC offices. Many at the rally marched to the armory and surrounded it while a smaller group entered and ransacked the building, throwing uniforms and other items into the hallways. Upstairs in the administrative offices, they smashed desks and office equipment, tore telephones out of the walls, set a fire, and put the torch to a pile of ROTC uniforms on the front steps. By about 2:00 p.m., when Vice President for Academic Affairs R. Lee Hornbake and other administration officials had arrived to survey the situation, the protesters had already started toward Route One. Shortly after the demonstrators gathered near the south gate of the university, over a hundred members of the Maryland State Police tactical squad, riot clubs in hand, rushed into the crowd. Some of the protesters threw stones and other projectiles. Roughly half fled down College Avenue; the rest remained just inside the gate, in a tense standoff with police. Taunts flew back and forth. Demonstrators chanted, “Hell no, we won’t go,” “Pigs off campus,” and “Nixon’s in Cambodia and we’re in the streets. When Nixon’s out of Cambodia, we’ll get out of the streets.” Throughout the rest of the afternoon, control of Route One would seesaw back and forth, students blocking traffic, and police clearing them out again. As afternoon turned to evening, protesters again began pelting police with rocks, eggs, and bottles. At approximately 10:00 p.m. police fired tear gas canisters in an attempt to disperse the demonstrators, many of whom tried to escape by running onto the campus. Police were right on their heels with tear and pepper gas. Harford Hall, a men’s dormitory, was evacuated after a tear gas canister crashed through a window. By early Saturday morning relative calm had been restored. Police had acted with the complete cooperation of the administration. In the absence of President Elkins, who was overseas, officials explicitly authorized the state police to enter the campus in pursuit of demonstrators. After that first day—the largest disorder in the university’s history—the atmosphere on Saturday remained tense but quiet. A storm had moved in, and demonstrators chose to remain inside for most of the day, until at 12:30 a.m. Sunday morning they occupied Route One a second time. It was still raining as about 150 students marched down to Route One and began what would turn out to be a four-hour demonstration. This time they were outnumbered by about 150 state troopers and
The May 1970 Protests at the University of Maryland

By 4:30 a.m. the protesters had melted away in the downpour. A few huddled under storefront awnings; others sought refuge in a doughnut shop. Police gave them five minutes to disperse or face arrest, but according to some observers officers waited less than a minute before charging into the Plain and Fancy doughnut shop and a local tavern. Twenty-eight people were indiscriminately arrested, many of whom were not involved in the demonstrations. It appears that most of those arrested were talking and eating; one was asleep in a chair. According to Lt. Col. Thomas Smith, the arrests were a preemptive measure. “We took the action in order to break the back of the protests. We did not want them to come out of the shops and do the same thing over and over again.” Governor Marvin Mandel, with university administration approval, had instructed police to “take the necessary actions” to clear the area of demonstrators.

The first few days of protest, largely characterized by chaos and confusion, continued into Monday, May 4. That morning protesters held a rally at McKeldin Library, and then quickly occupied the administration building. Remaining but a short time and causing no damage, the crowd soon moved to Route One. By 1:00 p.m. an estimated 2,500 demonstrators had gathered, the largest crowd until that point. In an attempt to quell the protests, the administration agreed to SGA Vice President Mike Blank’s request for the cessation of classes on May 5 so students could take part in a “Foreign Affairs Study Day” of speakers and workshops. The decision, announced mid-afternoon via loudspeaker to those on Route One, failed to end the blockade of the road. When news of the Kent State shootings reached the campus later that afternoon, the protests intensified. Lawrence Babits, a UMD graduate assistant, was injured by a blast from a police shotgun. By 6:00 p.m., protesters and more than a thousand National Guardsmen and state police were engaged in battles similar to those of May 1. At 8:30, Governor Mandel declared a “state of emergency” and set an overnight curfew. By midnight, order had been restored, though guardsmen continued to patrol the campus until the next morning.

The “Foreign Affairs Study Day” provided a brief respite from the upheaval of the past few days. The main event was a rally held on the university mall, where anti-war speakers addressed a crowd of over three thousand. On the few occasions when protesters attempted to initiate marches on Route One and the Reckord Armory, they were shouted down or quietly ignored. To many, including the administration and Adjutant General Edwin Warfield III, commander of the Maryland National Guard, it appeared that student passions had been subdued. After conferring with Mandel, Warfield announced that most of the National Guard would leave at noon the next day. “Our observation of student activities makes us believe that everything has returned to normal... They (the students) have made their point and they got their public attention.” Warfield was only partly right. Though the Guard’s presence on campus would not be immediately necessary, everything did not return to normal. For the next seven days the campus remained relatively calm, but the student strike
that began on the eighth day brought normal university operations to a halt and created a grading controversy that would instigate the fifth, final, and most violent occupation of Route One.52

The strike that began at UMD on May 5 had its origins in a mass demonstration at Yale on May 2. Support for the strike quickly spread to other campuses; by May 4, a National Strike Information Center at Brandeis University was reporting that sixty campuses were set to begin strike activities the next day. Then the shootings occurred at Kent State, and within twenty-four hours, 30 percent of the nation’s 2,500 colleges and universities joined the strike.53

At UMD, it began early in the morning on May 6 and gathered support throughout the day. By 10:00 a.m. it was reported that although few classes had been canceled, attendance in some departments was down 50 percent. A rally at noon saw 1,500 students gather on the university mall. A petition circulated through the crowd signed by eighty-five faculty members stating they would suspend classes for the rest of the week in support of the strike. That evening more than two thousand students and faculty met in Cole Field house to organize the university strike. Robert Shuyler, an assistant professor of anthropology, was unanimously elected chairman of the steering committee.54

The debate inside Cole Field House was fractious. Many, including Robert Schuyler and members of SDS, were opposed to continuing activities on Route One. Although by this time SDS was essentially marginalized from the main body of protesters, many still looked to some of its members for leadership. After a voice vote defeated a motion to move to Route One, about two hundred dissenters left the meeting and went anyway. Those remaining eventually agreed to continue boycotting classes while seeking nonviolent avenues of protest. But the door was left open for a return to more confrontational tactics; Schuyler declared, “We’ll go to Washington, D.C. (for a major anti-war demonstration planned for the weekend) this Saturday. Then we’ll come back and start protesting in whatever way is necessary here again next week. . . . But if there is trouble, Mandel, if he’s got half of a brain, will close the university permanently.”55

Those who sought to shut down UMD got their wish the next day. In an attempt to halt the unrest, the administration closed the university, joining 224 other colleges, some of whom closed for the remainder of the semester. At 4:00 p.m., still without President Elkins, who was en route from Japan, officials announced that the campus would be closed until Tuesday morning. Concerned about the influx of outside protesters who were expected in the area for Saturday’s demonstration outside the White House, they cited “security concerns” for their decision.

But events quickly got beyond control. The National Strike Headquarters in Washington, the coordinating body for the demonstrations in the capital, had asked the UMD strike committee to locate lodging for more than 12,000 demonstrators. The university had been closed a mere five hours when Elkins arrived and
ordered it reopened, following a threat by much of the faculty to reopen it on their own. Eight hundred faculty members and 8,000 students then convened in the auditorium, where the faculty expressed its opposition to the closing as well as a “lack of confidence in the administration.” The strike and class boycott continued to expand; administration sources estimated that classroom attendance was down 65–70 percent.56

Faculty support for the protests was hardly universal; 206 faculty and staff members, primarily from the engineering and education departments, along with 458 students, signed an official statement later in the month opposing the continued occupation of Route One and the “Roman circus” atmosphere of the assemblies being held in Cole Field House. A smaller group acted as unofficial marshals, recognizable by their green construction paper armbands, who patrolled the campus in an effort to “provide rational alternatives to violent confrontation.”57

On May 11, a fourth occupation of Route One took place, this time with far less violence. Early that evening about five hundred demonstrators gathered in front of McKeldin Library, then moved to the armory in an attempt to occupy the building again and set up a strike headquarters. Rather than preventing them from entering the building, the administration allowed the protesters to set up in the lobby. With no one to rail against, they grew bored, and chants soon began for activities to move to Route One. Local police were not present, and although Governor Mandel
placed state troopers and National Guardsmen on alert, they were not ordered in. “Green Arm band” marshals kept much of the crowd off to the side of Route One, and although blockades did occur, they quickly dissipated.58

The following day, about 850 faculty members, joined by more than seven thousand student spectators, met at Cole Field House, to determine how striking students would be graded. The day before, the administration and the board of regents endorsed a proposal put forward by an ad hoc student-faculty committee on educational policies headed by Thomas Aylward, a professor of speech and drama. A second proposal, drawn up by the ad hoc committee of faculty to support the strike, based on a memorandum issued by the Strike Steering Committee on May 8, accepted the Aylward plan, but added provisions designed to lessen the negative impact on students’ academic standing. Known as the Chaples plan, after Ernest Chaples, an assistant professor of government and politics, it had widespread support among striking students and from the SGA, which up until that point had largely been silent. On May 13, the SGA voted to “actively lead the student body to the liberation of Rt. 1” if the faculty did not accept the Chaples plan the next day. In an “urgent memorandum” to the faculty, the Student Strike Committee stated that many students feared the “academic consequences resulting from leaving the matter of grades to the discretion of faculty members who disagree politically with aims of the strike” and wanted to “insure that no student is penalized academically in any way for his participation in the strike.” The proposal, they added, “is (for once!) not negotiable.”59 Or as one striker phrased it, in the parlance of the times, they didn’t want to get “screwed by reactionary teachers.”60

Meeting again in Cole Field House on May 14, the faculty after heavy debate chose to accept the Aylward proposal by a vote of 1,583 to 696. Their decision triggered a four-hour battle between more than three thousand protesters and some five hundred police and National Guardsmen. In some of the bitterest confrontations of the month, guardsmen chased demonstrators from Route One onto the university grounds, and pitched battles again left the campus enveloped in tear gas. By one account, over fifty rounds of tear gas were fired within a ten-minute period. For their part, protesters broke windows in a number of buildings, tore down light poles, and pelted soldiers with rocks and bottles. By the time order was restored around midnight, seven hundred more National Guardsmen had been called to the scene, over a hundred demonstrators had been arrested, and Governor Mandel had again issued a “state of emergency.”61

While students and guardsmen fought on Route One, two separate groups of protesters entered the administration building. The faculty-student meeting had ended at 7:00 p.m., and sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 the first group, numbering fewer than fifteen, went inside. Campus police informed them that they would be arrested if they remained. Former Vietnam Moratorium Coordinator Lawrence Dean apparently came up with the idea to occupy the building:
I said, ‘We shouldn’t go to Route One, we should go to the administration building.’ Because that’s the only place that these problems can be solved, people driving on Route One, they don’t deserve to be held up for an hour on their way home. . . . I came up with the idea to march on the administration building, and present our goals to them. Although at that time you could call them our demands. We marched to the administration building, went inside, nobody was there. We thought like Dr. Elkins, and administration would be there and we’d be able to confront them, but . . . [there was] nobody there. And some students may have gone into some offices, but for the most part, we just milled around the lobby, maybe chanted our slogans, and I don’t know what. But the thing I remember specifically that was the most interesting, was that we took the felt directory board that said ‘Dr. Elkins, Room 101.’ . . . And we took all those letters down and we put ‘End the War in Vietnam Now.’62

Karen Pomerantz, also with the group, recounts a similar story:

Well that was when we were able to successfully win a group of students to take over the ROTC building, I mean the Administration building, although people were at Route One also. . . . and I remember they accused us of breaking and entering and burglary. But actually the door was open, we walked in, some people rearranged the directory signs to spell out . . . you know, our demands. . . . And, I think some people may have, I don’t know, defaced some paintings on the wall. I’m not sure if that happened or not. But, we had a sit-in there, and I’m not sure how many hours that lasted.63

The sit-in appears to have lasted only a little over an hour; the students left at approximately 9:30 p.m. No one was arrested. No damage was reported, and except for the rearranged letters on the directory board, the area was untouched. Neither the Baltimore Sun nor the Diamondback reported this incident, probably because when it occurred, Route One was still occupied by thousands of demonstrators. Far greater damage was caused to the Administration Building later that night, beginning sometime after 10:30, when more than a hundred protesters began ransacking the lobby, throwing furniture out on the sidewalk and setting it on fire. At about 11:30 one demonstrator poured gasoline on the floor of the lobby and set it ablaze. Hundreds watched until firefighters put it out after fifteen minutes, and National Guardsmen dispersed the crowd.64

The administration, with the assistance of the governor and the National Guard, used these incidents as a pretext to take swift and drastic action against the anti-war leadership. Earlier in the evening, in an emergency meeting with the board of regents, President Elkins claimed that the violent demonstrations were being instigated by “a highly radical element partially inside and partially outside the university.” Elkins and the regents agreed that strong measures were necessary to
end the disruptions. One board member asked, “Have you ever heard of counterintelligence? That’s what you have to use on the campus. . . . You’ve got to use the same tactics against the sons-of-bitches as they use against the university.” The next day Governor Mandel, with the full cooperation of the university administration, gave General Warfield carte blanche to evict from the campus any person involved in any of the unrest since May 1. Rallies of more than one hundred people were banned, and an indefinite campus curfew of midnight to 6:00 a.m. was set. He also quickly banned twenty-five students from the university grounds. Their names had been provided by the administration, and almost all were well-known leaders of the campus anti-war movement. In all likelihood, administration and law officers knew the names of many of those who had entered the Administration Building on the two separate occasions, and they were well aware of who was responsible for the extensive damage done to the building. The Sun reported that “many pictures and thousands of feet of television tape were made by authorities” during the assault on the administration building, and the occupation of Route One, which could have been used to identify the participants.65

The crackdown effectively ended campus protest for the remainder of the semester. Students held three more rallies that did not approach the violent episodes of
the previous weeks. On May 16 the Strike Steering Committee, meeting off campus, voted to defy the ban on rallies and hold a demonstration on the university mall on Tuesday, May 18. Sensing that “student responsibility was beginning to reassert itself,” General Warfield rescinded the ban thirty minutes before the rally was to begin and allowed the rally to go on. Two days later, 1,500 students marched to President Elkins’s home at midnight in a peaceful memorial to those killed at Kent State and Jackson State. On May 22, actress and activist Jane Fonda, author Mark Lane, and others spoke to a crowd of over three thousand.66

A day earlier, graduate assistant Larry Babits turned himself in to the police, the last of those who would come to be known as the “Maryland Ten” to do so. Eight others had already been served warrants. Singled out were prominent anti-war leaders, a disproportionate number of whom were SDS. Karen Pomerantz, Mark Woodward, and David Willett were members of the dominant Progressive Labor wing of SDS; Richard Fox was allied with the smaller Revolutionary Youth Movement 2 faction; Robert Wade had been connected with SDS since 1967; Steven Cullen and Terry Mckeon had been among the leaders of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Lawrence Dean had also headed the Moratorium Committee but more importantly had been an outspoken thorn in the administration’s side since he arrived at the university. Mary Malloy was not an activist and was not present when the Administration Building was broken into, but she physically resembled one of the anti-war leaders. Larry Babits was the lone faculty radical arrested. Their trial, set to begin in the fall, marked the beginning of the end of anti-war activism at UMD.67

The Aftermath and the Trial of the “Maryland Ten”

The events of May 1970 at universities across the nation were the last great gasp of the student anti-war movement. With students departing for the summer, campuses became quiet again. The Cambodian incursion and resulting protests had breathed new life into a movement that had been on life support, but the momentum that had arisen so quickly was just as suddenly stalled. As one historian puts it, the student movement “never recovered from the summer vacation of 1970.” Large-scale actions still occurred—in April 1971, more than half a million people convened in Washington for a peace demonstration, the second largest gathering to occur there. But by this time the American public had largely turned against the war, and though the U.S. would not officially extricate itself from Vietnam until January 27, 1973, it looked to many as though the war was finally winding down. With most of the country now holding the formerly radical position that the United States must get out of Vietnam, and with an end to the conflict in sight, demonstrations and protests gradually withered away.68

College Park reflected the national mood. On May 26, 1970, the Strike Steering Committee officially disbanded. Twenty members reorganized as the Democratic Radical Union of Maryland (DRUM), kept as their platform the five demands of
the student strike, and planned to resume protesting in the fall. But when the fall semester began, DRUM found students unresponsive, and, aside from a September rally at which foreign policy issues were the major topic, accomplished little except to form a committee to support the “Maryland Ten.”

On December 10, after several delays, the trial of the “Maryland Ten” began in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court in Upper Marlboro. Six months earlier, on June 18, the Prince George’s grand jury had handed down indictments. Karen Pomerantz, John David Willett, Robert Wade, Mark Woodward, Stephen Cullen, Richard Fox, and Lawrence Babits were charged with four counts of forcible entry, forcible detainer, trespassing, and disorderly conduct for their roles in the May 14 break-in of the Administration Building. Lawrence Dean and Mary Malloy were charged with the same four counts as well as an additional count of destruction of property. Terence Mckeon, who wasn’t involved in the incident at the Administration Building, was charged with destruction of property for the May 1 ransacking of the ROTC armory.

They disagreed about how to proceed with their defense. Some, such as Karen Pomerantz, sought to turn the court proceedings into a political trial; Lawrence Dean and others wanted to de-emphasize the political aspect. In the end, those who wanted to make political statements during their testimony—Pomerantz, Woodward, Willett and Babits—did so, and appeared to have some impact on the jury. “We tried to pack the courthouse as much as possible with supporters. And in our testimony we described what our politics were,” Pomerantz recalled later. “And I just remember testifying that I believed in revolutionary politics and that it was necessary for the working class to take control of the country. But I said I did not break into that building. . . . and one of the jurors said that if we were truthful enough to say what we believed in then we were probably telling the truth.”

The actual evidence presented against the defendants was thin. Campus police gave conflicting testimony and contradicted themselves. Defense witnesses testified that the doors to the administration building had not been forced open by the defendants, as the prosecution claimed, but had been opened for them by campus police.

On December 10, the first verdicts were announced. Charges against Mary Malloy were dropped after campus policemen testified that she had been mistakenly identified. Lawrence Dean was found guilty of trespassing and forcible entry, with sentencing set for the end of February 1971. On February 4, Pomerantz, Willett, Woodward, and Babits were acquitted of all charges and set free. Robert Wade, Steven Cullen, and Richard Fox pleaded “no contest” and eventually were acquitted as well. Terence Mckeon was also soon exonerated. On February 27, Judge Ralph Powers sentenced Lawrence Dean to two three-month jail sentences, to be served concurrently. In explaining his reasoning for such a stiff sentence in contrast to the rest of the “ten,” Powers told the court that his ruling was based on Dean’s “insincerity, bad attitude and lack of remorse, and to set an example for other demonstrators.”
The court allowed Dean to complete the remainder of his undergraduate program, and in June 1971 he began serving three months at the Maryland House of Correction in Jessup.73

The sentencing of Lawrence Dean was the last incident connected to the May 1970 protests and represented the beginning of the end for anti-war activity at Maryland, though protests did not completely disappear. In May 1971 the National Guard again occupied UMD, following the massive anti-war rally in Washington. This time the protests were directed primarily at ROTC. In a repeat of the previous May, student protesters blocked Route One, destroyed property, and engaged in hit-and-run tactics with guardsmen and police. Governor Mandel again declared a “state of emergency,” and the National Guard bivouacked in the Administration Building. The unrest lasted only a week, with fewer arrests, less damage, and less student participation than the previous year. The following April, protest erupted in response to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. The National Guard returned for the last time and made another seventy arrests but remained on the campus for only a few days. Only a few hundred students participated in this, the last major instance of anti-war unrest at UMD.74

Despite what seemed to many to be a revolutionary moment, the protests at Maryland produced little long-lasting change. The university system remained intact, students did not take over, and research contracts continued. In the short term though, the protests made a considerable impression. The financial cost to the university was high. In November 1970, the administration placed the damage done to university buildings during the protests the previous May at more than $150,000. A university research panel reported the following fall that the unrest had actually improved many students’ academic standing. The number of grades C or higher in May 1970 was 11 percent higher than in the previous year’s spring semester, while the number of failing grades was halved. It seems that the acceptance of the Aylward proposal, which so many students had opposed and which brought on some of the worst of the violence during May, had actually benefited students.

The protests did reflect a tremendous shift in student attitude. Anti-war sentiment had made an almost 180-degree turn from when pro-war students had attacked SDS members in the student union in 1965. A poll taken in November 1970 indicated that half of the 5,691 students surveyed had taken part in the demonstrations. Fifty-eight percent said that they had been influenced by radicals, and 72 percent said that the Vietnam War was the major source of student unrest on the UMD campus. The historically apathetic students of UMD had become engaged in one of the major issues of their generation, and though late, to a degree that went beyond many universities that had seen major anti-war activity much earlier.75

One of the principal targets of anti-war activists was the role of ROTC. Although demonstrators damaged the Reckord armory, they had little effect on the status of ROTC at Maryland. The following fall, the head of the campus ROTC admitted
that although the number of new recruits was down from the previous year, few in the program had left. The decline was merely the continuation of a downward trend that had begun in 1965, when participation in ROTC was made voluntary, long before the Vietnam Moratorium of 1969, when anti-war protest expanded beyond SDS. One ROTC cadet even cited a positive effect of the protests, stating that they actually raised the political awareness of cadets. The protests of May 1971, which were directed primarily against ROTC, also had little effect. When the faculty-student senate voted on May 19, 1971 to restrict ROTC to an extracurricular activity without academic credit, President Elkins rejected the proposal. As of September 2010, the ROTC is still at the university and continues to be available for academic credit.76

More immediate were the changes implemented by the administration to reduce the likelihood of future protests. On September 2, 1970, the board of regents held a special meeting and approved a series of interim rules of conduct that effectively removed the power to handle cases of student misconduct from the student body. The agent was a new administrative position, that of chancellor. Formerly, all cases of student misconduct went to the student-dominated judiciary committee, which would then recommend the degree of punishment to President Elkins. This procedure still applied to most infractions, but six of the most serious violations, five of which were directly related to student protest, would now be decided upon by the president and the responsible chancellors of the Baltimore, Baltimore County, and Eastern Shore campuses. The new guidelines essentially gave officials the power to define misconduct as it saw fit, leaving the student body far weaker relative to the administration than it had been before the protests.77

Of the two organizations that drove College Park student activism during the 1960s, one would thrive and firmly establish itself as a powerful force on campus until the present day; the other would disintegrate soon after the events of May 1970. The Black Student Union achieved more for minorities on campus. By 1971 its efforts had resulted in the creation of a black student newspaper, the establishment of an African American studies program, and most importantly, the increased enrollment and hiring of African American students and faculty. In the fall of 1970 African American enrollment at UMD was 1,285, an almost 50 percent increase from the previous year. Since 1970, the university has consistently been ranked among the top ten historically nonblack colleges in enrollment and graduation of African Americans.78

Moreover, the BSU is still in existence. Its goals remain much the same as they were forty years ago. In 2010 its stated purpose was “to represent the interests of the Black undergraduate students of UMD” and to “communicate the particular needs and concerns of black students to the administration and general university community.” One of the largest organizations on campus, with more than three thousand members, the Black Student Union continues to play a significant role in the future direction of the university.79
In contrast, for the SDS chapter, which initiated the first anti-war actions at UMD, the May protests marked the beginning of a swift end. The following semester, the remnants of the tiny chapter were absorbed into DRUM. In a *Diamondback* article that fall, SDS members presented their post-May 1970 platform. They remained committed to Progressive Labor's worker-student alliance and to "increasing political awareness...and working to build campus worker support and increase their awareness that the University is just as racist and sexist to the workers as the United States is to the people." There is no mention of any war-related activity or goal. The war was no longer a principal concern. By the fall of 1970, with three of its members among the "Maryland Ten" and SDS no longer recognized as a separate entity from DRUM, its days as a campus force were over. Some of its members would take part in the May 1971 protests, not as members of SDS but as part of an ad hoc group, the University Spring Action Coalition. As its members graduated and the national organization dissolved in 1974, SDS ceased to be a presence on the campus. But that was not the end of the organization at UMD.80

In 2006, a new version of SDS reemerged nationally. As of May 2008, it listed more than ninety-three chapters with more than two thousand members at universities, colleges, and high schools. While maintaining ties to the original SDS in name and philosophy, the current version has adjusted itself to a fundamentally different climate. The UMD chapter, which in 2010 numbered some twelve members, devoted its energies to, among other things, having fair trade coffee on campus, establishing that clothing being sold on campus is made under fair labor conditions, and having student input on hiring new professors and new school policies. Like their predecessors, they are but a tiny fragment of the student body, but nothing suggests that this incarnation of Students for a Democratic Society will evolve into the campus pariah that their 1960s counterparts did.81

In 1984, Wilson Elkins's memoir, *Forty Years as a College President*, was published. Elkins, by then retired, collaborated with historian George H. Callcott for a revealing series of interviews that detail virtually every aspect of his tenure at the university. Elkins devoted considerable space to reflection on the student movement of the 1960s and what he saw as its legacy.

Elkins maintained that there was nothing wrong with his conservative, laissez-faire approach to civil rights:

I didn't feel pressure pushing against integration, but I think the prevailing sentiment which guided the University was to stand apart from the issue. We did not press for higher enrollments of minorities, and we did not offer any special services. The attitude was very different, of course, from the policy that was finally developed by the federal government, and which the state and the University were finally drawn into. . . . [The University's policy] was not an ag-
gressive policy that attempted to admit a large number of minorities, almost regardless of admission requirements.82

William Sedlacek, who was a member of CCAR and faculty advisor to the BSU, saw it differently. “[Elkins] was a guy who wasn’t really prepared either mentally or through experience to deal with the sort of disruption that came up. . . . I would not . . . call [Elkins] a racist, but he did not understand the structural problems of the university. His view was that bringing in folks that were less qualified would destroy the university.” Nevertheless, most of the historical gains for African Americans at UMD occurred between 1968 and 1970, during Elkins’s presidency, which might not have been the case under a different president. By 1969, Elkins was publicly engaged with African American issues, meeting with the BSU leadership, and establishing committees that in less than a year would create a black studies program and an affirmative action plan. Hayward Farrar, who as president of the BSU personally dealt with Elkins, gives him much credit for the progress made on behalf of African Americans at the university. “In retrospect he was far more progressive than he seemed at the time, for he either quietly encouraged or at least did not interfere with those administrators . . . who wanted racial change at the university. . . . [He] was hardly the reactionary racist we thought he was. Looking at him now, I believe that his leadership style was just what was needed at College Park.”83

If history has somewhat vindicated President Elkins’s stance on civil rights, his perspective on the anti-war movement was rooted in misunderstanding. In his memoirs, he declared that, “underlying the protest was the draft. Radical students enlisted the support of a much larger group of students who were opposed to the war, and some students who were just not interested in working very hard at the University. . . . As the draft was relaxed and finally ended, this had a great effect on the protests. The protests became weaker and weaker.”84

Although the relaxing of the draft was a contributing factor to the decline in anti-war activity after 1970, it was far from the only one. The lack of a national leadership organization and continuing repression by government agencies contributed to the demise of the movement. Also, activist burn-out, the ascension of other political causes such as the women’s movement, and the fact that former student protesters were graduating and joining the work force, left a dwindling population of anti-war demonstrators. After the collapse of the SDS National Office in 1969, the anti-war movement was left without a major leadership organization. Although historians disagree as to how much authority SDS actually wielded, especially near the end, the organization did serve as an important symbolic presence within the movement itself as well as in the public and media perceptions. Government repression also hastened the destruction of anti-war activism. The FBI’s COINTELPRO program, along with the CIA, and local and state law enforcement agencies, devoted much energy to discrediting and destroying the anti-war and civil rights movements. Fa-
tigue was also an important element, especially among those who had been involved since the movement’s inception. Many activists turned to other causes or just simply abandoned politics altogether, retreating into more private pursuits. The principal reason, though, for the decline in anti-war activity after May 1970 was the simple fact that it just was not as necessary anymore. President Nixon’s policy of “Vietnamization” was bringing American troops home; by 1972 only 24,000 remained in Vietnam. In addition, the nation had largely adopted the formerly radical viewpoint that the United States must end the war in Vietnam. As historian Todd Gitlin points out, while it is true that protests increasingly slowed after 1970, opposition to the war continued to spread.85

Perhaps Elkins’s most regrettable error was in his conviction that a small group of radicals, namely SDS, was responsible for all of the violence and unrest on the campus. This belief led to the arrest and trial of ten campus anti-war leaders, ostensibly for activities related to the break-in and destruction of the Administration Building but really for their positions as outspoken and disruptive student activists. Elkins’s description of the radical leadership provides a revealing glimpse into the reasoning behind the administration’s scapegoating SDS for the violence:

Some of them had never been in school, and some of them had been around the University for a number of years, and some were fairly good students. A large group were not students at all but people coming to the campus to influence the students. Others were part-time students, or students who had withdrawn. Only a few were good students who just leaned toward radicalism. . . . I think the violence was caused by the leaders, the real radical leaders. I don’t think they were the only ones who participated in the violence, such as blocking Highway One in College Park and vandalizing the administration building, but these things were obviously led by radicals who did not want to see the University continue as it was.86

Prior to the October moratorium in 1969, Elkins was partially correct in his assessment of the leadership of UMCP anti-war movement; anti-war activity was driven entirely by the tiny chapter of SDS. But by the time of the Moratorium, nationally and on the UMCP campus, the anti-war movement had grown beyond SDS. The group played a diminished role in what occurred in May 1970. Some of its members and former members were actively involved in the strike committee, but SDS itself had been marginalized in numbers and influence. Most members opposed blocking Route One and destroying campus property and tried to persuade others to avoid confrontation. The turn toward violence and destruction occurred only after SDS had relinquished control of the UMD anti-war movement to the more politically moderate majority of students.

Most of the campuses that saw anti-war protest during the month of May 1970
experienced nothing like the violence at College Park, for which UMD's administra-
tion and law enforcement bear part of the responsibility. Confronting unarmed
student protesters with tear gas and riot clubs was ill advised and merely provoked
more confrontations. When law enforcement was restrained, such as during the
occupation of Route One on May 11, student protest remained largely peaceful, and
spurts of violence quickly dissipated. But the protesters themselves carry just as
much of the responsibility. Student demonstrators provoked National Guardsmen,
taunting them, throwing rocks, bottles, and other projectiles, and engaging them
in futile confrontations on Route One. Many were simply caught up in the drama
unfolding before them and needed only an excuse to destroy university property
and partake in the violence. As one said, "You've got to realize that there was this
strong commitment against the war, and it was also a great party."87

Though the evolution of the 1960s anti-war movement at UMD was shaped, in
large part, by the university’s geographical location south of the Mason-Dixon Line, it
differed in many respects from other southern schools. Like other southern univer-
sities, UMD's segregationist history contributed to complicated interaction among the
varying strains of the student movement. UMD also fit the image of the apolitical,
sleepy, southern campus; activism arrived relatively late, which can be attributed in
part to a student culture centered around fraternity life, parties, and athletics that
went hand in hand with a historic apathy towards politics. Succeeding administrations
played an important role in maintaining this culture, opposing student involvement
in contemporary issues going back to the mid-nineteenth century. Anti-war activity
remained relatively dormant until the May 1970 Kent State shootings, which served
as a “universal rallying point” for many campuses. But the most important element
in the evolution of the anti-war movement on campus was a distinctly northern
trend: the emergence of SDS. The organization never gained a significant following
in the southern states; by 1968 only twenty-six out of an estimated 350 chapters were
in the South. SSOC, a less radical, less confrontational, more southern version of
SDS, came to be more representative of the South. Like SSOC, the UMD chapter of
SDS remained committed to a non-violent philosophy, distinguishing it from many
northern chapters, particularly later in the decade. UMD may indeed have been a
“staid, quiet, little southern school,” but for three weeks its students took part in a
series of protests that rivaled any at northern universities.88

NOTES

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versity of Maryland.
As of 2010, the formal name of the College Park campus is The University of Maryland, College Park. In 1988, under a massive restructuring, a number of institutions were incorporated as the University System of Maryland: the University of Maryland, College Park, University of Maryland, Baltimore, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, University of Maryland, University College, University of Baltimore, Bowie State University, Coppin State University, Frostburg State University, Salisbury University, and Towson University. In 1997 the Maryland General Assembly passed legislation that allowed the campus at College Park to be known as the University of Maryland. This draws a distinction between it and the other campuses, denoting its status as the flagship campus of the system. The other schools within the University System of Maryland are not satellite schools of College Park, although the University of Maryland, Baltimore is the only other school permitted to confer certain degrees that state, simply “University of Maryland.” This article employs either “The University of Maryland, College Park,” or the acronym “UMD” to refer to the College Park campus. “The University of Maryland” is used when referring to all the campuses, as it was prior to 1988.


7. Two groups of largely white students and faculty, the Campus Coalition against Racism (CCAR) and a University Fair Housing Committee, emerged late in the decade and sought many of the same goals as CORE and the BSU, working with them in a supporting capacity, especially CCAR. SDS also supported some of the BSU’s goals, but there was little cooperation between the two groups. See Hayward Farrar, “Prying the Door Farther Open: A Memoir of Black Student Protest at the University of Maryland at College Park, 1966–1970,” in *Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement: White Supremacy, Black Southerners, and College Campuses*, Peter Wallenstein, ed. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008). George Rodgers, “Elkins Sees no Sign of Upheaval,” Baltimore Sun, November 18, 1967.

8. Robbie Lieberman and David Cochran, “‘It Seemed a Very Local Affair’: The Student


12. Callcott, A History of the University of Maryland, 243, 247–48, 250, 275, 293–94. The emphasis on military instruction was not entirely phased out. A lecture and two hours of drilling per week remained as part of the curriculum. Callcott, The University of Maryland at College Park: A History, 52–53.

13. The second Morrill Act, passed in 1890, recognized a segregated society. The act provided money rather than land to the schools, with the provision that “no money shall be paid out under this act to any State or Territory for the support and maintenance of a college where a distinction of race or color is made in the admission of students, but the establishment and maintenance of such colleges separately for white and colored students shall be held to be in compliance with the provisions of this act if the funds received in such State or Territory be equitably divided as hereinafter set forth.” U.S. Congress, Morrill Land Grant College Act, 1890, http://www.pvamu.edu/pages/600.asp, accessed May 26, 2009.

14. In 1951 the first African American undergraduate, Hiram Whittle, was accepted to UMD. See Callcott, The University of Maryland at College Park: A History, 84. Two years after the Brown decision, out-of-state African American students began to be accepted at UMD.
Universities in the other border states—Delaware, West Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky—followed a similar path. Callcott, *A History of the University of Maryland*, 351.

15. By 1964, 82 percent of incoming freshman had graduated high school in the top half of their class; in 1950 the percentage had been 65; In 1969, the American Association of Universities accepted UMD as a member, making it one of the top 50 research institutions in the United States; Callcott, *The University of Maryland at College Park: A History*, 91–93, 97; Callcott, *A History of the University of Maryland*, 391, 395–96.


17. Farrar, “Prying the Door Farther Open.”


20. Fenton, “The History of Desegregation at UM”; Callcott, *A History of the University of Maryland*, 394. University chaplains were also instructed by the administration not to take part in civil rights demonstrations in the first part of the decade.


26. In the fall of 1967, campus SDS chapters revealed a host of university-government links. MIT’s revealed that over 79 percent of the university’s annual budget was based on government and defense contracts. At Columbia, SDS provided evidence of a $125,000-a-year contract with the CIA, the existence of which had previously been denied by university officials. Protest against campus military recruitment was more widespread. According to one estimate, nearly 25 percent of the nation’s universities experienced protests against military recruiters on campus during the 1966–67 school year, attracting supporters from outside the ranks of SDS in the process. In one of the most extreme cases, an SDS-initiated picket of DOW Chemical Company, the principal manufacturer of napalm, at the University of Wisconsin
in Madison eventually grew into a weeklong class boycott by over five thousand students, marked by violence and multiple arrests. See Sale, SDS, 369–74, 380.


37. Sale, SDS, 559, 621. The Weathermen remained underground until the late 1970s, when the remnants of the group surrendered. A few remained underground and continued armed resistance until 1981, when the last of them were arrested during the failed robbery of an armored truck in Nyack, New York. See Richard G. Braungart and Margret M. Braungart, “From Protest to Terrorism: The Case of the SDS and the Weathermen,” International Social Movement Research, 4, Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1992.), 67.


46. “1,000 at UM Erupt Over Cambodia Push; Police Use Tear Gas.” The identity of the person has never been determined. Both the *Baltimore Sun* and the *Diamondback* refer to him as a student. One anti-war leader believes that he/she was an undercover police officer. (Interview with Karen Pomerantz, digital recording, College Park, August 22, 2008.) Referring to demonstrations in 1971, Jordan Goodman, another student demonstrator, stated that “One of the things that I later learned was that some of the people who moved the demonstrations to Route 1 were working for the police. They saw this as a way of breaking up the demonstration because if they could get it to move to Route 1, they could bring in the troops to break up the demonstration.” Jordan Goodman interview, digital recording, College Park, March 27, 2008, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore.

Although there is no direct evidence of involvement by law enforcement, FBI surveillance of the UMD SDS chapter had been going on as far back as 1965, when FBI agents twice visited the campus to investigate the SDS chapter and turned over information on members to President Elkins. The *Diamondback* quoted the *Baltimore Sun* that Elkins stated he had
received information from the FBI. When contacted by the *Diamondback* though, Elkins denied that he had met with any agents. (Ira Allen, “FBI Watches SDS Activity,” *The Diamondback*, November 1, 1965.) In addition, paranoia about police and FBI infiltrators had been running rampant through the SDS chapter since 1968. (“Paranoia Strikes Deep...”) University of Maryland Activists Unite, accessed May 11, 2009, http://www.route-one.org/students/paranoia-strikes-deep.html.) FBI involvement on other campuses is well documented. For example, at Ohio State University, which along with UMD was one of the few universities to see any violence on May 1, evidence indicates that state police instigated it. According to historians Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, “The official story was that activists closing and chaining the gates to the campus—allegedly preventing ‘crowd control’—had ‘forced’ the guard to fire on demonstrators. It was later revealed that those who committed the act in question were in reality members of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, deliberately attired in such a way as to impersonate demonstrators before the news media.” Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2002), 221–22.


48. “1,000 at UM Erupt Over Cambodia; Tear Gas Used by Police”; Parker, Lewis, Petranek, and Gainen, “Dorms Evacuated; ROTC Ransacked.”

49. Parker, Lewis, Petranek, and Gainen, “Dorms Evacuated; ROTC Ransacked.”


52. The most prominent speaker was Dr. Benjamin Spock, a major liberal voice in the anti-war movement, who cautiously endorsed the violence of the previous days, stating that he was opposed to its use in most circumstances but adding, “I think it’s necessary to combat violence with violence.” “Large Mall Rally Hears Spock,” *The Diamondback*, May 6, 1970. Warfield was the grandson of former governor Edwin Warfield.

53. Associated Press, “Cambodia Protest Rocks the Nation,” *The Diamondback*, May 5, 1970; Gitlin, *The Sixties*, 410. The Yale Strike committee demanded that the U.S. government end the oppression of political dissidents and release Bobby Seale and all captive Black Panthers; it must immediately withdraw from Southeast Asia; and universities must abolish all ROTC programs and end all war-related research and defense department contracts (“Night Violence Mars Rallies,” *The Diamondback*, May 4,1970). Many of the universities that joined the strike adopted the three demands outright or altered them to fit the needs of particular campus situations. The UMD Strike Committee adopted the demands while adding two more of their own: ending the “systematic oppression” of women in every sector of society, and abolishing the board of regents and governing the university through an elected body of students, faculty, and workers. *Radical Guide*, 14.

59. “State Troopers Sent to U. of M. Campus”; Karen Argy and Larry Blonder, “Strikers Grade Clarification Gets Regents, Administration Backing,” *The Diamondback*, May 12, 1970. The Aylward proposal called for granting grade amnesty to all striking students between May 1 and May 11, allowing students to continue classes for the rest of the semester if they so desired and permitting them to drop courses without credit or penalty. The Chaples plan would have permitted students to receive a pass/fail grade for work completed up to May 1, before the protests had begun; take a standard letter grade for that work; take one final exam to gain a pass/fail grade for the course; or take an “incomplete” and make up the course over the summer. Susan Gainen, “Ad Hoc Faculty Assembly Asks Referendum on Two Grade Plans,” *The Diamondback*, May 2, 1970; “Protest Tied Grade Option Voted at UM,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 12, 1970; Susan Hayes, “SGA threatens to lead March to Rt. 1 if Chaples Plan Fails,” *The Diamondback*, May 14, 1970; “Urgent Memorandum,” May 13, 1970, Archives and Manuscripts Department, Hornbake Library, University of Maryland, College Park.
62. *Radical Guide*, 11; Lawrence Dean, interview with author, digital recording, Laurel, Md., October 18, 2008. This was essentially the same version of events that he gave in his testimony during the trial of the “Maryland Ten.” *The Diamondback* reported on December 11, 1970 that during his testimony, “Dean explained that he had gone to the building not to engage in a sit-in or to demonstrate, but to talk with some administrators. He felt the questions brought up by the strike committee would be better served by a talk with the administrators rather than stopping cars on Rt. 1.” Bob Hobby, “Charges Against Malloy Dropped,” *The Diamondback*, December 11, 1970.
66. *Radical Guide*, 13, 14; Larry Blonder, “Rally Challenges Guard Orders,” *The Diamondback*, May 19, 1970. After the rally, fifteen UMD students went with a group of demonstrators, including Fonda and Lane, to Fort Meade in an attempt to distribute leaflets to soldiers. They were quickly arrested and expelled from the base.
“Conflicting Testimony Marks Trial,” ibid., December 14, 1970. According to Dean, he got into an argument with Elkins on his very first day on the campus as a freshman. During registration, he took issue with the fact that university police carried guns on campus, and aggressively questioned the president about it. Lawrence Dean, interview with author, digital recording, Laurel, Md., October 18, 2008. Dean had also been arrested on December 5, 1969, for trespassing after he refused an order by campus police to stop using an amplification system, which was banned on campus, during an anti-war rally. “UM Student Arrested for Bullhorn Use,” *Baltimore Sun*, December 6, 1969.


69. *Radical Guide*, 10, 14; Sara Breslow, “Does DRUM Listen to Itself?” *The Diamondback*, September 26, 1970; Chuck Petrowski, “Committee Organized to Aid 10,” ibid., December 3, 1970. The committee was largely ineffective in gathering support. On December 10, 1970, the day the trial began, DRUM attracted barely a hundred supporters to a rally on the university mall. More notoriety was achieved during the fall semester by a series of anonymous bomb threats, sixty between September and December. University buildings often had to be evacuated, disrupting classes. The threats were eventually discovered not to have been politically motivated. One student was calling in threats in an attempt to cancel one of his classes. Bob Hobby, “Ten from May Protests Face Trial,” ibid., December 10, 1970; David Lightman, “Bomb Scare Safeguards Sought,” ibid., December 18, 1970; Leonard Taylor, “Remembering the Riots of Spring, 1970,” *ECE Connections*, Summer 2006.


possession, use, or distribution of illegal drugs on university property; the destruction or
theft of personal or university property; the use of buildings without authorization; and the
internal disruption or obstruction of authorized activities on university property.
78. Fenton, “The History of Desegregation at UM”; Farrar, “Prying the Door Farther Open,”
158.
79. University of Maryland Black Student Union, http://www.careercenter.umdedu/Student-
80. SDS did return in the fall semester after the 1971 protests but failed to gain a following.
“Audience Cool to UM Protest,” Baltimore Sun, September 17, 1971; Chuck Petrowski, “SDS
Evolves,” The Diamondback, November 19, 1970; “Guard Sweeps Campus After Disruptions,”
ibid., May 6, 1971.
81. Students for a Democratic Society, http://studentsforademocraticsociety.org/home/
accessed March 1, 2009; Lauren Shull, “The New-Look New Left,” Baltimore Sun, April 13,
2008.
82. Callcott, ed., Forty Years as a College President, 124.
83. Fenton, “The History of Desegregation at UM”; Farrar, “Prying the Door Farther Open,”
147, 151–54, 162. The affirmative action plan called for the creation of a cultural study center
to examine the academic and social needs of minority students, the increased recruiting of
black students, faculty, and staff, and the establishment of more academic support services
for African American students.
84. Callcott, ed., Forty Years as a College President, 130–31.
85. For two examples of the extremes to which historians treat the role of SDS in the move-
ment, see Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, and Gitlin, The Sixties. See also Churchill
86. Callcott, ed., Forty Years as a College President, 128. Jordan Goodman offers a different
perspective on the demonstrations: “This was a movement which was almost exclusively . . .
within campus. The people you found out later on were from out of campus were often working
for the police and not the demonstrations. The head of the student government (at the time of
the 1971 protests) was one of the main people.” Jordan Goodman, interview, digital recording,
College Park, Md., March 27, 2008, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.
88. Michel, Struggle for a Better South, 17–18; Wheeler, “Hell No, We Won’t Go, Ya’ll,”153–55;
Copper mining drew wealthy investors to central and western Maryland in the eighteenth century. (Jean Nichols Bellin, Carte de la Delaware Bay, 1757, Maryland Historical Society.)
Historical interpretations of copper mining in Maryland generally include information pertaining to a small group of unknown English (ostensibly Cornish) miners calling themselves the Fountain Company. In 1750, according to tradition, they opened at least one mine, possibly two, and operated a copper works in what are now Baltimore and Frederick Counties. Legend also asserts that the miners, as Loyalists, fled to England at the outbreak of the Revolution.

New evidence, though, conclusively places the operation many miles south, in what is now Montgomery County, well outside Maryland’s accepted and recognized copper districts. Through company minutes and accounts, and recorded observations of the mine’s manager, the once-shadowy figures of the Fountain Company—investors and underground laborers alike—emerge. Most of its investors did not flee the Revolution. Mine manager Herman Husband, for example, played an important role during the North Carolina Regulator movement and later was a rabble-rousing antagonist during the Whiskey Rebellion. Additionally, situating the company operations in Montgomery County calls into question the accepted boundaries of the state’s copper districts and prompts discussion of whether to extend existing boundaries or to recognize new locations.

The 1719 discovery of copper on Schuyler’s land in the red Triassic sandstone of New Jersey’s Newark Basin touched off a mining rush that would not be seen again in North America until the Dahlonega, Georgia gold frenzy of the 1820s and the California Gold Rush of 1849.1 The effects of the Schuyler discovery rumbled up and down the Atlantic seaboard for the next five decades. From Vermont to the Carolinas, men had their eyes on the ground thinking of copper, silver, and gold. New mines appeared, and Marylanders did not escape the fascination and allure of striking it rich.

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Mining excitement swept southward from New Jersey, reaching southern Pennsylvania and northeast Maryland within two years of the Schuyler discovery. Many had mine fever, including Pennsylvania’s lieutenant governor, William Keith, who brought Cornish miners to the disputed border area along the Susquehanna River in a three-prong effort—to open a series of copper and tin mines, acquire land on his own behalf, and at the same time lock in Pennsylvania’s claim to the long contested area between Maryland and Pennsylvania. Hoping to enrich his holdings (and coveting the same land along the Susquehanna River), Maryland’s lord proprietor, Charles Calvert, upon receiving the news in England, formed a mining partnership along the same lines as Keith and ordered exploratory shafts and pits sunk in the disputed region.²

“Schylers and the mine upon the Susquehanna hath made such a noise in the world, that the woods are now full of mine hunters. Many discoveries are already made; but the worth of them is unknown until shafts be sunk, to find out the largeness of the vein.” So wrote a determined but frustrated Philemon Lloyd, secretary of Maryland, to his employer Charles Calvert in the spring of 1722, after being dispatched to the disputed area along the border with Pennsylvania.³

Early eighteenth-century colonists who explored the sparsely settled areas of western Maryland discovered new mineral deposits. Calvert’s secretary and business
partner Philemon Lloyd thought more was needed to better exploit these discoveries and gain greater control (and a larger profit) over base-metal mines—copper, lead, tin, etc.—except for iron, which was considered commonplace. (Mines for precious metals like gold and silver were already claimed by the crown as Royal Mines.) This is evident in a follow-up letter dated July 28, 1722, in which Lloyd wrote:

> that it be proposed unto his Lordship and if he think it reasonable that a new condition be annexed unto the former conditions of plantations; that all other mines except iron, which is more or less all over the country, as to lands as yet untaken up, be reserved in the grants, be reserved in like manner as the Royal Mines. . . . This only is certain, that our woods are full of mine hunters.

He also made note of the general knowledge of the “mine hunters,” their skill (or lack thereof) in exploiting the found minerals, and proposed a correction to what he saw as a bad situation that could get worse.

> We want skillful men; and forasmuch as the honor is done me of coming into the co-partnership, it seems very reasonable and advantageous that upon the opening and discovery of any valuable mines of lead, tin, or copper, that I should have the power of contracting with such discoverer, so as to make the mine our own, allowing to every such discoverer a proportion of their own discovery, by which means we may have under our management the greater part of the mines and may then work them at pleasure according to their goodness. Great numbers of mines or tokens of mines are found: the difficulty is finding the principle veins: which I take to be owing to the ignorance of the miners.⁴

What Lloyd proposed was a near-complete takeover of mining operations in the Maryland colony in the alleged interest of good mining practice. It was also in violation of a law passed by Parliament in 1693 concerning the designation of Royal Mines. Calvert, aware of this law, must have rejected this proposal. This is reflected in 1733, when he issued nineteen modified conditions for land grants, warrants, and patents: “18th. In all grants or patents hereafter to be granted, on future warrants, there shall be a clause reserving one-tenth part of all mines, other than royal mines excepted, by such receivers at the pitts mouth, that is, when raised.” Calvert was determined in getting his share of mine production, even to the point of taking his tenth share as the ore was raised “at the pitts mouth,” but he would do so legally. These modified conditions lasted until the outbreak of the Revolutionary War.⁵

The eastern Maryland/Pennsylvania border area mines quickly filled with disputed claims. Pennsylvania lieutenant governor William Keith’s agents had already arrested several members of Calvert’s advance surveying team by the time Lloyd
arrived. The charges included trespassing on land that Pennsylvania had claimed and creating unrest among the Native American population. In a letter to Calvert, a pugnacious Keith referred to these men as “land pirates.” Calvert and Lloyd prepared to argue the matter in court but soon turned their attention south and west, to areas “further down in Maryland.”

On March 2, 1732, in an effort to encourage settlement and exploration of the western and northern sections Maryland, “The Right Honorable Charles, Absolute Lord and Proprietary of the Provinces of Maryland and Avalon, Lord Baron of Baltimore,” issued a proclamation inviting all settlers to the “backlands of the northern and western boundarys.” Those willing to relocate agreed to the following terms: settlement within three years of the proclamation date, two hundred acres of land granted to families and one hundred acres to unmarried persons (male or female), and annual payments deferred for three years.

New York’s Cornelius Eltinge responded to the invitation and traveled to the Sugarlands of Maryland. On March 4, 1732, the proprietor granted him a patent from a four-hundred-acre surveyed tract in what was then Prince George’s County. Named the Fountain, the property’s distinguishing feature was a “large fountain” or a continuously flowing spring. Sometime between 1732 and 1744, under unknown circumstances (perhaps the telltale green staining of local outcroppings or discovery of a gossan during clearing and plowing), someone detected copper bearing ore on the property. News of the discovery reached the ears of men such as those whom Philemon Lloyd had hoped to attract to the Maryland “backlands”—men with mining experience, knowledge, and money to invest.

The “Skillful Men”

In 1744 a group of entrepreneurs, mostly native Marylanders, formed “The Fountain Company.” Its purpose, as stated in the opening sentences of the company charter, dated “this twenty second day of April, anno one thousand seven hundred and forty four,” was to “open the earth, prospect a branch of mines called The Fountain laying in Frederick County in Maryland.” In 1744, Cornelius Eltinge sold the one hundred-acre parcel, the Fountain, to John Webster, acting representative for this group of investors, to which he belonged. John Webster proved a good choice. As a partner/operator of the Bush River Iron Works in northwest Baltimore County, his practical experience ultimately served him well.

All five of the original five investors were born and raised in Maryland:

Isaac Webster, Baltimore County, related to John Lee Webster, investor in and iron master of the Bush River Iron Works, related to fellow investor John Bond by marriage. Isaac was a “man of wealth and position.”

Jacob Giles, Harford County, wealthy plantation owner, entrepreneur, member of the Ohio Company, and politically well connected, he was arguably, in his time, one of the richest men in Harford County.
John Bond, Baltimore County, described as “John Bond, Gentleman,” lawyer, merchant, and land speculator; he was related to Isaac Webster and was an investor in the Bush River Iron Works. He also served as a justice of the peace and judge of the Baltimore County Orphans’ Court from 1769 to 1773.12

John Lee Webster, Baltimore County, related to Isaac Webster, investor in the Bush River Iron Works. He was also an active investor in other iron works, including some in Virginia.13

Samuel Gilbert. Related to the Webster family by his marriage to one of the Webster daughters, he sold his shares to John Bond on August 19, 1756, and moved his family to southwestern Virginia.14

Two or three additional men may have been involved with mine operations, but it is unclear when they became investors. The names of Robert Adair and Aquila Hall, both from Harford County, are recorded on the first page of the company ledger as one-sixteenth shareholders. William Leech also appears in the ledger, although his association with the operation is not clear.15

The years 1745–1754 yield little information on the Fountain Company. Escalating tensions between the British and French in the Ohio Territory eventually led to the outbreak of the French and Indian war in 1755, and investors may have been hesitant to expand. However cautious they may have been, the Fountain investors were not idle. They completed a resurvey of the property in 1754, adding seventy newly discovered acres of unclaimed land contiguous with the original Eltinge 1732 patent that enlarged the tract to 170 acres. Additionally, from an advertisement placed in the November 7, 1754, Maryland Gazette, a “copper works” operated on or near the mine property. The survey included the names of additional investors:16

Herman Husband, Baltimore County, Fountain mine manager, land speculator, and arguably the most famous (or infamous) of the Fountain investors.17

Daniel James, Fairfax, Virginia, gunsmith and land speculator, one of three investors not from Maryland, although he apparently spent at least part of his time plying his trade as a gunsmith in Frederick County, Maryland.18

James Perry, Frederick County, planter and land investor: his main role appears to have been something akin to company quartermaster, responsible for the procurement of tools and supplies.19

Captain John Thompson, Mariner, of Great Britain, ship’s captain.20
Captain William Tipple, Mariner, of Great Britain, ship's captain. Circumstantial evidence suggests that he may have been captain of a transport ship with the British Royal Navy squadron bringing Major General Edward Braddock's army to America. The naval flotilla delivered troops and goods for the ill-fated campaign against Fort Duquesne.  

**Fact vs. Tradition**

The accepted story concerning the Fountain Company is that a group of English miners (meaning Cornish) formed a company sometime prior to 1750 and concentrated their efforts in what is now Baltimore County. For the last 125 years, historians, researchers, and geologists have associated the Mineral Hill site (Scotts Mine) near Louisburg in western Baltimore County, and an unidentified “mystery” mine in either Carroll or Frederick County, with Fountain Company operations. Herman Husband simultaneously managed both sites. Researchers have suggested the Dolly Hyde Copper Mine, Repp Copper Mine, Cox Group of Mines, Unionville Lead Mine, even the Liberty Copper Mine, as possible locations of the “unknown” site.

Experts believe that a copper smelting operation existed in Deer Park, approximately one mile from Mineral Hill. Other scholars claim the “English Miners” fled back to Britain at the outbreak of the Revolution and that Maryland confiscated their property. It is also believed that Dr. John Stevenson of Baltimore, owner of the Liberty Copper Mine, continued mining and smelting operations at Mineral Hill, probably using abandoned Fountain Company equipment.

What of the claims identifying the Scotts Mine/Mineral Hill site with the Fountain Company mine and copper works? Does the evidence support a Baltimore County location? And how does the second “mystery mine” site factor into the story? The answers to these questions are found in the land patents and the company records—and place the Fountain Company mine and copper works in what is now Montgomery County—not in present day Carroll, Baltimore, or Frederick Counties.

**Early Years**

It is possible that between 1744 and 1754 the company’s investors considered and managed other properties, possibly the Mineral Hill mine and copper works site, where pre-Revolutionary War diggings have been identified. In fact, colonial mining works at Mineral Hill are quite extensive, covering an area of approximately thirty acres. Most are near-surface mines and pits where copper carbonates (malachite and azurite), and copper oxides (cuprite), could have been readily extracted. Concentrated and easy to smelt, these are the minerals colonial miners sought in addition to native copper. Other locally abundant copper bearing minerals, such as chalcopyrite and bornite, proved more difficult to process. Remnants of colonial efforts to refine sulphides surfaced in the 1840s when Isaac Tyson reopened the Mineral Hill mine.
The first ores processed at the site came from residue from the nearby smelting operation. Colonial-era slag contained considerable amounts copper.\textsuperscript{25}

Yet nothing in the historical record gives evidence that the Fountain Company was involved with the Mineral Hill mine or the nearby copper works. The earliest records (1744) identify Samuel Sewell and Phillip Jones Jr. as owners of Sewell’s Relief (the early name for Mineral Hill), located along “Flush Run, descending into Great Morgan Run.” This may have been the site of the copper discovery to which Philemon Lloyd enigmatically referred two decades earlier as “further down in Maryland.” The arrangement between Sewell and Jones lasted until 1750.\textsuperscript{26}

On August 30, 1750, Phillip Jones Jr. (owner of one-third share) entered into partnership with Dr. Andrew Scott of Baltimore County, who may have purchased his two-thirds share from Sewell at an earlier date. It was during this period that the mine property, formerly known as “Sewell’s Relief,” became “Scott’s Mine.” By 1752, Scott had fallen upon financial and marital hard times. Unable to pay his debts, he was forced to relinquish his two-thirds share to Dr. David Ross for “all copper or other ore now dug and raised to the surface of the earth or which shall be hereafter be dug or raised to the surface of the earth.” The names of the 1744 and 1752 owners do not correspond to any of the Fountain Company investors, casting doubt on the claim that they were the owner/operators. Nor do Fountain Company records mention “Scott’s Mine,” “Sewell’s Relief,” Dr. Andrew Scott, or Phillip Jones Jr.\textsuperscript{27}

So what was the exact location of the Fountain copper mine and works? Two clues are found in the land description on the 1732 Eltinge patent. “I have survey’d for the said Cornelius Eltinge all that hail as part of [the] land called the Fountain lying in the said county & beginning at a bounded Black Oak standing near to a large fountain on the West Side of the Muddy Branch near the Sugarland Road.” This description places the property not in Baltimore County but in a section of what was then Prince George’s County, later Frederick County (1748), and finally Montgomery County (1776). Muddy Branch is a well-known tributary of the Potomac River in central Montgomery County, and the Sugarland Road was one of two east-west routes that led to the Sugarlands, near present-day Poolesville and Comus, in the shadow of Sugarloaf Mountain. Modern-day River Road was the main road known from colonial times as “the Sugarland Road.” The road mentioned in the property description as the “Sugarland Road,” however, is present-day State Route 28, known locally as Darnestown Road. It should also be noted that this is the first documented note of this route, in addition to River Road, also being called the Sugarland Road. The colonial description of the property locates the 170-acre Fountain tract near the corner of present-day Quince Orchard Road and Darnestown Road, in the southwest corner of what is now covered by “The Orchards” and “Kentlands” housing developments. The other feature mentioned that supports a Montgomery County location was a large fountain or spring of noteworthy proportion—and thus the 1744 investors named their company. Since most of the Fountain investors were Quakers,
they may have chosen the name for its religious symbolism or as a metaphor in the hope that wealth would flow from the mine.  

In 1760 manager Herman Husband wrote a description of the area in which he walked to the top of the hill, approximately a quarter of a mile above the mine and could see for many miles into the Blue Ridge Mountains stretching south into Virginia. Sugarloaf Mountain looms just to the west, with the Frederick Valley opening just beyond, an inviting gateway to its rich farmlands. It’s still possible to enjoy this satisfying panorama on a clear winter day by parking along Chestertown Road, located in the Kentlands subdivision, and walking to the top of the small ridge south of the Little Quarry. This view is not possible from the Mineral Hill / Scotts Mine site.

More evidence linking the Fountain Company to a Montgomery County site is found in the November 7, 1754, Maryland Gazette. Convict servant John Raner had run away “from the copper works, near Seneca Creek in Frederick County, Maryland” and should be returned to “James Perry, near the said works, at Rock Creek, in Frederick County,” or to John Bond in Baltimore County. The copper works operated “near Seneca Creek” and “near the said works at Rock Creek.” Both are major streams whose combined watersheds drain about half of Montgomery County, eventually feeding into the Potomac River. This notice places the copper works/mine site in an area where Rock Creek and Seneca Creek are close together, possibly in the area of Derwood, just a few miles east of the mine site and just south of present-day Gaithersburg, Maryland. It is interesting to note that in the early eighteenth century Derwood was known as Deerpark and Deerwood. Could this be the Deer Park often associated with the Fountain copper works?

And what of the second site, often alluded to but never positively identified? On June 24, 1760, Herman Husband signed a lease agreement with Ninian Hamilton for mineral rights on a nearby property, “Resurvey of Aberdeen,” located along Muddy Branch downstream from the Fountain. This document supports entries in the company ledger that slaves and miners also worked on the Hamilton property, and verifies that from 1759 to 1762 Herman Husband managed two copper mines. Resurvey on Aberdeen is mostly undeveloped land today, with most of it falling within the boundaries of the Muddy Branch Park system, further strengthening the case for a Montgomery County site.

Lastly, evidence of a more anecdotal nature supports a Montgomery County location for the Fountain Company mine and copper works. According to retired U.S. Geological Survey geologist John Windolph Jr., an oral tradition existed among the most elderly residents of the area surrounding the Kentlands, that a silver mine existed on the property early in its history. Gold and silver are often found in small amounts in copper mines as minor accessory minerals. It is possible that memory of the copper mine morphed to silver through decades of storytelling.
The Men in the Mine

Much of what is known of the Fountain Company, from the men who invested their money to the men who labored underground, is due to Herman Husband’s detailed record-keeping. His meticulous listing of expenses, notes concerning the mine conditions, types of ore encountered, health of the miners (including the slaves), weather, food consumed, and tools used give us a clear look into this eighteenth-century operation, and allows us to identify some of those workers:

John Raner. The “lusty, swarthy” convict servant whose description in the *Maryland Gazette* portrayed him as a miner experienced in the use of black powder.33

James Nicholson and James Smith. Named in the record as the two miners in agreement with Herman Husband’s assessment of the mine.34

John Ward. Possibly brought in as a temporary mine worker, shown to have been paid on June 29, 1760.35

Will, Ben, and Pompey. Slaves hired from Widow Samuels, June 12, 1760.36

Also available for the Fountain Company, but missing for most early mines, are accurate drawings of the proposed underground works showing how it appeared underground in relation to the ore deposit. Herman Husband penned beautifully detailed diagrams annotated with commentary and notes on the ore and country rock. The mine manager specifically mentioned “white sulphur” (perhaps the sulphides pyrite or marcasite, or possibly galena or one of its oxides), “yellow sulphur” (probably chalcopyrite), and “greens” (in all probability the carbonate mineral malachite). Husband described a vein six inches wide that dipped at about seventy-five degrees, almost vertically, and recorded that Smith and Nichols used the word “Twitch” or “Twith” to describe the vein’s appearance. The word “Twich” is an Old English or Cornish word that describes a pinch in an ore body (lenticular in appearance, like slightly flattened sausage links that follow one after another). At one point the vein pinched out and miners did not reach the next section for nearly eight days.37

In 1962, during sewer line construction near the intersection of Longdraft Road and Quince Orchard Road, at a depth of approximately six meters, masses of native copper up to several centimeters across were found. The copper occurred in a “quartz-epidote vein that trended north-northwest along a ridge, in diorite porphyry” that had been converted to “talc-bearing schist.” In addition to the native copper, other minerals were noted, including “specular hematite, azurite, malachite, limonite, and possibly cuprite.” These excavations occurred close to the eighteenth-century mine location and may indicate the types of minerals discovered more than two centuries ago.38
Manager Herman Husband (1724–1795) kept meticulous company accounts, including intricate diagrams of the underground works. (Fountain Company Account Book, MS61, Maryland Historical Society.)

Husband’s descriptive narrative allows us to follow the progress of the mine on an almost daily basis over a six-month period. Through his observations we can ascertain the conditions under which they labored and catch a brief glimpse of the working life of an eighteenth-century miner. It was hard, dangerous, manual labor. With the exception of black powder for blasting, mining techniques would have been familiar to a first-century Roman mine worker: the use of fire to heat a rock face, which was then dowsed with water (cracking and disintegrating the material, making it easier to excavate), the use of hand augers, and pick and shovel work, all done underground in faint candlelight.

From the beginning of June 1760 into late July, the work progressed steadily as they routinely noted “sharpening augurs” and “boring holes” in preparation for blasting.39

July 15, 1760: “Sharpened augurs and bored holes”
July 16, 1760: “Pitt full of water”
July 17–18, 1760: Two blasts and excavation done, some timbering on the 18th

Work continued through late July, regardless of tough conditions. Shafts were being sunk into “solid rock.” Husband described the gangue material (rock in which
the ore is contained, or with which it is closely associated) as “slippery to the feel.” The area of the mine lies directly along the south edge of what is today known as the “Quince Orchard Serpentine Body.” Serpentine is a hydrous magnesium-silicate metamorphic rock, often accompanied by steatite (soapstone) and talc. All three have a slippery, greasy feel. Serpentine is used widely in the modern-day construction industry for road building, rip rap, concrete aggregate, and railroad ballast. It is quarried locally, just a few miles from the Fountain site, at the Hunting Hill Quarry, in another large serpentine body.

By the first week of August the summer heat and humidity left “Pompey Sick.” By mid-month torrential rains “filled our pitt with water,” and Husband reported that his men worked two days removing water and “rubbish” from the work area. He then traveled to Baltimore for tools that Perry had not provided, and on his return wrote that the men had cleared the hole and resumed blasting and tunneling.

The manager’s records also enumerate the supplies needed to maintain the men and to work the mine. Among the varied and extensive items were pork, cheese, nails, butter, blankets, tin pans, sugar, “linon” bags, mattocks (pick axes), hammers, sledge, paper and ink, plates, mush pot, rope, augers (drills), compass, a windlass with an iron crank, coffee, flat files, chest and padlock, spoons, rum and brandy. Husband traveled approximately thirty miles for finished goods but found local suppliers for pork, beef, and wheat. Efficient and organized as he was, the company’s investors extended his position six months at a salary of £100.

Herman negotiated disputes with the miners and with the investors. The miners’ pay was calculated on a per-foot-of-excavation basis and they claimed 125 feet of excavated shafts and drifts. Husband had recorded 116 feet. Apparently resolved, the manager noted in the spring of 1761 that two shafts up to 40 feet deep and nearly 50 feet of drifts had been dug, over “125 feet into solid rock” at a “cost of £300. Despite the dispute, and through six months of back-breaking work, the outlook of the miners and the manager remained positive. The “prospect was extraordinary and all the miners agreed that the easiest way to remove the ore was to sink a second shaft as deep as necessary for a level from the branch and drive out to cut the ore, which is supposed might be done in four or six months with 3 miners and a manager.”

Disagreement among the investors was not easily resolved. At the November 4, 1760 investor meeting the group was informed (by persons unknown) that Captain William Tipple and Captain John Thompson had not made their contributions, £33.6.8 (worth $6,000 today). Further, neither they, “nor any of their representatives” could be found, despite “letters being written to both of them in England.” The attending shareholders resolved, at the discretion of Herman Husband, to post a public notice in an effort to find the two delinquent mariners. The notice in the December 18, 1760, Maryland Gazette “requested” that Tipple and Thompson, in accordance with the “agreeable articles,” pay their arrears to the manager, Herman Husband, “on the premises without delay.” The issue dragged on for nearly four years,
until the May 16, 1764 meeting. The company claimed that Thompson now owed the company "twenty three pounds sterling" as a one-eighth share investor. Thompson countered that he was only a "1/16 share holder" and therefore was only due to pay 11£ and change. The other investors disagreed, and John Bond drew up a legal brief in which he advised Thompson to pay. No further record of the incident survives. The resolution of this matter is not known as the record is silent in this regard.45

**Epilogue**

By 1764–1765 the activities of the Fountain Company were winding down, although the company would continue on, in name only, for another fifty years before finally disappearing. It would appear that by 1764 the company's investors decided to discontinue further subsidizing the mining, and the mine(s) were idle. And what of the men that formed the company? A James Perry, probably the investor, patented other land in Frederick County (now Montgomery County) in the late 1750s and 1760s and died in 1771, leaving his land to his children.46 Captain Tipple and Captain Thompson probably wound up back in Britain. A William Tipple does appear as a land investor in Montgomery County, but his property is on the confiscation list of 1783. John Bond turned his attention back to Baltimore and Harford County pursuits. Herman Husband moved on to new land opening for settlement in western North Carolina. For Bond and Husband the remainder of their lives would take dramatically different paths.

Herman Husband was given leave from the company in mid-1762, following the death of his wife, at which time he moved to Orange County, North Carolina, where he had been quietly accumulating land (some historians say as much as 10,000 acres) for a number of years. It seems that he had been anticipating an earlier move to North Carolina with his family but was unable to go, probably because of an unnamed sickness that had struck his wife. That would account for his return to Maryland in late 1759 or early 1760 and for his nearly two-year stay.

In 1770, Husband was elected as a representative from Orange County to the North Carolina legislature. Within a short time he became embroiled in the Regulator movement, an attempt by citizens of western North Carolina to correct (regulate) what they saw as the unfair trade and tax practices and blatant corruption in the administration of Governor William Tryon. Husband stirred up trouble as a pamphleteer, railing against Tryon and his cronies. As a committed Quaker he would not advocate the use of violence, but he felt that given enough pressure, the government would change. Unfortunately many of the other leaders of the movement did not agree about the use of force, and his writing only inflamed the situation. In 1771 armed conflict erupted in Alamance, North Carolina between the Regulators and the governor's troops. The Regulators were soundly beaten, their leaders arrested, and some hanged. Herman Husband, though a Quaker who would not participate in violence, was nevertheless a recognized leader of the movement. Declared an
outlaw, he was forced to flee North Carolina or be executed. He made his way back to Maryland and then into what would become Somerset County, Pennsylvania, living with relatives and using the assumed name Tuscape Death.

When the Revolutionary War broke out, he once again began to use his real name. In 1789 he was elected to the state assembly and was vocal in his nonsupport of the Constitution, which he felt infringed on the rights of the states. Within a few years he became embroiled in yet another controversy, the Whiskey Rebellion, and this time he was unable to escape detention. Specifically targeted for arrest by George Washington, who probably remembered him for his prewar activities in North Carolina, he was arrested at his Bedford County home on October 19, 1794. He was charged under federal law with high treason and taken, bound, to Philadelphia to stand trial. After enduring seven months of imprisonment he was pardoned and released on May 12, 1795, but he was seventy-one, and his health began to fail. His wife and one of his sons tried to accompany him on the journey home, but he never made it past the outskirts of Philadelphia. He lay in an inn, burning with fever—probably caused by his imprisonment—for more than four weeks, before dying. He was buried on June 19, 1795. His grave site remains unknown to this day.47

After 1764 the investors apparently decided that they would not further subsidize the mine, and we hear of no more mining or mine operations involving the Fountain. From 1764 until his death in 1789, John Bond seems to have switched his attention to the development of Fell’s Point and other properties, and to his duties as judge of the Orphans’ Court in Baltimore (1769–73) while still hanging on tenaciously to the Fountain property. His daughter, Anne Bond Fell, had been married to Edward Fell, and upon his death Anne controlled the land development of Fell’s Point, a desirable

*Husband called for delinquent investors to pay their contributions immediately.* (Maryland Gazette, December 18, 1760).
deepwater port area immediately adjacent to the City of Baltimore. John Bond became chief spokesman for his daughter and lent her his expertise at law during the early growth of Fells Point.\(^48\) When Bond died in 1789, his will stipulated that the Fountain property be divided between two of his grandsons, John W. Bond and Thomas E. Bond.\(^49\) Each was to receive a one-half share, which indicates that between 1765 and 1789 the other investors had relinquished or sold their shares to John Bond.

After Bond’s will was proved in 1790 we hear nothing more of the Fountain until 1812, when a caveat was filed against the property by Benjamin Gray, an adjacent landowner.\(^50\) Court records indicate there were problems serving papers on the two Bonds. This, coupled with disruption from the war with Britain in 1812–14, exacerbated the issue until 1816, when a decision handed down by the court slightly readjusted the boundaries of the property. The caveat papers list some of the improvements that had been made to it—a log house and kitchen worth ten dollars, and 8,500 split rails with two gates worth twenty dollars, but curiously, no mention is made of the mine or copper works.\(^51\) The 1816 decision is the last we hear of the Fountain as a separate entity. From then on the property became part of an amalgam of parcels as families divided and sold off portions of the land.

Sometime between 1816 and the early 1820s, the property was sold to the Claggett family, prominent local farmers. In 1852 the Claggett heirs sold their farm, which included the Fountain, to Frederick A. Tschiffely. The abundance of wheat grown on his farm led to its becoming locally known as “The Wheatlands.” In 1942 the farm was sold to Otis Beall Kent, who renamed it “The Kentlands.” In 1944 a series of lakes were impounded on land that included a portion of the Fountain, possibly inundating some of the mine works.\(^52\)

In 1988 the Kentlands farm was sold to a development group, and construction of the Kentlands Development and Town Center began in 1990, obliterating all trace of whatever may have been left of the Fountain mining operation.\(^53\) Prospects for finding any remains of mining operations at “Resurvey on Aberdeen,” Herman Husband’s second mine, are better, for the site lies mostly on undeveloped park land. At the time of this writing the search for this site continues in earnest.

Although small copper deposits are not economically important today, early mining operations such as the Fountain copper mine played an important part in the development of the “backlands” of what was then the wild Maryland countryside. The ‘rediscovery’ of those mines sheds light on colonial life in Maryland and adds to the industrial history of Montgomery County, which has often been viewed in the narrow context of tobacco farming and various milling operations. It would seem that mining, at least early on, played a significant role in stimulating the growth of the local milling industry, encouraging expansion and maintenance of local roads, promoting settlement, and attracting investors from Maryland and Virginia. Doubtless, more discoveries of this nature (if county land records are any indication) will be made. An example can be found at “the Mine Banks,” another Montgomery County
site in the Laytonsville-Woodfield area, which may prove to be another early colonial site, this time directed at iron derived from magnetite.54

These and other early pre–Revolutionary War endeavors are evidence of the diverse opportunities available to entrepreneurs who laid a foundation for later mining in Montgomery and surrounding counties. In the decades following the Revolution, other “skillful men” like Isaac Tyson once again became interested in the mineral resources of Frederick, Montgomery, Carroll, and Baltimore Counties. By 1825 chromite mines were being opened in Montgomery and Baltimore Counties, and by the 1830s copper mining was once again under way in Frederick County. Unfortunately it seems that the copper deposits of Montgomery County faded into obscurity until the mid- to late-1800s, when copper was discovered in small amounts in the Triassic red shale and sandstone located a few miles west of the Fountain, in the area surrounding Poolesville. The same period also saw the discovery of gold in Montgomery County, a subject to which much literature has been devoted.

This account also has the potential of altering the number of recognized copper-bearing districts in the state. Up until now the Maryland Geological Survey has recognized three distinct copper districts. From west to east they are: the Linganore, the Sykesville, and the Bare Hills copper districts. Perhaps the time has come to recognize four, possibly even five, copper districts. Interestingly, on a geological map the Fountain copper mine and Resurvey on Aberdeen lie in an almost direct line southwest of the Sykesville mines, which were located along a southwest-northeast trending fault. The Fountain and Aberdeen sites could conceivably be within a southern extension of that fault. If that turns out to be the case, they may be included as a southern portion of the Sykesville district. If not, then it may be appropriate for the Maryland Geological Survey to recognize this area in south-central Montgomery County as a fourth copper district.

I also propose that the Triassic Basin deposits of Montgomery County, which contain at least three known copper mines and as many copper prospects and occurrences, coupled with the John Digges copper mine (circa 1742—the oldest known copper mine in the state) in far western Carroll County, be considered for inclusion as a fifth copper district. But that is a topic that warrants further research and discussion.

NOTES

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3. Philemon Lloyd to Lord Baltimore and Co-Partners [Discovery of Mines], the Calvert
Papers, No. 2, Selections from Correspondence [transcript, p. 26], Maryland Historical Society.

4. Ibid., pages 29–41. Lloyd’s recommendation in this letter is a reiteration of an earlier statement he made in a letter to Calvert dated July 19, 1722. He also stated that he was afraid that some patent holders would either try to conceal the fact that mineral deposits were on their land, or die and take knowledge of such deposits with them to the grave.


8. Otis E. Young, “Origins of the American Copper Industry,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, 3 (1983): 117–37. Young shows that in the 1740s high demand for copper and copper concentrates in Europe was the driving force behind investing in copper prospecting in the North American colonies, with English and Dutch smelters paying up to £70 per ton for high-grade concentrates. The demand was driven by the increase in sailing exploration and the unprecedented expansion of the Royal Navy. Hundreds of tons of high-grade copper, alloyed to either tin or zinc, were needed to produce brass and bronze, mainly for precision naval instruments and ordnance.

9. “Leases, deeds, and financial records of various members of the Bond Family of Baltimore, Baltimore and Harford Counties… ledger of John Bond of Falls Point 1749–67; and Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, Formed to Exploit Minerals in Frederick County 1744–64,” MS61, Bond Family Papers, MdHS. The original company charter is included in the MdHS collection but is badly tattered and in very delicate condition. A copy of the charter can be found in the Fountain Company record book, apparently copied into the record book by Herman Husband, the mine manager. Frederick County Circuit Court, Land Survey and Condominium Plats, Resurvey on The Fountain, Jacob Giles et al., 170 acres, 1755/12/13, Patent Certificate 3954 (MS), Maryland State Archives; Kate Fawver, “Women’s Economies in the Chesapeake: The Organization of Labor in a Plantation Society,” paper presented at the Program for Early American Economy and Society, October 1, 2004, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 15–16. [Fawver draws her information from *A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635–1789*, vol. 2, (1985). John Lee Webster was the major investor in the Bush River Iron Works. He is listed as owning a furnace (smelter), three mills, three thousand acres of land, a large bay schooner and other watercraft for transporting his iron. He had experience financially and logistically in moving mineral commodities.


15. Preston, *History of Harford County*, 221–23; Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MS61, MdHS. The charter stipulated that meetings of the company were to be held on an alternating schedule at the copper mine and at the Bush River Iron Works.
16. *Maryland Gazette*, November 7, 1754; Resurvey on The Fountain.
17. Resurvey on The Fountain. Four of the original 1744 investors (Giles, Bond, and the Websters) were still listed, along with new names.
19. Resurvey on The Fountain; Fountain Company records.
20. Resurvey on The Fountain. Other than his participation as an investor, nothing more is known of him.
21. Ibid.; Winthrop Sargent, *History of an Expedition Against Fort Duquesne in 1755, Under Major General Edward Braddock* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1856), 141. A Captain William Tipple appears in the records as captain of a transport ship called the Fishburn, which had been commandeered by the Royal Navy in Britain and used to transport 100 men and officers bound for the Fort Duquesne campaign under Braddock. It was one of 13 transport ships and two ordnance ships under escort by two men-of-war that arrived in Hampton Roads on March 2, 1755, and then a few weeks later she was docked in Fairfax, Virginia. This arrival date coincides nicely with the appearance of William Tipple as an investor in mid-1755. He was probably a civilian captain and may have had a connection with Daniel James, another investor and a gunsmith based out of Fairfax, who spent a portion of his time working as a gunsmith in Frederick, Maryland.
23. Ibid., 5.
25. “1744 deed to a copper mine in Baltimore County, Maryland,” #3877, Tyson Family Papers, 1722–1786, 1861, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Otis E. Young, “Origins of the American Copper Industry,” 118–19; Heyl and Pearre, “Copper, Zinc,” 47. These were sulphides, containing, as the name suggests, sulfur. This made their processing (with the technology then available) much more difficult and wasteful—in short, costly. Great Britain had an ample supply of copper sulphides and Welsh miners were developing easier ways of reducing and concentrating their copper sulphides at home. The extra cost that would have been incurred by the colonists to refine and ship their sulphides (as compared to the relative ease of refining the aforementioned carbonates) would have made it too costly to compete with mines in Britain. *Maryland, It’s Resources, Industries and Institutions*, Prepared for the Board of World’s Fair Managers of Maryland, by Members of Johns Hopkins University, 1893, 112–13.
26. Tyson Family Papers, UNC.
28. Prince George’s County Circuit Court, Land Surveys and Condominium Plats, “Fountain,” Cornelius Eltinge, 100 acres, 1734/6/10, Storage Location 01/26/01/03, Patent Certificate 859 (typescript), Maryland State Archives; *Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to Revise the State Constitution* (Annapolis, 1851), 2:114; Shelia Smith Cochran, *River
Road: An Early History (n.p.: The Author, 1986, 1990), located at the Montgomery County Historical Society; Early property locations (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), Overlay Map #12 for Rockville/Gaithersburg, Montgomery County Historical Society. In the 1940s a series of lakes were built on the Fountain and adjoining properties. From north to south they were: Lake Lynette, Inspiration Lake, Lake Nirvana, and Lake Placid. All are apparently fed from that prodigious spring Cornelius Eltinge called “The Fountain,” which eventually drains into the Muddy Branch a few yards north of Darnestown Road.

29. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MS61, MdHS.
30. Maryland Gazette, November 7, 1754; Jo Seymour and Carlos P. Avery, “Short History of Derwood, Maryland,” Montgomery County Historic Preservation Commission, http://www.ericcarlson.net/derwood-history.html. The Deer Park tract dates from 1722 and was located on the south end of what is now Gaithersburg, Maryland, extending south along State Route 355 toward modern-day Shady Grove Road. This is a good example of how names of places often change with time. By the early 1800s Deer Park became Deer Wood; in the late 1800s the name Derwood was adopted by the B&O Railroad and remains in use today.


32. Author interview with USGS geologist (ret.) John Windolph Jr., 2007.
33. Maryland Gazette, November 7, 1754.
34. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MSS-MS61, MdHS.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. The use of slave labor for something as specialized as mining and ore processing was not unusual in eighteenth-century Maryland. By the mid-1700s there were scores of known iron ore banks and iron works (furnaces, etc.) operating in the upland piedmont area. It is estimated that there may have been as many as 4,000 slaves working in Maryland iron mines alone. Many filled special niches in the industry, such as charcoal makers, ore processors and smelters. For the more intricate and involved processes, slaves often went through a development routine akin to an apprenticeship, being trained by experts in their respective fields. Phillip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 23.

37. Fountain Company record book.
38. Lawrence Bernstein, Minerals of the Washington, DC Area (Maryland Geological Survey, 1980), Educational Series #5, pp. 40–43. Curiously, there are no records indicating how much ore was removed from the mine or was processed in the smelter. Approximately ten pages are missing from the center of the record book, and these may have contained the production records. Although all traces of the mine and accompanying dumps are gone, and any production estimates would be conjecture, it is safe to say that both mines together probably never produced more than a hundred tons of concentrates or metallic copper.

39. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MS61, MdHS.
42. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MS61, MdHS; Mary Elinor Lazenby, Herman Husband: A Story of His Life (Washington, D.C.: Old Neighborhoods Press, 1940), 179–80; Mary Ann Ashcraft and Johnny Johnsson, “Carroll Land Used for Mining,” Carroll
County Times, January 13, 2008. “That year he (John Digges) asked the colonial government to pass a bill exempting his miners from the duties expected of men in the colony, namely military training and mustering, clearing the highways, building bridges and payment of levies. There were still Indian raids on the Maryland frontier at that time, so Diggs must have had clout in Annapolis to propose such an exemption. The legislators granted his request providing there were no more than 50 taxable persons employed. They also noted “the making of copper or raisin [sic] of copper ore within this province will be advantageous to the trade of Great Britton [sic] as well as beneficial to the inhabitants of Maryland.”

During the colonial period in Maryland landowners were responsible for the maintenance of their local roads, which often meant that certain sections of road were kept up better than others; some were nothing more than slightly widened Indian trails or were badly rutted. The four towns mentioned as purchase centers are Elk Ridge, Baltimore, Fredericktown, and Bladensburg. All are twenty miles or more from the mine site. Keep in mind that colonial roads were not as direct or built and maintained as they are today. Making a 50–60 mile round trip via horse-drawn wagon or on horseback would have been grueling. The fact that Maryland landowners were subject to a special tax and work levies to maintain the roads bordering their properties is clearly illustrated by the exemption (as noted above) that John Digges received from Annapolis in 1742 while operating a copper mine along the banks of Little Pipe Creek, in what is now Carroll County.

43. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company, MS61, MdHS. The company records contain a number of instances when tools were not provided by James Perry when they were needed. Reading between the lines, it must have been frustrating to a detail-man like Husband, described by a biographer as a serious-minded man with “great self-command,” not to have what he needed to get the work done in what he would have considered to be a timely manner.
44. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company.
45. Minutes and Accounts of the Fountain Company; Maryland Gazette, December 8, 1760.
46. Patent Records and Frederick County Wills, Book A1, pp.391–92, Maryland State Archives.
47. Lazenby, “Herman Husband,” 179.
50. Montgomery County Circuit Court, Land Surveys and Condominium Plats, Recovery, Benjamin Gray versus Thomas E. Bond and John W. Bond, 1816, Caveat Papers 351, MSA S 1565-142, and Resurvey, Fountain Shown with Recovery, 1816, Caveat Papers 351, MSA S 1565-155, Maryland State Archives.
51. Montgomery County Circuit Court, Maryland State Archives.
53. Ibid.
54. Early property locations (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), Overlay Map #5 for Damascus/Goshen, Montgomery County Historical Society.
Maryland History Bibliography, 2010: A Selected List

ANNE S. K. TURKOS and JEFF KORMAN, Compilers

From 1975 on, the *Maryland Historical Magazine* has published regular compilations of books, articles, and doctoral dissertations relating to Maryland history. The following list includes materials published during 2010, as well as earlier works that have been brought to our attention.

Bibliographers must live with the fact that their work is never finished. Please notify us of any significant omissions so that they may be included in the next list. Send additional items to: Anne S. K. Turkos, Archives and Manuscripts Department, 2208E Hornbake Library, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

Previous years’ installments of the Maryland History Bibliography, as well as the full bibliography for 2010, are now searchable online. Please visit http://www.lib.umd.edu/dcr/collections/mdhc/ for more information about this database and to search for older titles on Maryland history and culture.

**African American**


### Agriculture


Archaeology


Architecture and Historic Preservation


“Nurturing a Nation.” *Common Ground* (Summer 2010): 12–17.


“Prince of a County, 2010.” *News and Notes from the Prince George’s County Historical Society*, 39 (July–August 2010): 5. [Locust Grove]


Biography, Autobiography, and Reminiscences


———. “It’s a Long Way to the Top.” *Baltimore*, 103 (December 2010): 144–47. [Phil Wiser]


**County and Local History**


Bourjaily, Abigail. “Historical Linguistic Background of Saint George’s Island, Saint Mary’s County, Maryland.” *Chronicles of St. Mary’s*, 57 (Fall 2010): 5–28.


Glass, Jesse. “‘Myself Intrinsically!’ Two Antebellum Carroll County, Maryland, Know-Nothing Satires.” Graduate School of Applied Linguistics, Meikai University, 10 (2008): 167–85.


**Economic, Business, and Labor**


Education


Beitzell, Edwin W. “Early Schools of Southern Maryland.” Chronicles of St. Mary’s, 57 (Summer 2010): 4–10. TO LOCAL

Boggs, Anastasia L. “Community College Department Chairs’ Leadership Styles and Faculty Utilization of Instructional Technology.” Ph.D. diss., West Virginia University, 2010.


Collins, Michael. “What Factors are Attributed to Improved Achievement in One High-Performing, High-Poverty, Urban Elementary School in Maryland?” Ph.D. diss., Wilmington University (Delaware), 2010.


Ennis, Bonnie H. “Understanding Attitudes and Perspectives of Underperforming African American Males in Middle School Mathematics.” Ph.D. diss., Wilmington University (Delaware), 2010.

Fink, Louise L. “A Comparison of Grade Configuration on Urban Sixth to Eighth Grade Student Outcomes in Regular and Special Education.” Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2010.


Smith, Kishawn L. “The Relationship between Professional Learning Communities and Student Achievement.” Ph.D. diss., Walden University, 2010.

Wang, Ming-Te. “School Climate Support for Student Engagement during Adolescence.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2010.

**Environment**


**Geography and Cartography**


Koot, Christian J. “The Merchant, the Map, and Empire: Augustine Herrman's Chesapeake and Interimperial Trade, 1644–73.” *William and Mary Quarterly,* 67 (October 2010): 603–44.


**Intellectual Life, Literature, and Publishing**


Maritime


Plante, Trevor K. “I have the honor to tender the Resignation…” *Prologue*, 32 (Spring 2010): 42–47. [includes brief biography of Raphael Semmes]


Medicine


McNees, Pat. *Changing Times, Changing Minds: 100 years of Psychiatry at the University of Maryland School of Medicine*. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Medicine, 2010.


**Military**


Hutzell, Rick. “Remember These 12 Names.” *Anne Arundel County History Notes*, 41 (Summer 2010): 3.


**Music and Theater**


**Native Americans**


Munday, P. Erin. “And Then There Were None…The Fate of the Maryland Indians.” *Chronicles of St. Mary’s*, 57 (Summer 2010): 11–20.
Politics and Law


Religion


Mann, Margaret W. *A Life of Devotion: The Life of Dr. Ira L. Fetterhoff*. Lusby, Md.: Margaret W. Mann, 2009.


### Science and Technology


### Society, Social Change, and Popular Culture


Brown, David G. *Sotterley: Her People and Their Worlds, Three Hundred Years of a Maryland Plantation*. Chambersburg, Pa.: Chesapeake Book Company, 2010.


Scott-Childress, Reynolds J. “From ‘Nature’s Nation’ to ‘Washington’s Playground’:


Weinreb, Michael. *Bigger Than the Game: Bo, Boz, the Punky QB, and How the ’80s Created the Modern Athlete*. New York: Gotham Books, 2010. [includes chapter on Len Bias]

**Transportation and Communication**


**Women**

Acton, Lucy. “Horses are Her World.” *Mid-Atlantic Thoroughbred*, 18 (September 2010): 20–27. [Katy Voss]


Book Reviews


There are many accounts that provide detailed descriptions of the actions of the D.C. Sniper(s), John Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, and the tactics police used to apprehend them. This book does not attempt to add to that literature. Rather, it focuses on the media response to the events of October 2002. Censer uses the events, because of their apolitical coverage—an assumption he makes based on their universal condemnation—to move beyond the traditional scholarly endeavors to decipher journalistic framing. As thoroughly explored in the bibliographic essay (225–30) the approach of “framing” is designed to analyze journalistic assumptions of all types, but it is most commonly used to characterize the press as politicized, partisan, and/or ideological. By examining the media coverage in the apolitical atmosphere surrounding the sniper, Censer attempts to move past the concern with political bias and uncover the nonpolitical assumptions under which journalists operate when producing the news. Building on the self-descriptions of journalists that highlight their apolitical motivations, such as satisfying their curiosity or getting the scoop, Censer uses this case study to investigate the apolitical views of the community that color their coverage and by using a nonpolitical topic, he tries to provide greater insights into the “fundamental assumptions of the press” and the “layer of uncontested frames of thinking that underlie all reporting” (xvi).

The prologue, a condensed narrative account of the crime spree, provides relevant background information to contextualize the media analysis. Additionally, it acts as the framework on which the rest of the volume rests, since it presents the unfolding crime spree as it was understood—James D. Martin appeared as the “first victim,” when in fact he was the fifth victim, shot October 2, 2002, something the media realized the next day. Although this is a good narrative summary, a simple timeline for Muhammad and Malvo would have aided in orienting the reader in later discussions.

The first three chapters contain the main analysis of the press and the levels of fear that various outlets portrayed. Chapter 1 focuses on the *Washington Post*, the dominant newspaper (and, arguably, media outlet) in the sniper coverage. Censer concludes that, although coherence is not normal in such a decentralized organization, general themes did appear. Articles emphasized fear but many tempered it with a sense of community. In Chapter 2, using a selection of local and national stations, Censer sees the ultimate message radio and television delivered as a vast moral-
ity play with daily coverage of the fear and confusion. Chapter 3 samples the vast landscape of national and international coverage. According to figures that Censer regularly references but never directly cites, there “likely were more journalists than police” involved in the case (94). The sources examined ranged from the Washington Times and the Richmond Times-Dispatch to international reports from the Daily Mail (Britain) and Le Monde (Paris). Despite a few significant exceptions, notably the Post, the overwhelming majority emphasized worry, anxiety, and fear.

In Chapter 4, Censer delves into the attitudes of individual journalists covering the snipers by constructing a narrative around the development of the journalistic response and highlighting journalists’ personal experiences. This narrative shows that the sensationalism surrounding the spree was not the result of political slant or conscious choice, but it leaves open the possibility that passion for reporting and competitiveness may have led to the sensationalistic tone of their coverage. Chapter 5 analyses the response of three very large school districts, Fairfax (Va.) and Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties (Md.). Censer compares their responses with that of the press and finds that overall, the schools saw the sniper as a threat, but one that could be managed. Although superintendents dealt with events as an unfolding crisis, most schools carried on reasonably normally. While the media emphasized fear, schools were more optimistic throughout the period.

Censer’s footnote biographies of journalists and media personalities are particularly helpful. While many national broadcasters then working are currently well known, most will eventually join their print and local counterparts in relative obscurity. Therefore, these biographies will extend the book’s usefulness for many years.

Censer concludes by pulling together the various threads to show that apolitical and non-deliberative mechanisms that cultivate fear exist in the media. Within American society, those who wish to generate fear could use a media that was willing and, possibly, ineluctably inclined toward it. Ultimately, the fear that has characterized American politics post–9/11 is only possible by understanding how the media works.

For the student of the modern media, this is an important case study in the fundamental assumptions of the press and its underlying framework. Although Censer’s analysis is limited by his sample size, he does provide a glimpse behind the curtain at the mechanisms that journalists rely upon to generate the news. Though the case study contained in this book may only be of interest to a small number of historians, the methods and conclusions will appeal to a much wider range of academics.

Thad Parsons III
Alexandria, Virginia
Antero Pietila has been interested in issues related to civil rights since his arrival in the United States from Finland in 1964. After he earned his master's degree in journalism from Southern Illinois University, Pietila began a long newspaper career. His work as a reporter for the *Baltimore Sun* exposed him to the many facets of racial segregation and the changes taking place in Baltimore's residential neighborhoods. This book is the culmination of ten years of extensive research on how segregation and bigotry shaped Maryland's largest city.

Although Baltimore has its own variations, this book could be the story of many other American cities during the same period, 1880–2009. Interviews with the major players in Baltimore's housing history enhance this fascinating look at how underhanded business practices, secret deals, and amoral realtors made fortunes resegregating the city's neighborhoods.

Beginning with the sale of a home on McCulloh Street to an African American in 1910, Pietila tells us how racial change occurred in the city's neighborhoods. The blockbusters of Baltimore were nicknamed “the 40 Thieves,” and they instilled panic in white residents. Blacks, shut out of the real estate market by most real estate brokers and financial institutions, were eager to purchase any available housing at a premium in such a limited market. The blockbusters exploited Baltimore's segregated neighborhoods by taking advantage of white panic and blacks' need for housing. Using predatory lending and installment contracts to place black residents into often substandard housing, blockbusters profited on all aspects of the real estate transfer. Whites viewed them as pariahs for creating panic in their neighborhoods. Blacks saw them as agents of change with opportunities for improved housing.

Redlining, a practice in which lenders refuse to lend money or extend credit in certain neighborhoods based on the ethnic and racial characteristics of its residents, played a major role in Baltimore's development, determining where people moved in the city. Pietila also traces the role local and national governments played in helping to maintain segregation. The city council legislated segregation by identifying who could live in which areas of the city. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) would not provide mortgages in the inner cities or to blacks. The building of the interstate highway system opened vast tracts of neighboring Baltimore County to housing development, and the FHA provided low down payment, thirty-year mortgages to white residents who eagerly seized the opportunity to move out of the city. White flight was also helped by measures adopted by Baltimore County executives (among them former vice president Spiro Agnew) that ensured that housing and the county remained predominantly white.

An added dimension is Baltimore's story of anti-Jewish housing practices. Jews, like blacks, were relegated to specific parts of the city where they grew their com-
munities and local institutions. Pietila identified one major player, Joseph Meyerhoff, himself Jewish, to be a major discriminator in that he would not rent or sell to his fellow Jews. Additionally, the esteemed Johns Hopkins University placed quotas on the admission of Jews, a policy shared by the University of Maryland Medical School. The author makes excellent use of his access to the archives of the Baltimore Jewish Council to document and illustrate these practices.

Pietila clearly shows how today’s residential Baltimore came to be. His is a fascinating book and an excellent read.

Arthur M. Holst
City of Philadelphia


For a city that seldom gets the scholarly attention it deserves, 2010 was a big year for books about Baltimore. It saw the publication of Not in My Neighborhood, Antero Pietila’s exposé on residential segregation, as well as Howell Baum’s monograph detailing the promise and shortcomings of school desegregation in the city. And while there may be no such thing as bad publicity, Charm City cuts a rather dubious figure in each book—for housing and education, integration remains a dream deferred in Baltimore. For Baum, the clear culprit for the persistence of de facto segregation in Baltimore schools, whose student body was 89 percent African American in 2004, is liberalism. Within three weeks of the Supreme Court’s historic decision in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954), Baltimore’s school board voted to comply with desegregation. But, Baum asserts, the means by which Baltimore desegregated contained the seeds of resegregation.

Baltimore was one of four border cities to comply immediately with Brown, but unlike Wilmington, Kansas City, and St. Louis, it did not use districting to create school assignments expressly designed to integrate the school system. Baltimore instead opted for “open enrollment,” which “ended legal differentiation of white and black schools and let students transfer to any school” (71). Treating enrollment as an individual choice in an ostensibly free marketplace of school options squared with liberal approaches to race in the middle of the twentieth century. But, Baum asserts, because “liberals are indifferent to the aggregate outcomes of individual choices” (13), the school board never took the affirmative steps necessary to ensure long-lasting integration. The liberal approach set the stage for white flight and the retrenchment of segregation by the end of the century.

Baum prefaces his examination of the city’s desegregation efforts between the 1950s and 1980s with three chapters that establish the liberal approach as a distinctly Baltimorean solution in a city with a history of avoiding uncomfortable
racial conversations. Baum’s first chapter recounts the peculiarities of talking about race in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Baltimore, within the city’s history of coexisting enslaved and free black populations as well as its subordination to more powerful interests elsewhere in the state. It is an intriguing back story, but one that Matthew Crenson examined more persuasively and provocatively in his 2006 Urbanite article, “The Elephant in the City.” Prior to Brown, the local chapter of the NAACP, supported by the influential Afro-American newspaper, fought the separate-but-equal doctrine that confined black students to decidedly unequal schools. Through dogged activism within an atmosphere in which schools would have to be desegregated one by one, a coalition of civil rights groups fought to admit the first black students to Baltimore Polytechnic Institute and to what is now Mergenthaler Vocational-Technical High School.

The early promise of Baltimore’s response to Brown, Baum argues, was curtailed by the inherent flaws of a liberal strategy around desegregation. In theory, Baltimore families were unencumbered by race and could choose to send their students to any school. In practice, very few white families chose to send their children to formerly “colored” schools. Baum is sensitive to different constituencies in Baltimore and the reasons for their particular responses to open enrollment. Middle-class black families embraced it because they were fed up with living under constrained educational choices. Working-class white families opposed and sometimes protested it because, unlike affluent white liberals who could send their children to expensive private schools, they were “less able to move if changes upset them” (86). While much of his narrative deals with negotiations among elite city officials, lawyers, judges, and federal investigators, Baum skillfully grounds the city’s case for open enrollment in Baltimore’s infamous neighborhood consciousness and local imperatives.

Six years after Brown, African Americans outnumbered white students in Baltimore schools. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, not even federal pressure and the threat of withholding funding could make the city replace its open enrollment policy with more active steps toward integration. In 1987, a decade of federal wrangling with Baltimore officials to determine whether or not they had done enough to promote integration (a long process of letters, court hearings, and appeals that Baum recounts in sometimes excruciating detail) ended with a judgment from the Department of Education that there were no longer any “vestiges of . . . prior de jure school segregation” (207). That might have been true, Baum concludes, but black children suffered as a result of a free choice model of school desegregation that allowed white families to choose not to integrate.

As reviewers in the City Paper and elsewhere have noted, Baum’s singular emphasis on liberalism as the cause for resegregation in Baltimore is far too simple. Moreover, though parts of Baum’s indictment of liberalism are persuasive, it is also true that some civil rights activists adopted a classical liberal, color-blind approach in the 1950s and 1960s, and even earlier. Their goal had been to remove the legal
recognition of racial distinctions—Jonathan Bean’s *Race and Liberty in America: The Essential Reader* (University Press of Kentucky, 2009) is a useful primer. There is a more complex argument to be made about liberalism as help or hindrance to racial equality, but Baum leaves little room for it in this monograph. Liberalism bears some of the blame for the fate of school desegregation in Baltimore, but the local as well as national contexts in which liberalism emerged the victor over intentional integrationism, particularly in the 1970s, deserve more scrutiny than Baum supplies here. What inequalities today do we attribute to individual choices—and are these in fact inequalities that we could be doing more to correct? That is the book’s most resonant question.

**Francesca Gamber**

*Maryland Institute College of Art*


In her second major work, Alison Games traces England’s transformation from a weak country in the mid-sixteenth century to a powerful nation a hundred years later. Games recognizes that the English were financially and militarily weak when they began constant overseas travel by 1560 and argues that the colonial and commercial enterprises these cosmopolitan men created contributed to the country’s emergence as a powerful nation by 1660. These cosmopolitan globetrotters were a diverse group of “merchants, promoters, adventurers, proprietors, soldiers, governors, travelers, ministers, and diplomats” who traveled the globe and keenly adjusted to and learned from the countries to which they traveled. They took in a variety of experiences and thus had no monolithic response when arriving at a new destination. London was at the center of this “web of empire,” and the growing migration of English cosmopolitans led to a network of connections linking England to other parts of the world through migration and commercial and colonial expansion.

The first chapter meticulously examines recreational and educational travel and brilliantly scrutinizes English travel literature to show that those who ventured abroad brought their newly acquired knowledge home—information about other languages, customs, cultures, and how to interact with foreign people. Games then discusses how the Mediterranean became the origin of the British empire. Because the English were initially weak and vulnerable in the early stages of travel to this region, they pursued strategies of accommodation, adaptability, and deceit that would become their model in subsequent commercial and colonial ventures. Merchants who traveled to the Ottoman Empire, Lisbon, and Japan between 1590 and 1660 used a variety of pragmatic strategies based on their surroundings to connect with local trade networks. Eventually they linked trade networks around the world.
Games discusses English efforts to establish a plantation colony at Jamestown and the colonial governors, trade consuls, and ambassadors who attempted to set up colonies in North America and elsewhere. These men traveled from post to post, using private funds such as those available from the Virginia Company to help establish global colonial and commercial enterprises. Games then addresses the decades from 1640 to 1660 during the political and religious struggles of the Civil War and Commonwealth. She notes that the English were not always successful towards their quest for empire; disease and lack of agriculture, directly related to unfamiliar climate, dictated failure in colonies such as Madagascar.

Lastly, Games examines Ireland in the 1650s against the background of England’s growth into a powerful nation. By the mid-seventeenth century, England colonized other peoples such as the Irish by employing “violent, coercive, and state-orchestrated” methods of colonization. The Crown and the English government used “brute force” in attempting to compel the Irish to migrate. Ireland, by the 1650s, was an example of the “culmination” of previous English colonization experiences. The power of the English to forcibly remove people brought Ireland, the Caribbean, and North America into what was by the seventeenth century an empire.

A few small criticisms. At times the book reads like a disparate set of chapters, each of which could almost be its own article. In places better transitions from one chapter to another would have been helpful, particularly between “English Merchant” and “Virginia,” and between “All the King’s Men” and “Madagascar.” A second suggestion would be to, if possible, probe a bit more into the travel literature—how many read it and with what reaction(s). Despite these small qualms, Games presents an intriguing, well-researched, beautifully written monograph.

MELISSA AMY MAESTRI
University of Delaware


In A “Topping People:” The Rise and Decline of Virginia’s Old Political Elite, 1680–1790, Emory G. Evans argues that eighteenth-century elite Virginia families rose to prominence through financial diversification and political savvy but declined in power due to increased debt and living beyond their means. Evans, a University of Maryland professor and scholar of the eighteenth-century Chesapeake who passed away in 2009, puts a fitting capstone on a distinguished career with this century-long examination of elite Virginia society. Wonderfully written and meticulously documented, the ample footnotes provide evidence of a complete mastery of the archives and secondary literature that only a top scholar can provide.

A “Topping People” is arranged chronologically and organized into four chapters
Evans begins by justifying the temporal and topical boundaries for his study. His decision to limit his study to the wealthiest families in Virginia assumes the vast amount of social, political, and economic control these families had over the development of the colony. The documentary record this group left behind is substantial, which played a role in Evans’s choice. He begins in 1680 because “the relationship between the crown and the colony began to change as the government tried to exercise greater control over Virginia” (3). This decision leaves Bacon’s Rebellion out of the discussion for the most part; a conversation between Evans’s findings and some of the more recent scholarship on the period would have been welcome here. The twenty-one families he studied came from varied geographical English regions but shared an ambition for diversified profit. Additionally, they sought political appointments to protect their growing wealth and influence. In spite of the “difficult times” in Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, the families were well situated for success in the eighteenth (22).

Evans is most comfortable when writing about politics, and this is particularly evident in the second chapter. This longest chapter of the book provides a detailed analysis of the struggles between the elite families and the royal governors. At the beginning of the century, the struggle was focused around the governor and his council, a politically appointed group whose membership comprised a great number of the elite families. Three decades of political struggle led to increased colonial stability, a trend Evans identifies with the rise in power of the House of Burgesses. Indeed, by 1737, he argues, “despite the fact that the sons of many of the leading families continued to seek council seats, the House of Burgesses was where most of them served” (89). Evans turns next to the economy. Diversified profit-making ventures and good decisions led to the rise of the elite families in Virginia, but elite status in the eighteenth century led to their downfall. In order to increase their wealth, new generations began to expand family enterprises, especially tobacco production, and more and more they came to rely on credit and debt. As Evans points out, “increased income and wealth brought increased credit, and that in turn produced increased debt” (111).

He continues to argue this point in his final full chapter, “Society, 1700–1776.” Wealthy Virginians sought to imitate their British counterparts and worked to create a deferential society that would protect their interests. Families intermarried to protect their wealth, and parents educated their children in the best London boarding schools they could afford. Yet the material trappings of promoting their status apparently led to their downfall. The rising social classes began to impinge upon the deferential order the elite tried to create. Additionally, they began to make poor decisions in regard to their wealth. Evans suggests that moral degeneracy played a role here, noting “horses and horse racing became a major preoccupation for many” (151). At the heart of his argument, and Evans demonstrates it persuasively, is the
assessment that these top families simply lived “beyond their means” (168). The epilogue carries these families through the revolutionary and early national periods to document the end of their influence. The increasing debt with which they had lived for decades could not be sustained. Indeed, for William Byrd III, the loss of political and economic influence led him to end his own life (193). By the end of the revolution, political and economic power in Virginia was moving westward and away from the eighteenth-century elite.

Evans’s argument is persuasive and A “Topping People” can certainly be profitable reading for both scholarly and nonacademic audiences. Indeed, much of the substance of the rise and fall of the Virginia elite resonates within contemporary U.S. society. However, we are left to wonder whether a more substantial discussion of slavery might have amplified or augmented his conclusions. Although Evans admits that “these elite families were so dependent on their slaves and the relationship was so intimate and pervasive,” slavery does not play a major role in most of the book. Additionally, it would have been enlightening to learn how the influence and culture of the elite affected other layers of Virginia society. Regardless, A “Topping People” is a fitting bookend to the career of one of the top scholars of eighteenth-century Chesapeake politics and society.

Ian J Aebel
University of New Hampshire


*Family Values in the Old South* sets out to showcase how real antebellum southern families functioned. Editors Craig Thompson Friend and Anya Jabour detail the ever-changing model of a family alongside modern misconceptions about Old South nuclear families and their functions. (The modern yearning for a return to old-time traditions has no basis in actual antebellum family values.) Antebellum families included slaves, but this “disturbing side . . . is often overlooked out of a longing for the more romantic notions of the Old South” (3). These essays explore family structures that undermine the Old South of romantic myth.

The book is split into three parts. In Part One, four authors “examine structure, power, and function” in southern families by looking at unconventional families (9). Nancy Zey recounts how many children in orphan asylums were not technically orphans at all but instead had parents in dire straits. One’s family was not static and changed “many times over the course of a person’s life” (33). Emily West researched cross-plantation slave marriages in an attempt to destroy the myth that such unions created “a type of ‘single parent’ family” (43) that allowed slaves to fulfill expected gender roles. The men traveled to visit their families, while the women kept house,
provided childcare, and prepared for the visits. But West proves that separation in cross-plantation marriages resulted from a “relative lack of concern,” and that slaves actually favored them (50). Friend notes that mourning practices in the South mirrored those of the North, except “when it came to antebellum southern childhood death, [then] race mattered” (64). White southerners classified grief as feminine and established strict mourning rules. Slaves, who did not own their time, could not conform to the grieving periods whites were socially permitted. Grief over children's deaths depended on gender and race. Jabour discusses female love, which defied expected heterosexuality. No southern equivalent of “Boston marriages” emerged because female relationships failed to become common in the region. Only teaching allowed women a respectable occupation to financially support themselves, and families refused to support maiden aunts. Jabour shows how women tried and failed to subvert male dominance because their options were limited.

Part Two looks at home businesses to highlight the way southerners defined values. Lynn Kennedy discusses women’s sewing, which required much time and showed women’s familial obligations. Providing their families, including slaves, with clothing was the mistress’s contribution to the family’s material well-being. Teaching young girls and slaves to sew increased this production. Kennedy notes that sewing was a cross-racial skill, but slave women were never considered capable of the fine sewing that white women produced. Using the marriage of Ann and Richard Archer, Nikki Berg Burin details the stresses that female plantation management could have on a relationship. Burin is clear that “female plantation management was . . . a manifestation of patriarchal privilege” and an addition to the wife’s normal responsibilities of household, children, and pregnancy (141). Business became an essential part of a plantation marriage, but it weakened the marital bond by causing distrust, loneliness, and unhappiness. Kirsten E. Wood’s essay focuses on inns, taverns, and hotels. The reliance on female labor in a yeoman’s household was hidden from the public eye, but in public houses patrons openly viewed and affixed a price to women’s labor, causing issues for women’s respectability and creating “competing versions of proper family structures and gender roles.”

The contributors in Part Three “move beyond both the boundaries of the family and the walls of the household” to demonstrate how families created social and cultural standards (9). Andrew K. Frank unravels Indian/white sovereignty through the trial of George Stinson, who married a Creek woman, started a trading post with his new brother-in-law, and was adopted into a matriarchal clan. This arrangement allowed him to subvert federal licensing regulations but also reworked traditional southern family values. Christopher J. Olsen traces how southern political culture placed family values in the public eye. Wealthy planters offered their homes for polling places, and prominent men were appointed as voting officers. The men guarding the right to vote held office year after year and passed the positions down to their sons. Kevin Noble Maillard shows how wills allowed accusations of miscegenation to
undermine family ties. Using Paul Durbin’s will, Maillard shows how an heir, Philis, a free-colored woman, was forced to defend her inheritance in court. Durbin’s sibling claimed Philis was a slave and therefore not their brother’s rightful heir. South Carolina law treated the two families, one white and one mixed-race, differently, and family values became skewed when the members were not all white.

These essays bring to life real southern family values, but the compilation seems incomplete without a short conclusion. Despite this minor flaw, Family Values in the Old South offers interesting scholarship that removes the romantic veil from one important aspect of the Old South.

Kerry M. Cohen
University of Alabama


In April 1861 the state of Virginia, birthplace of seven of sixteen American presidents, voted in convention to secede from the United States. After weeks of serious debate and a proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln calling for 75,000 volunteers to preserve it by military force if necessary, delegates to the state secession convention chose to leave the Union. Secession had come to fruition in the Deep South in response to Lincoln’s election months earlier, but many Virginians held out hope that their state would not be forced to choose such a risky course of action. Unlike South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, all of which voted to leave the Union in response to Lincoln’s election, the states of the Upper South took their time. The debate in Virginia was spirited and heartfelt, and thanks to a masterly job of editing by William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson, readers can follow Virginia’s perilous journey in the words of those who framed the debate. Showdown in Virginia is an outstanding collection of primary documents that chart Virginia’s course during the period.

The book is divided into three sections, each prefaced by a short introduction that provides context. Each document is introduced with a brief explanatory paragraph. The first section includes fourteen speeches from delegates representing a wide range of opinion. Six are from delegates who favored secession, and eight are from some of the state’s most prominent unionists. This section reflects discussions that took place before the firing on Fort Sumter, when the unionist point of view at the convention was formidable. As the editors point out, the debate is fascinating because the topic itself was unique and, in contrast to discussions of more mundane political matters, participants had a vested, personal interest in the debate’s outcome. “Individuals seldom suffer a political crisis that may destroy their lives,” the editors maintain, and “the high stakes generated a catch in the throat and a fright in the
voice” (1). The second section deals with intrastate class issues related to taxation. Non-slaveholders in the state’s western reaches were angry over tax advantages given to eastern slaveowners. At the same time, many of the latter sought western support for secession to the point that they were willing to compromise on the tax issue. The debates were heated and, foreshadowing events to come, some westerners even discussed seceding from Virginia if slaveholders took the state out of the Union. The differences over taxes represented an important “issue within the issue” at the convention. Rather than unifying the state against a perceived common threat, the secession debate in Virginia irritated old wounds, driving many easterners and westerners farther apart. The third section of the book deals primarily with the convention in the days immediately following the assault on Fort Sumter. This was a critical period, because the fallout from the assault on Sumter dashed the hopes of Virginia’s unionists. Lincoln’s subsequent call for volunteers was a “deathblow to procrastination” that made secession a foregone conclusion.

*Showdown in Virginia* is an important addition to scholarship on the secession movement. It gives readers a well-organized glimpse into how the secession process worked in the Upper South, where there were fewer radicals and rash acts immediately following Lincoln’s election. The book is also interesting because, although they did not know it at the time, the men who framed the debate were not just discussing a political issue. In the end they made decisions that transformed their state into one of the primary military theaters of a bloody civil conflict. For these reasons anyone interested in Civil War history or Virginia history should find much of interest in this skillfully edited collection of primary sources.

Ben Wynne

Gainesville State College


Few Civil War myths have persisted more tenaciously than the idea of a “Solid South” unified in devoted support of the Confederacy. These two volumes demonstrate quite the opposite. Victoria E. Bynum’s dissection of North Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas communities during and after the war, and Kenneth Noe’s examination of men who waited until after 1861 to join the Confederate army both highlight the primacy that many southerners placed on local and family concerns. That southerners cared about their homes and families might seem to reinforce longstanding notions, but the implications of each author’s argument make quite
clear that during the war families’ needs clashed with Confederate imperatives and in the end proved more important.

Bynum looks closely at anti-Confederate populations in North Carolina’s Quaker Belt, Jones County Mississippi, and the Big Thicket region of East Texas to argue that local kin groups fought against the Confederacy during wartime and actively resisted the reassertion of elite control in Reconstruction and beyond. She draws on family papers, censuses, War Department data, genealogical information, newspapers and governors’ papers to bolster her claims that kinship and class, not ideology or race, mattered most for the people she studied. Leaving room for local variation, she argues that religion motivated resistance in North Carolina, but not in Mississippi or Texas. Particularly fascinating are Bynum’s portraits of family groups, especially the Collins family branches in Mississippi and Texas, and Newt Knight’s interracial family in Mississippi. The book is stronger on the war than the postwar years, where the outdated nature of Bynum’s bibliography harms the credibility of some assertions, especially about Populism.

Noe focuses on men who joined the Confederate army in or after 1862 to determine if the usual array of motivations assigned to Confederate soldiers—patriotism, state rights ideology, peer pressure, honor, the preservation of slavery, religion, hatred of the enemy, and small group cohesion—applied to those who enlisted later. He draws on the letters and diaries of 320 men who joined up in 1862 or later and carefully quantifies the percentage of men in his sample who discussed each topic. Aside from tentative suggestions that later enlisters might have been marginally older and more likely to be married, little moved by Confederate nationalism, uninterested in state rights, and not out to impress the girls or polish their own reputations, but seemingly concerned that slavery not be eradicated, the book resists generalizations. Later enlisters cared most about their families and wanted to go home, but whether they differed in those regards from early enlisters is by no means established by Reluctant Rebels, nor does it seem terribly plausible. Although later-enlisters do not emerge as a coherent group that stands apart from others in any meaningful way, the book makes a strong case for remembering that even the Confederate army was no united front.

A key difference between Bynum’s interpretation and Noe’s analysis is that Bynum emphasizes class conflict while Noe downplays it. For Bynum, poor people united to stick it to the rich. The Long Shadow, then, fits firmly within the camp that argues that the Confederacy crumbled from within because of class conflict. If occasionally Bynum’s evidence suggests a subtler interpretation (individuals she sees as punished merely for being poor, for example Ann Bowers Boothe and Pattie Ruffin in Chapter 3 seem to be ostracized by equally poor whites not for their poverty but because they defied community norms of race and gender), her reminders about the presence and significance of economic inequality remain salutary. Noe, conversely, shows that class determined little where late-enlisting Confederates were concerned. Poor
men had more to worry about in terms of their families’ well-being, but they proved neither more nor less likely than the wealthy to enlist, seek substitutes, worry about the absence of slavery, or take any other position on the war. So airtight is Noe’s case about the primary importance of family concerns that the reader is left a little disappointed that the book did not break away from cataloging the familiar list of soldiers’ motivations to consider more deeply what it meant for soldiers to privilege “kin and neighborhood.” How did such tendencies force the Confederate government to adjust? If class division did not crush the Confederacy, and “overwhelming numbers” of Yankees do not satisfy Noe as the explanation for the Confederacy’s downfall, then how should we understand Confederate nationalism and defeat? Still, the book did not set out to consider such questions, but rather to fill a gap in existing literature on Confederate soldiers, and readers who cannot resist filling their bookshelves with volumes on every aspect of the Confederate army are fortunate to have this particular subset dissected with Noe’s sensitive, clear-eyed affection.

None of Bynum’s three communities was in Maryland, and Noe’s book only creeps into Maryland three brief times when the Army of Northern Virginia campaigned there, which makes both books important to southern and U.S. history more than state history. Noe closes his book puzzling over the modern tendency to romanticize the Civil War. These two books provide important reminders that the Civil War was no thrilling diversion, but rather a time of conflict, division, and often tragedy.

Chandra Manning
Georgetown University


Burrus Carnahan’s quest is to determine whether Abraham Lincoln authorized or condoned violations of the laws and customs of war during the Civil War. His study, which concludes with Lincoln’s acquittal, leads to a fruitful examination of the conduct of Lincoln and his generals through the prism of nineteenth-century international law.

Carnahan does a superb job of explaining a fundamental difficulty that arises in any consideration of the legality of Lincoln’s Civil War actions—the conceptual ambiguity arising from civil war. For many reasons, Lincoln did not want to treat the Confederacy as a foreign nation. Yet many of his orders, such as seizing private property or treating captured Confederate soldiers as prisoners of war, would have been illegal and unconstitutional had he been merely leading a police action against recalcitrant citizens. Lincoln’s ambivalence as to the nature of the conflict, and his sometimes flexible approach, make it difficult to define a single rule of law by which to gauge his actions.
Nonetheless, there are sufficient legal standards for a historian to use in evaluating Lincoln’s conduct. In addition to international law, the American military was eventually guided by a code drafted by Dr. Francis Lieber and issued on April 24, 1863, which delineated both the laws of war and the procedures used to enforce those laws. For example, according to the Lieber Code, “military necessity” was a legitimate justification for the taking or destruction of private property, but the code forbade such action if done for vengeance or cruelty—a line consistent with Lincoln’s political and moral views.

To illustrate this principle, Carnahan offers the story of Mary Morton, the wife of a Confederate soldier, whose Arkansas home was seized by an army provost marshal. Lincoln intervened and declared that, while it was permissible to take cotton and other usable items for military purposes, there was no legitimate justification for seizing the house and furniture of noncombatants such as Morton.

Carnahan also describes Lincoln’s moral opposition to retaliation against the innocent for actions done by others. After the 1864 massacre of African American soldiers at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, Frederick Douglass urged Lincoln to retaliate by executing Confederate prisoners of war. Lincoln refused, saying that he “could not take men out and kill them in cold blood for what was done by others” (73).

Carnahan notes that rather than declaring broad policy statements, Lincoln took a piecemeal approach to issues concerning the moral and legal rules of war. Though he occasionally intervened in individual cases, he did not offer general rules. For example, after some generals permitted the burning of houses, Ulysses S. Grant proposed that Lincoln issue a formal order prohibiting the practice. Lincoln did not give such an order, though he did informally indicate his opposition. Although Carnahan is correct that “command responsibility”—the requirement that leaders act to prevent subordinates from committing war crimes—did not become generally established until after World War II, uncertainty lingers concerning whether Lincoln is somehow responsible for failing to act more forcefully after becoming aware of the practice.

Carnahan also accepts Lincoln’s habit of informally counseling his generals to avoid violations of legal norms rather than issuing more formal orders. When, for example, Lincoln heard rumors in 1864 that unionist “death squads” in Kentucky and Missouri had murdered southern sympathizers with the approval of army officers, he did not order his commander, Gen. William S. Rosecrans, to stop the death squads, though he opposed such killings. Instead, he wrote a friendly note to Rosecrans, adding that, if the rumored assassinations occurred, “This should not be. Of course, I have not heard that you give countenance to, or wink at such assassinations.” Carnahan explains this as an example of Lincoln’s choosing to be “diplomatic and tactful with a general facing a very difficult mission” (111).

Another tricky legal issue raised by the conduct of Lincoln’s generals was the appropriateness of destroying all provisions within a geographic area, and ravaging,
rendering a place uninhabitable. When William Tecumesh Sherman led his march through Georgia, his troops burned the town of Millen in retaliation for the horrendous conditions they had just discovered at a nearby Confederate prison camp. Carnahan concludes that destruction of a community, especially when its residents had nothing to do with the camp, was not justified by military necessity and violated the existing rules of war. It is uncertain whether Lincoln was aware of this activity. He did receive a letter from Sherman, indicating that if Confederate sympathizers did not cooperate then “desolating the land” might follow, but according to Carnahan, Lincoln would not have understood the implication. He could have drawn on “his limited military experience,” in the 1832 Black Hawk War (94), but based on what Lincoln had seen in that conflict, he “would have expected” Sherman’s troops merely to commit “acts of minor hooliganism,” not burn a city (96). Unfortunately, Carnahan offers no evidence to support this defense of Lincoln.

Carnahan is on much firmer ground in his discussion of Lincoln’s order authorizing the bombardment of Baltimore at the beginning of the Civil War. On April 25, 1861, barely a week after Fort Sumter had surrendered, and a few days after Massachusetts troops had been attacked by mobs in Baltimore, Lincoln told Winfield Scott that if Maryland seceded the general was to use all methods to counteract the creation of an enemy force, including bombarding the city. Even though Maryland did not secede and Baltimore was never shelled, the mere authorization of an artillery attack on a civilian population raises important legal issues. Carnahan explains how the laws of war have changed radically, how an attack on a civilian population today would be considered an obvious violation of international law, but modern standards should not be applied retroactively. Wartime actions, however they appear to contemporary sensibilities, must be understood under the legal and moral standards of their day.

This episode indicates one of the strengths of Lincoln on Trial. Carnahan has adroitly woven together a compelling tale of military conduct (and misconduct) with a comprehensive understanding of historical and modern rules of national and international law. The result is a solid work that will not only contribute to Civil War literature, but will greatly aid in our understanding of the difficult legal issues faced by Abraham Lincoln. In addition, Lincoln on Trial will be an invaluable aid to those studying the growth and development of the rules by which warfare is conducted. While constantly remembering that we must not use current standards to evaluate this historical experience, we use that experience to gain a better sense of how, and why, these standards have evolved.

Matthew Meyerson

University of Baltimore
The tragedy of the Civil War extends beyond the numerous dead and the massive destruction. The real weight of the war lies heavily upon the American mind for the sole reason that it was fought between Americans. Romantic views of the conflict as a family affair, seen in terms such as brother against brother, allows reconciliation without resolution. Sore subjects, such as racial atrocities or prisoner-of-war camps, remain festering beneath the surface, because the grim reality of wartime experiences cannot be romanticized.

Benjamin G. Cloyd tackles one of these issues. Captivity during the war was deadly. It resulted in 56,000 deaths, “nearly one-tenth of the 620,000 men who perished in the conflict” (1). Allegations of atrocities by both sides provide Cloyd with a platform from which to interpret the complex path of sectional reconciliation into the twenty-first century. Such a brutal subject also illustrates the lingering reticence among Americans to fully confront the implications of responsibility and fault for the treatment of prisoners during their civil war.

Cloyd identifies the discordant nature of Civil War prisons in American memory in the wartime policies and experiences of the Union and Confederacy. Unprepared for a long war on such a massive scale, both sides created a prison system from scratch. The unsanitary conditions of the camps were fatal, but Cloyd emphasizes the breakdown of the prison exchange in 1863. Halted by the Confederacy, which was unwilling to exchange captured black soldiers, the breakdown of the cartel, Cloyd argues, resulted in a massive influx of prisoners that strained the resources of both nations. Wartime propaganda increased the perception of prison atrocities, each side accusing the other of purposefully denying rations, medical attention, and adequate shelter. Those perceptions remained relevant during Reconstruction with the execution of Henry Wirz, the former commandant of Andersonville Prison. Andersonville, the deadliest prison camp of the war, and Wirz were viewed by northerners “as the primary symbols of Confederate atrocity” (36). Republicans waving “the blood shirt” often referred to atrocious Confederate prisons in postwar elections, ensuring the continued presence of the animosity created during the war.

Cloyd uses soldier’s memoirs extensively throughout the first part of the book to identify the development of two distinct sectional memories. Northern soldiers highlighted the dismal conditions of southern prisons, like Libby Prison in Richmond and Andersonville in Georgia, and accused southerners of purposefully mistreating inmates. Southerners inverted the northern view by stressing the horrors of Johnson’s Island in Ohio and Point Lookout in Maryland. This enmity persisted in published memoirs, some of which appeared as late as the early twentieth century, countering scholars’ claims of a complete sectional reconciliation by 1900. This vestige of wartime
hatred lived on beneath the surface of sectional reconciliation, because “to recall the prisons was to recall not just suffering but deliberately inflicted cruelty” (90).

Sectionalized understanding of American memory builds upon the arguments of David Blight’s *Race and Reunion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), specifically in the division of northern, southern, and African American views toward the war. The presence of African American memory of prisons is limited to an examination of Memorial Day celebrations at Andersonville during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and is only described by contemporary, and highly racist, reports from the local newspaper. Details are brief, save to explain that the mostly black participants commemorated the event through the emancipationist view that emphasized the sacrifice of Union soldiers for black freedom. Readers may have appreciated more information on these celebrations, specifically since they occurred throughout the Jim Crow era in Georgia, but Cloyd remains focused on the white memory of Civil War prisons.

A fascinating aspect of the book is his analysis of the shifting nature of memory. The twentieth century offered numerous examples for Americans to rationalize the horrors of Civil War prison camps beyond sectional blame. In light of Nazi concentration camps and the Bataan Death March, many Americans came to the “realization that . . . the prison experience of the Civil War did not represent a break from the past but perhaps instead the origins of a grim pattern” (111). Placing the experience within the larger context of man’s inhumanity during modern warfare provided a new perception of Civil War prison camps that reflected the fears of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War. Cloyd’s analysis of this transformation illustrates the malleable nature of historical memory and how “the need for a usable past require[s] continued attention” in each successive generation (128).

This work, a welcome addition to the growing field of Civil War memory, offers much to ponder as Americans observe the sesquicentennial of the Civil War, especially in addressing the unanswered questions of responsibility. Most of the book’s focus is on Andersonville, although many Maryland readers may be enticed to visit Point Lookout State Park and compare some of Cloyd’s conclusions with the interpretation presented at the park’s museum.

Boyd R. Harris
*University of Mississippi*


As we embark on marking the 150th anniversary of the American Civil War, readers will doubtless find much new scholarship covering the war’s various aspects, but relatively few scholars will spotlight the period following the soldiers’
return home. Andrew L. Slap’s timely release describes what happened in the years following Appomattox and surveys the period’s enduring impact on the region. His essayists, including experts as well as emerging historians, illuminate a largely uncharted region in Reconstruction history—Appalachia. With a variety of writing styles and research techniques, the book highlights the vast economic, social, and political transformations that occurred in Appalachia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Chapters entitled “A New Frontier” and “A Northern Wedge Thrust into the Heart of the Confederacy” remind readers that reinterpretation remains a vitally important facet of historical writing. Slap explains that the central purpose of his work is to add a new understanding to Appalachia and Reconstruction history. According to Slap, minimal writing has been produced on the subject, and as a result of new research much of Appalachian history warrants reinterpretation. In addition, Slap anticipates that the contribution will aid in redefining the region as well as correcting many of its current stereotypes.

Appalachia has long been considered isolated from the rest of the nation, but during Reconstruction, it in many ways kept pace with other regions. With that said, Reconstructing Appalachia focuses on aspects that separated the region from the former Confederate states. Among the issues discussed are race, poverty, women in the workplace, and the exploitation and reinvestment of natural resources. Furthermore, depending on the section of Appalachia in which they occurred, many of the topics differ. As a result, analyzing the region during Reconstruction has often been described as “chaos and upheaval” (43). Nevertheless, the editor and contributors to Reconstructing Appalachia have provided fresh, intuitive theses anchored in sound research.

The central theme in Appalachia, critical in nearly every regional issue, was political division. Following four years of atrocities, mountaineers, many of whom had supported opposing interests during the war, returned to homes that were commonly located within the same Appalachian hills and hollers. As contributing author Steven E. Nash notes, those mountaineers “wore their loyalties like targets over their hearts” and as a result ensured continued conflict (107). Many historians argue that in Appalachia the Civil War did not end in 1865 but continued through the Reconstruction period. Chapters on Breathitt County, Kentucky, and a close look at the struggles in West Virginia, clearly demonstrate the tensions that persisted between Union and Confederate supporters. A chapter discusses Unionist efforts in West Virginia to limit the former Confederates’ power, and another addresses partisan shifts in West Virginia’s state politics. Sadly, the political disunity drastically hampered the coal industry in the state. Despite West Virginia’s abundant natural resources, poverty planted its roots during Reconstruction. Similar unrest is explored in an essay on North Carolina’s political dilemmas. The issue of African American equality remains a central theme here, in which debates in North Carolina peaked
over the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, several Unionists called for the creation of a new state.

Two chapters are dedicated to a remaining Reconstruction and Appalachian icon, the Ku Klux Klan. Although the KKK is commonly thought of as an organization dedicated to the oppression of African Americans, a communal study of the Mossy Creek KKK sheds new light on the organization’s motives. Keith S. Hébert considers the Mossy Creek KKK as a grassroots movement committed to the protection of local distillers during the enforcement of the 1870 liquor tax.

In addition, various chapters underline more specific topics, including a reinterpretation of Tennessee governor Parson Brownlow’s racial ideals. Mary Ella Engel’s essay on John Hamilton Morgan’s 1876 mission to Georgia explains the appeal that various religious groups gained during a time of poverty and uncertainty following the war. Northern Appalachia is discussed in a chapter dedicated to tracing the course of Reconstruction in Pennsylvania. As in West Virginia, natural resources played a key role in postwar Pennsylvania.

The final chapter, “Civil War Memory in Eastern Kentucky Is ‘Predominantly White,’” provides an excellent example of the enduring impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Appalachia. It proves that economic, political, and social implications formulated during that era continue to affect the region today. Moreover, it encourages continued research and reinterpretation of the issues with the hope of coming to grasp with the “chaos” of the region.

Although the book does not contain a chapter specifically dedicated to Maryland, students and historians will find several references and connections to the state’s history. Overall, I would recommend *Reconstructing Appalachia* to a wide array of audiences because it tackles an assortment of topics. Most importantly, it invites reinterpretation and helps to redefine a region characterized by a multitude of stereotypes.

**Carl C. Creason**  
*Murray State University*

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*Cooking in Other Women’s Kitchens: Domestic Workers in the South, 1865–1960.* By Rebecca Sharpless. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. 304 pages. Illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $35.00.)

Rebecca Sharpless examines the lives and personal experiences of African American women in the South as domestic servants, specifically cooks, from the postbellum period through the 1960s by effectively using oral histories, autobiographies, published reports, manuscripts, census data, newspaper accounts, cookbooks, diaries, and letters, among myriad other primary and secondary materials. The breadth and variety of her sources is a major strength of this work and gives the reader abundant firsthand accounts of African American women’s experiences as hired cooks. *Cooking*
*in Other Women’s Kitchens* is an eye-opening account of the hardships, daily labors, personal relationships, racial strife, and triumphs in the lives of these women.

Sharpless begins by setting some high goals for herself. The first is to examine how African American women used domestic work such as cooking “to bridge the old ways and the new, from slavery to employment of their own choosing” (xii). In addition, Sharpless hopes “to discover how African American cooks successfully functioned within a world of extremely hard work, low wages, and omnipresent racial strife” (xiii). She also admits to a third, initially unintended purpose: to confront and challenge popular racial stereotyping of African American domestic cooks. She limits her research to African Americans in domestic service in the southern United States, because their situations “differed substantially from those of the white women who worked in food services” (xii). Though the book does not try to serve as a comparative study, which is understandable given the amount of research required, Sharpless should have provided a more detailed discussion of the general landscape of female domestic workers, white and black, during the time studied.

Overall, Sharpless accomplishes her goals. The preface is comprehensive and rich with information about her methodology and sources, including a thorough examination of the challenges of analyzing cookbooks as primary sources. The introduction provides a necessary and interesting overview of African American women migrating from rural to urban areas, and of the transition from cooking as slaves to cooking as paid employees. Interestingly, the main chapters are not organized chronologically but instead are arranged to mirror a cook’s journey through the various stages and characteristics of employment. Partial chapter titles outline this journey and include: “Becoming a Cook,” “The Food,” “Compensation and Workers’ Resistance,” “Creating a Homeplace,” “Cooks and Their Families,” “Relationships with Employers,” and “Expanding Opportunities and the Decline of Domestic Work.” An informative appendix entitled “Cooks’ Wages, 1901–1960” follows the main text and provides insight into individual cooks’ compensation in various cities across the South. There is no real conclusion to this book, only a final chapter that briefly discusses the changes in domestic work and in race relations inherent to the post–World War II period. It would have been helpful had Sharpless revisited some of the goals she laid out in the preface and fused some of the themes and ideas that are scattered throughout the main chapters.

A central theme in the work revolves around how African American women resisted discrimination and oppression and coped in difficult circumstances, either in secret, by dissemblance, or through tactics more evident to employers. Sharpless provides numerous and sometimes stark examples. Cooks “toted” or brought home leftover food, purposely mishandled their employers’ kitchen equipment, spit in the food, pooled wages with other family members, brought their young children to work with them, resisted or acquiesced to rapes by household men, and quit outright unsatisfactory positions. The complex interplay of gender and race in domestic
work, of two women living and working in the same household—one as employer, one as employee; one white, one black—is another theme brought to the forefront. Sharpless aptly demonstrates how southern white women perpetuated the Jim Crow system in the microcosm of their homes, and how they were extremely naïve about the real lives and ambitions of their African American employees.

The state of Maryland is included in Sharpless’s definition of the South, but she examines the South more generally as a region and presents overarching themes, instead of focusing on particular states or even periods. Because Sharpless cites so many first-hand accounts from individual cooks and others, references are often made to specific cities where cooks worked, including major local cities such as Baltimore and Washington, D.C. Although no mentions of other Maryland cities with domestic workers are evident, scholars of Maryland history will still find the work very useful as a general guide to these women’s lives. Additionally, the book provides extensive information related to the history and culture of food and of food preparation in the South, and of cooking technology.

*Cooking in Other Women’s Kitchens* is thoroughly researched and well written, and will appeal to general readers but largely to scholars interested in women’s history and African American history. Sharpless accomplishes what she sets out to do with this work and provides readers with a sometimes astonishing but honest look at the lives of African American women cooks.

Elizabeth A. Novara
*University of Maryland, College Park*


Philip F. Rubio’s comprehensive history of African American labor and the U.S. post office traces the crosscutting influences of the search for racial equality, civil rights, and economic justice, culminating in the Great Postal Wildcat Strike of 1970. Rubio proposes an intriguing thesis: black postal workers served as a sort of “transmission belt” between laborers and the middle class, communicating notions about the shape and direction of activism across classes and, Rubio argues, across races (7). Postal employment was not only central to African American community development, black postal workers also significantly changed the post office and its unions for all workers. Before the Civil War, southern whites in particular opposed the employment of African Americans in mail handling, but postbellum post office employment quickly became a sure source of income for thousands of blacks. Met with white prejudice, black postal workers formed their own unions, whose primary aim was fighting white supremacy on the job. The first such union, the National Alliance, was founded in
1913 by “college-educated intellectuals” influenced more by Progressive reform than radical activism (33). In the interwar period, the Alliance acted as “a kind of ‘labor NAACP’—using negotiation rather than confrontation with postal management and unions” (38).

Rubio’s argument rests on a black activism uniquely driven by its own, mainly middle-class, imperatives. The Alliance remained the strongest instrument of black empowerment in the post office for almost sixty years after 1913, primarily focused on extending union representation while simultaneously opposing the formation of Jim Crow locals. The author demonstrates that the fight against separate locals within the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) and the National Federation of Post Office Clerks (NFPOC) required constant pressure on the part of the Alliance and the African American rank-and-file. Although short-lived CPUSA-influenced postal unions also pressed the issue of black equality, Rubio argues that the effective influence of white leftists was a peripheral issue; the notion of a nascent black-left-labor coalition crushed by McCarthyism is misapplied to the racial struggle at the post office (76–77).

By the 1950s the postal service was a “niche” job for African Americans. Added to those college-educated African Americans from the early twentieth century were black veterans returning from WWII military service; all evinced professional aspirations not to be undone by discriminatory treatment on the job. Rubio’s work is most effective at describing the U.S. post office as a crucial theater in which both white supremacists and black postal workers tested the limits of such federal edicts as the FEPC, the Brown decision, and, later, JFK’s Executive Order 10925 banning discrimination by employers and unions involved in federal contracts. Although their victories could appear small—the pre–WWII banning of the requirement for photographs on civil service applications, for example—Rubio recovers the collective significance of these small victories.

The author cites a cadre of mostly middle-class groups responsible for these post-war successes: returning veterans; African American women, newly involved in postal work during wartime; African American men and women with college degrees and institutional involvement in the black freedom movement; and African American union members (77). One wishes that the voices of this fascinating coalition had come through more strongly in the narrative, if only to emphasize the underlying theme of agency in Rubio’s provocative thesis about postal workers as an ideological transmission belt for the black community. He does recover numerous examples of well-known African American leaders’ time with the postal service, including Heman Marion Sweatt, the plaintiff in Sweatt v. Painter, and Harold Middlebrook, an NAACP youth leader.

Rubio’s book culminates in the Great Postal Strike of 1970, the largest strike against the federal government and the largest wildcat strike in U.S. history. Beginning on March 18, 1970, in Manhattan, the strike involved 200,000 postal workers in as many as 200 cities in 13 states, at a time when a mail stoppage still had the
power to cripple American banking and industry. By March 23, President Richard Nixon declared a state of emergency and called on 22,000 troops to move the mail in New York City. Soldiers were quickly stymied by the complex system of routing and delivering mail.

Fully 88 percent of postal workers were union members by 1968 (98 percent of letter carriers), as compared with one-third of federal workers overall (234–35). Denied the right to strike as federal employees, postal workers were fed up with inadequate bargaining rights, unsafe working conditions, and most importantly, a pay scale that forced most postal workers to take second jobs or qualify for food stamps. The author demonstrates that the Great Postal Strike was most successful in those cities where white supremacy was already waning, and he cites examples of traditionally conservative white union leaders and members who credited the civil rights movement with helping to inspire the strike. Rubio concludes that “the black labor protest tradition that has been referred to as ‘civil rights unionism’ in the mid-twentieth century in fact helped fuel . . . a ‘colorblind’ spontaneous rank-and-file labor protest” in the Great Postal Strike (260).

Elizabeth P. Stewart
Renton History Museum


The American soldier as a victim is an enduring image of the Vietnam War. However, as Andrew Huebner points out, that image was in the making years before American military involvement in Vietnam. Huebner tracks the evolution of the cultural depiction of the American fighting man (the “warrior image”), his masculinity, and the effects of his combat experience during World War II and the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He demonstrates a history of cultural sympathy for the plight of the soldier, analyzing the evolution of wartime depictions from optimistic portrayals of collective efforts toward victory to realist presentations of intense personal trauma. Purveyors of war imagery such as journalists, filmmakers, novelists, and poets, “exposed the suffering of individual soldiers, GI’s attempts at overcoming their suffering, the forms that overcoming took, and increasingly the possible victimization of American troops not only by war itself but by politicians, diplomats and military leaders” (12).

During World War II, propaganda emphasized the soldier’s personal sacrifice for the sake of the collective good. Government-sponsored material emphasized military service as a means of turning boys into men, downplaying the physical, social and psychological effects of combat. However, while most wartime material reinforced this image, some called greater attention to the individual experience of the common
Utilizing archival records from the Office of War Information and the Veterans Administration (VA) in addition to numerous films and novels, his section on World War II is perhaps his strongest. One of his most fascinating sources is *Let There Be Light* (1946), a provocative VA film that addressed soldiers coping with battle fatigue which was ultimately censored by the government. Moreover, his analysis of the appropriation of World War II as a backdrop for commentaries on the Korean and Vietnam Wars is an interesting sub-theme that runs through the rest of his book.

The Korean War brought greater emphasis on the personal suffering of the individual soldier. Less stringent government censorship coupled with the ambiguous pretenses behind American involvement in Korea prompted some journalists to portray soldiers as victims of circumstance cast into a conflict that was not of their making. “The soldier in Korea,” according to Huebner, “was heroic precisely because he struggled against long odds and miserable conditions, and later in the war because he fought against a backdrop of apathy and forgetfulness in the United States” (131). The soldier’s suffering was what made him heroic in addition to his sacrifice. For example, crying soldiers, mostly absent from images of World War II, became more prominent in Korean War iconography. While he successfully establishes a foundation for later depictions of American soldiers during the Vietnam War, Huebner’s section on the Korean War could be bolstered with greater attention to how image makers dealt with returning veterans, as he does for his other sections.

Viewed in the context of Huebner’s analysis of World War II and Korea, depictions of soldiers during the Vietnam War seem less surprising, “suggesting that perhaps the difference between Vietnam-era imagery and what came before was a matter of degree more than essence” (243). As public support for the war rapidly deteriorated and graphic reports of cruelty toward civilians and enemy combatants came into American living rooms, material produced during the Vietnam War began to suggest that soldiers were the victims of a brutal military system (and, by extension, ill-conceived government policies). Far from turning boys into men, journalist accounts, films, and the rhetoric of antiwar protesters such as Vietnam Veterans Against the War posited that military service turned boys into brutal killers. Material produced during and immediately after the war poked fun at the military establishment, emphasized the horror and moral ambiguity of warfare, or called attention to the physical and psychological ramifications of combat for soldiers and their families. Ultimately, “A slow, thirty-year process had transformed soldiers who seemed better for their time in the military into ones who seemed devastated” (269; emphasis in the original).

There is much in *The Warrior Image* that scholars will find interesting. Huebner utilizes a diverse array of sources, ranging from journalists’ accounts to wartime photography to films and novels and even museum exhibits. In many cases, Huebner’s “image makers” are the veterans themselves, negotiating their military service
through print culture and public demonstrations (as with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War). He also demonstrates the contested nature of the warrior image, paying special attention to African American challenges toward public depictions of black soldiers during each war. Some of his conclusions, namely that cultural images are products of their own time, will not seem groundbreaking to students of popular culture. Nevertheless, Huebner offers a well-written, compelling analysis that will interest both scholars and general readers alike.

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Thanks to the generosity of the Byrnes Family in Memory of Joseph R. and Anne S. Byrnes, the Baltimore City Historical Society presents an annual Joseph L. Arnold Prize for Outstanding Writing on Baltimore’s History, in the amount of $500.

Joseph L. Arnold, Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, died in 2004, at the age of sixty-six. He was a vital and enormously important member of the UMBC faculty for some three and a half decades as well as a leading historian of urban and planning history. He also played an active and often leading role with a variety of private and public historical institutions in the Baltimore area and at his death was hailed as the “dean of Baltimore historians.”

Entries should be unpublished manuscripts between 15 and 45 double-spaced pages in length (including footnotes/endnotes). Entries should be submitted via email as attachments in MS Word or PC convertible format. If illustrations are included, they must be submitted along with the text in either J-peg or TIF format.

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